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Perspectives on Agriculture, Diversification,
and Gender in Rural Africa: Theoretical
and Methodological Issues
Agnes Andersson Djurfeldt, Fred Mawunyo Dzanku,
and Aida Cuthbert Isinika
Introduction
The signing of the Maputo Declaration in 2003 marked a renewed interest in
the smallholder-based model of agricultural development among a broad
range of stakeholders: domestic, regional, and global – states as well as non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), farmers’ organizations, and researchers.
This broad coalition of interests united under the banner of pro-poor agricul-
tural growth, in the conviction that small-scale farmers if given the right
policies would provide for their own food security as well as generate a
marketable surplus (Mellor 1995, Lipton 2005). The eventual outcome of
increasing smallholder productivity was perceived to be the gradual structural
transformation of African economies, as envisaged in the 2008 World Devel-
opment Report, Agriculture for Development, for instance (World Bank 2007).
Several challenges to the optimism of the smallholder-based growth model
have arisen over the past two decades, however. While at the macro level GDP
(gross domestic product) growth has been rapid and there are indeed signs of
structural transformation in a number of African economies (Fuglie 2011),
the inclusivity of growth processes can be questioned on several grounds.
Shrinking farm sizes and increasing land size inequalities within the small-
holder sector, and the emergence of middle sized farmers, are reported in
studies from several African countries (Jayne et al. 2014). Nonetheless, the
prospects for leaving the agricultural sector altogether are small, as shown by
income data that demonstrate the persistent role of agriculture in rural
livelihoods across Africa as well as the poor opportunities for diversifying into
high-return activities outside agriculture (Davis et al. 2016, McCullough
2016). To such universal tendencies can be added the gender-specific aspects
of exclusion based on norms and institutions that discriminate against
women with respect to agricultural assets, inputs, and markets (Meinzen-
Dick et al. 2014, Quisumbing et al. 2015), as well as intergenerational chal-
lenges arising from an increasingly youthful population (Losch 2012, Wiggins
et al. 2015). Finally, studies attest to growing divergence in spatial terms,
between well-connected, well-endowed places and more marginal areas
(Andersson Djurfeldt 2013, Davis et al. 2016). The confluence of these
tendencies—increasing socio-economic differentiation amid rapid economic
growth (both within and outside agriculture)—could be suggestive of gener-
ally improving livelihoods, but also growing polarization within the small-
holder sector over time.
To date, few studies have considered these tendencies longitudinally or in
parallel—in this sense agricultural livelihoods are not situated in time or
space, nor in relation to other processes such as non-farm diversification. In
practice, however, rural livelihoods are characterized by sectoral as well as
spatial linkages, while they are also imprinted by relations of gender and
generation. Moreover, the seasonality of the agricultural calendar as well as
inter-annual variations in weather and markets makes time an especially
important dimension in studies of rural Africa. This book contributes through
addressing the dynamics of intensification and diversification within and
outside agriculture in contexts where women have much poorer access to
agrarian resources than men. We use a longitudinal cross-country compara-
tive approach to consider these linkages which have so far received limited
attention in the wider literature, as well as the broader policy debates.
The book has three interrelated aims. Descriptively, the aim is to summarize
and present findings from the third wave of a unique dataset – the Afrint
dataset which follows smallholders across six countries from 2002 to 2013/15.
Theoretically, our aim is to provide nuance to the current dominance of
structural transformation narratives of agricultural change through adding
insights from gender studies as well as village-level studies of agrarian change.
Placing agrarian change in relation to broader livelihood dynamics outside the
farm sector and contextualizing them nationally and regionally is a necessary
analytical adaptation to the unfolding empirical realities of rural Africa. We
are convinced that the combination of these perspectives will enhance the
research frontier in several fields and is of interest to academics within a
number of disciplines.
Finally, the policy aim of the book is to provide suggestions for more
inclusive policies related to rural development. Outlining the weaknesses of
present policies and illustrating gendered inequalities in access to agrarian
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resources will provide opportunities for identifying possible alternatives to
existing policy.
Theoretical Perspectives
As noted initially, the period since the early 2000s has seen the resurrection
of smallholder-based approaches under the rubric of pro-poor agricultural
growth. These approaches draw inspiration from the empirical example of
the Asian Green Revolution and mark a distinct break with the neglect of
smallholder agriculture that characterized the ‘lost decades’ of the 1980s and
1990s. Such models revolve around two interconnected theoretical assump-
tions: that small-scale farmers are efficient producers and that increased
commercialization among them can encourage broad-based poverty reduc-
tion and growth. Both of these postulates are based on the dynamics of
agricultural development in parts of South and South East Asia in which
comprehensive rises in smallholder productivity in combination with
improved markets, especially for staple crops, led to falling poverty among
farmers themselves as well as landless labourers (Rosegrant and Hazell
2000, Ravallion and Datt 2002, Ravallion and Chen 2004, Djurfeldt and
Jirström 2005).
At an overarching level therefore, raising smallholder productivity, enhan-
cing commercialization, and dealing with poor producer incentives for food
staples are seen as the vehicles for achieving broad-based agricultural growth
and reducing poverty (Dorward et al. 2004, Jayne et al. 2006b, Diao et al.
2010, Jayne et al. 2010). Encouraging smallholder inclusion in agricultural
value chains at different scales is in this respect crucial. Diversification
within agriculture towards higher-value crops and a gradual movement
into the non-farm sector in this way presages a gradual exit out of agriculture
as the economy moves through the process of structural transformation.
Where access to agricultural assets is relatively equal and initial production
potential is high, rising agricultural labour productivity is more likely to
emerge, enabling family members to be pulled into non-farm activities—
pursuits which over time tend to be concentrated in urban centres (Hazell
et al. 2007).
Challenges to the Pro-Poor Growth Model
More recently, differentiation within the smallholder sector has prompted
the realization that the smallholder-based model may be inappropriate
for resource-constrained households because of their limited chances of
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commercial engagement (Masters et al. 2013, Hazell and Rahman 2014). Here
poverty reduction will not follow from commercialization or agricultural
policy—rather, social policy intervention could be a better alternative.
While proponents of pro-poor agricultural growth increasingly recognize
the practical limitations of the smallholder model in terms of reaching mar-
ginal households, three strands of criticism have also been levelled against the
theoretical bedrocks of the model.
The efficiency of small-scale producers has been questioned by advocates of
large-scale farming, who argue that modern technologies and procurement
systems have undermined the inverse relationship between productivity and
land size that underpins the notion of superior smallholder efficiency. As
such, both food security and poverty reduction are better achieved through
large-scale agriculture (Collier and Dercon 2014).
A second body of criticism relates to the poor fit of an Asian-inspired
smallholder model to African conditions. Specifically, poor infrastructure,
low initial productivity, weather-related unpredictability, and weak linkages
to urban areas and industry pose considerable challenges to the possibilities
for raising smallholder productivity in the same way it occurred in Asia
(Ellis 2007).
A final strand of critique emanates from the scholarship on agrarian class
differentiation, which questions the market optimism of the pro-poor agricul-
tural growth model. Among these researchers, the insertion of smallholders
into local and sometimes global value chains is perceived to encourage polar-
ization of assets and incomes, as accumulation among the more well-
positioned leads to the marginalization of the poor (Havnevik et al. 2007,
Bernstein 2010, Bernstein and Oya 2014).
Gender and Farm Productivity
The considerable empirical evidence of gender differences in farm productiv-
ity must be added to the theoretical admonitions raised by critics of the
smallholder model. The general conclusion in the literature is that systematic
productivity gaps exist in favour of male-headed households, with gaps in the
region of 4–40 per cent (Udry et al. 1995, Goldstein and Udry 2008, FAO 2011,
Kilic et al. 2015, Slavchevska 2015). Although some of the gaps are attributable
to unobservables, differences in farm input access and use account for
a substantial part of the gender gaps (Doss and Morris 2001, Alene et al.
2008). The received literature also shows that gender differences in product-
ivity have a spatial dimension, mainly based on agro-ecology (Udry 1996,
Oseni et al. 2015), with the gap being substantial in low agro-productive
regions where rainfall, for example, is more limiting. Whereas factors such
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as farm size and the presence of female family labour tends to narrow the
productivity gap (Slavchevska 2015), others such asmale adult labour and area
cultivated to export crops tends to widen the gap (Kilic et al. 2015).
Diversifying Within and Out of Agriculture
In theoretical terms, raising smallholder productivity constitutes the basis for
moving away from agriculture, as households diversify initially within and
eventually out of agriculture. At the macro level the outcome of these pro-
cesses is the structural transformation of the broader economy in which
agriculture gradually loses its dominance in terms of employment and value
added (Chenery and Syrquin 1975, Timmer 2009).
In practice, however, many rural livelihoods combine incomes from the
farm and non-farm sectors, mainly through rural non-farm employment
(RNFE). The rural growth linkages literature in general postulates comple-
mentarities between the farm and non-farm sectors (e.g. Haggblade et al.
1989, Delgado et al. 1994, Delgado 1998, Haggblade et al. 2007). Other
studies have explored the effect of non-farm earnings or participation on
farm productivity indirectly through its impact on farm input use (Savadogo
et al. 1994, Hertz 2009, Mathenge et al. 2015). The empirical evidence is
mixed: while some find that farm investments are increasing with non-
farm earnings or participation (Lamb 2003, Ellis and Freeman 2004, Oseni
and Winters 2009), others observe the opposite (Ahituv and Kimhi 2002,
Kilic et al. 2009, Mathenge et al. 2015), or find no significant effect
(Chikwama 2004).
The observation that there is a general decrease in farm sizes across sub-
Saharan Africa (Jayne et al. 2010, Jayne et al. 2014), while at the same time
diversification into RNFE is observed to be increasing (Haggblade et al. 2010,
Losch et al. 2012), could lead to the conclusion that the two processes may be
competitors, not counterparts. Despite these tendencies and earlier warnings
of de-agrarianization and de-peasantization stemming from the literature on
agrarian differentiation (Bryceson 2009), recent data on the importance of
agriculture to rural livelihoods show that agriculture consistently contrib-
utes around 70 per cent of household cash incomes (Jirström et al. 2011,
Davis et al. 2016, see also Chapter 2 in this volume). While engagement in
the non-farm sector is high (70 per cent participation in the nine African
countries covered by Davis et al. 2016), its relative contribution to rural
incomes is low, pointing to the continued importance of agriculture to
rural livelihoods, but also the important complementary role of non-farm
diversification.
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Gender and Non-farm Diversification
The general conclusion from the existing literature on gender and non-farm
diversification is that participation and participation impacts are not gender
blind.Whereas women tend to diversifymore into non-farm self-employment
than men, wage employment is more the domain of men than women (see
for example Newman and Canagarajah 2000 on Ghana and Uganda). Nation-
ally representative household surveys in Ghana for instance, have shown
that participation in RNFE is higher among women than men. Gender differ-
ence in rural non-farm participation could be context-specific, however. For
example, Rijkers and Costa (2012) found in their rural non-farm entrepreneur-
ship study that whereas women were less likely to be non-farm entrepreneurs
in Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka, no gender difference was found in
Ethiopia. However, since asset endowment matters for access to high-return
non-farm diversification opportunities, if asset accumulation is gendered, as
indeed it is (Deere and Doss 2006, Deere 2010, Deere et al. 2013), then one
would expect high-return non-farm opportunities to also be gendered, and
actually this is the case (Lanjouw and Feder 2001).
Although Bagachwa and Stewart (1992) have suggested that RNFE oppor-
tunities tend to be more egalitarian than large-scale industrialization, some
authors have found that the impacts of non-farm employment are not the
same for women and men. For example, in Ghana, because women are more
involved in non-farm self-employment, and because this type of RNFE tended
to be inequality-increasing, Canagarajah et al. (2001) found that non-farm
activities were inducing inequality among female-headed households rather
than male-headed households. On the other hand, wage employment tended
to increase inequality among men.
Even among women, non-farm participation probabilities differ between
women heading their own households and women living in male-headed
households. For example, being a female head of household has been found
to increase the chances of non-farm labour market participation but not
necessarily so for women in general (Canagarajah et al. 2001).
Dual Exclusion?
As can be inferred from the literature both on agricultural productivity as well
as non-farm diversification, women face a dual exclusion based on a lack of
agricultural assets, but also related to their limited access to alternative liveli-
hood sources outside agriculture. Given the well-documented institutional
bias against women with respect to ownership and control over key agricul-
tural assets, it may be tempting to conclude that the smallholder model
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excludes women a priori. Studies of intra-household relations suggest,
however that gendered segmentation of livelihoods may be complementary
rather than conflicting, with female engagement in non-farm activities sup-
plementing men’s work in agriculture (Jackson 2007, O’Laughlin 2007). Agri-
cultural livelihoods therefore need to be understood both in relation to
gendered patterns of labour use and income generation, but also in relation
to the non-farm sector. This book attempts to contribute to filling an empirical
gap in this respect using data from a longitudinal dataset collected in six
African countries.
Research Design
The present book constitutes a follow-up study to two earlier phases of the
African Agricultural Intensification (Afrint) project. The analysis relies heavily
on a quantitative dataset—collected by the Afrint group1 in eight African
countries in 2002 and 2008 (Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique,
Nigeria, Tanzania, and Zambia) and again in six of these countries in 2013/15
(Ghana (2013), Kenya (2013), Malawi (2013), Mozambique (2015), Tanzania
(2015), and Zambia (2013)). The data hence consist of two panel rounds
(2002–8 and 2008–13/15) and three cross-sections: 2002, 2008, and 2013.
Two earlier volumes have reported on Afrint I and II (Djurfeldt et al. 2005,
Djurfeldt et al. 2011).
The data used in this book cover those countries for which data are available
for all of the three rounds of data collection, that is Ghana, Kenya, Malawi,
Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia. In addition, qualitative data have been
collected intermittently during the second and third phase of the project but
with a focus on the latter.
Quantitative Data Collection
The research design is based on a multiple-stage purposive sample, with the
selection first of countries, regions second, villages third, and finally house-
holds. The original database was collected with the aim to assess the possibil-
ities for an Asian-style Green Revolution in the context of sub-Saharan Africa
(Djurfeldt et al. 2005). With this overarching objective in mind, a multi-
stage purposive design was used to select countries and at a second stage
regions that were deemed to be above average in terms of agro-ecology and
1 <http://www.keg.lu.se/en/research/research-projects/current-research-projects/afrint>.
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accessibility, but excluding the most vibrant rural economies. Within each
country, variability was used as the sampling criterion for the selection of
regions, such that each country sample contains regions that are both
dynamic and less dynamic. The interpretation of the original sampling criteria
at the country level varied somewhat—and the Malawi sample therefore
contains four regions selected on the basis of crop production characteristics,
while the Mozambique sample contains three rather than two regions.
Within each region, villages were again purposively selected and a random
sample of the village population was taken based on household lists.2 The
sample is therefore representative at the village level. The self-identified farm
manager was interviewed and data were collected for a set of household-
level variables.
Data collection has been carried out at three points in time: for Afrint I,
data were simultaneously collected in eight countries in early 2002, while
Mozambique was added in 2005. For Afrint II, data were collected in late
2007 and early 2008 in nine countries as a follow-up to the first data collection
round. For Afrint III, funding for resurveying was not available for the full
dataset, moreover the funds that were secured were erratic, leading to a
staggered data collection effort. Data were collected simultaneously in
Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, and Zambia in early 2013, but in Tanzania in early
2015, and in Mozambique not until September of 2015. In what follows we
will refer to the first round of data collection as Afrint I, the second as Afrint II,
and the third as Afrint III. The first panel period (Afrint I to Afrint II) is referred
to as Panel I and the second (Afrint II to Afrint III) is referred to as Panel II.
The dataset contains fifteen regions and fifty-six villages, the distribution of
which are detailed in Table 1.1 and Figure 1.1.
A balanced panel design has been used to take into consideration attrition as
well as changes in the village populations over time, maintaining statistical
representativity between the rounds of data collection. A balanced panel
design entails keeping the size and representativity of the cross-sections intact
by sampling households to make up for attrition. In addition, substantial
changes in the village populations between the rounds of data collection
in terms of in-migration are addressed through additional sampling of
in-migrants specifically. The dataset hence contains three groups of respond-
ents: (1) panel households sampled either in two (Panel I or Panel II) or all
three rounds of data collection (Afrint I, Afrint II, and Afrint III); (2) house-
holds sampled to make up for attrition (sampled in Afrint II or Afrint III); and
(3) migrant households that have been added to take into consideration
2 In the case of Tanzania, a stratified random sample was collected at the village level.
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changes in the composition of the village population, either for the second or
third round of data collection.
Table 1.2 provides details on sample sizes in the cross-sections and panels,
and the attrition rates between the first and second and third rounds of data
collection respectively.
Attrition was lower between Afrint II and III than in the previous period and
also more evenly distributed between the countries.3 The data collection
efforts in Tanzania were affected by the death of the partner responsible for
data collection, while in Malawi similarly, staffing issues for Afrint II explain
the high rate of attrition between rounds one and two. Here the replacement
of the partner between rounds two and three, like for Tanzania, has led to
considerably lower attrition rates. Mozambique, finally, stands out with the
highest attrition rates between Afrint II and III—the explanation is thought to
lie in a combination of the high average age of the Afrint II sample and high
levels of out-migration.
For the first panel, it was noted that attrition was biased on the basis of
gender (more female-headed households left the sample), age (a gap of nearly
twenty years was noted between those who left the sample and those who
remained), education (education was higher among the household heads who
left), and household size (average household size was smaller) as well as
poverty (households were on average poorer) (Djurfeldt et al. 2011). While
Table 1.1. Data collection regions and type, Afrint III
Region Region type Number of villages Sample size, Afrint III
Ghana Eastern Dynamic 4 249
Upper East Less dynamic 4 289
Kenya Kakamega Less dynamic 5 150
Nyeri Dynamic 5 150
Malawi Ntchisi Less dynamic 2 100
Thiwi Lifidzi Less dynamic 2 99
Bwanje Valley Dynamic 2 100
Shire Highlands Dynamic 2 103
Tanzania Morogoro Dynamic 5 202
Iringa Less dynamic 5 193
Zambia Mkushi Less dynamic 4 268
Mazabuka Dynamic 5 214
Mozambique North Less dynamic 4 176
Centre Dynamic 5 169
South Less dynamic 2 82
3 The attrition rate for Zambia between 2002 and 2008 differs from the one reported in earlier
work. The reason for this is that data entry errors excluded one entire village from the survey in
2008. This village was then included again in 2013. For Panel I and II this particular village is not
part of the sample, but for the Afrint I to III panel it is included.
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Figure 1.1 Village study sites. (Map by Maria Francisca Archila Bustos, made with Natural Earth).
attrition was lower for the second panel, it must also be noted that these
differences have largely disappeared: the share of female-headed households
was the same among those who left and those who remained in the sample, as
was the average age and level of education of the farmmanager. In addition, as
with the first panel, there was no difference in the size of cultivated area
among the household types. The number of adult household members was,
however, still much lower among the households that left the sample
(3.1 compared with 3.4, significant at the 1 per cent level), possibly suggesting
that labour was a constraining factor to production among the households
that left the sample. The poverty component of attrition meanwhile has
disappeared: the ability to save and the number of meals eaten in the lean
season were the same for both groups, possibly suggesting that households in
the second panel wave were not being pushed out of agriculture.
The Survey
The ambitions as well as the quality of the data has evolved over the project
cycles: the Afrint I data focused on production and technology related to the
major grain crops (rice, maize, sorghum, teff) and cassava, whereas the Afrint
II survey added a more detailed section on commercialization and also
collected cash income data for the first time. For the final round of data
collection, cash income data were individualized, with data being collected
separately for all adult household members. One challenge in capturing
change over time is to deal with the fact that some variables were not gathered
during the first round of data collection.
While the Afrint dataset is unique in the sense that it captures changes in
rural livelihoods over time, several caveats need to be borne inmind. First, it is
representative at the village level and as such is not nationally representative.
Table 1.2. Number of cases in cross-section and panels, and attrition Afrint I to III



















Ghana 417 569 538 359 491 311 14% 14% 25%
Kenya 300 300 300 266 272 251 11% 9% 16%
Malawi 400 398 402 305 346 268 24% 13% 33%
Tanzania 403 400 395 263 348 235 35% 13% 42%
Zambia 407 403 482 348 333 277 14% 18% 32%
Mozambique 398 403 427 286 295 224 28% 27% 44%
Total 2,325 2,473 2,544 1,827 2,085 1,566 21% 16% 33%
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Conclusions therefore cannot be drawn about general improvements in food
security, for instance. Second, we have not aimed to collect the detailed type
of production data found in agricultural surveys collected by Michigan
State University for instance, nor do the data provide the detail commonly
found in consumption surveys (such as the Demographic Health Surveys).
Rather, the dataset provides a set of broad indicators capturing changes in
production, agricultural assets, food security status, commercialization, and
incomes. Rural livelihood dynamics can therefore be traced through changes
in these variables.
The problems associated with using the household as a sampling unit must
also be acknowledged. Here, concerns can be raised based on theory (and the
associated presumption of a joint utility function) as well as methodology
(assuming that the household head has perfect information and as such can
speak on behalf of the household). From a gender perspective the data are
problematic since the food security data, for instance, do not shed light on the
well-documented phenomenon of secondary poverty and food insecurity
found among girls and women in households that prioritize the dietary
needs of boys and men (Sen 1990). The original choice to collect data at the
household level stems from budgetary as well as time constraints (neither of
which have improved over time), and for reasons of comparability the unit of
analysis has been retained since Afrint I.
For the final round of data collection, we have attempted to remedy the
shortcomings of this approach by adding data on intra-household generation
of cash income. As for Afrint III, the farm manager was asked to estimate the
size of cash income for the household as a whole but individual cash income
data were also collected for all adult household members within each house-
hold. Although the lack of individual data for Afrint II prevents outright
comparison, differences in size and composition of cash income by sex of
farm manager can be traced over time, while gender patterns of intra-
household sources of livelihoods can be described for the final round of data
collection at least.
The drawbacks of using cash income data to analyse livelihoods in contexts
where subsistence production is widespread must also be acknowledged.
Nonetheless the varied nature of production systems across regions and coun-
tries and the lack of detailed production data for roots and tubers prevent the
calculation of total household income.While cash income analysis is partial it
is also neutral in the sense that it does not disregard the contribution of non-
grain crops to household welfare. Further admonitions also relate to the extent
to which patterns of cash income generation can capture intra-household
gender relations: while intra-household income data can say something
about how women and men make their living, they say nothing about differ-
ences in consumption and expenditure based on sex. Moreover, even if
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gender-based gaps in cash income (whether within or between households)
may reflect the structural discrimination of women, to what extent such
shortfalls translate into differences in household welfare is not possible to
assess by using income data alone.
Qualitative Data Collection
The quantitative survey has been supplemented by qualitative fieldwork car-
ried out in two villages in Kenya (2007), four villages in Ghana (2011), three
villages in Malawi (2012), and six villages in Zambia (2012 and 2016). The aim
has been to shed light on intra-household aspects of livelihoods with respect
to engagement in agricultural production, technology use and decision mak-
ing, involvement in non-farm activities, and the control over proceeds gener-
ated from different sources of income.
The qualitative data collected in Kakamega in Kenya documented seaso-
nality and intra-household food consumption arrangements (Andersson
Djurfeldt and Wambugu 2011). Qualitative fieldwork was carried out in
November 2011 in four villages in Ghana in both the Eastern and Upper
East Regions. Both spouses in dual-headed households were interviewed sep-
arately, alongside women heading their own households (AnderssonDjurfeldt
et al. 2014). This method was replicated in November 2012 in three villages
in Malawi (in Thiwi Lifidzi and Ntchisi Regions) and three villages in Zambia
(in Mkushi and Mazabuka Regions), and again in another three villages in
Zambia, in 2016 (Andersson Djurfeldt and Hillbom 2016). The villages
in Zambia and Malawi were purposively sampled on the basis of the quanti-
tative data as patterns in these data suggested that they had been the sites of
pro-poor agricultural growth (Andersson Djurfeldt 2013).
For the intra-household interviews, respondents were selected from the
quantitative sample through stratifying households by cash income per
adult equivalent in each village. The households were divided into three
groups on the following basis: below average, average, and above average. In
each village, the intention was to select three households randomly within
each category, with a total sample of nine dual-headed households (covering a
total of eighteen respondents per village) in each of the six villages. The
ambition was to collect data also from three households headed by single
women in each income segment. Since these households were generally
clustered in the below average income category, and many women had also
remarried or were not possible to trace, a supplementary sample of women
heading their own households was taken.
In total around 170 interviews were carried out with individual farmers
across the ten villages in Ghana, Malawi, and Zambia. The individual
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interviews were carried out by trained research assistants—mostly masters-
level students. Individual interviews at the household level were comple-
mented with key informant interviews with the village heads (or in some
cases the sub-village heads), members of the water association, lead farmers,
members of credit groups and cooperatives, extension agents, and other staff
from the ministries of agriculture.
To triangulate further, focus group discussions were carried out with gender-
separated groups, stratified by age. The respondents in the focus groups were
not part of the individual interviews. The key informant interviews and the
focus group discussions were carried out by four senior researchers. The ana-
lysis in what follows is predominantly quantitative, however, with the quali-
tative data being used mainly to illustrate and explain the tendencies
identified in the quantitative data. In particular, Chapters 3, 4, 7, and 8 draw
on the qualitative fieldwork.
Who Are the Female-Headed Households?
The self-identified farm manager was interviewed during the survey. For the
first round of data collection, the presumption was made that this was the
same person as the household head. For the two subsequent rounds, this
presumption was shown to be wrong. In the analysis that follows, the sex of
the farmmanager is used to classify households as female- or male-headed. The
aspiration is to capture as broad a category of female household headship as
possible, including both de facto and de jure heads of household. This objective
runs the risk of merging households with quite different characteristics into a
single category, however.
For Afrint III, 734 farms—or 29 per cent—were managed by women. Out of
these 124 (17 per cent) had amale household head, and they were therefore de
facto rather than de jure female-headed households—that is there was a male
household head residing elsewhere. The use of the sex of the farm manager to
classify households by gender in this sense combines households that are
likely to be differently positioned with respect to the agrarian economy.
Access to non-farm incomes as well as male labour may be quite different
depending on whether a non-resident husband is part of the household
or not. Asset data show few differences between the two household types,
however, with two major exceptions. Land size is slightly larger among the de
facto female-headed households for Afrint III: 1.7 hectares compared with
1.4 hectares for the de jure female-headed households (significant at the
5 per cent level), and access to male labour is also higher among the former.
With respect to access to male labour, the de facto female-headed households
replicate the patterns of male-headed households rather than the de jure
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female-headed households, with half the adult labour being male in the
de facto female-headed households compared with 38 per cent for the de jure
female-headed households (significant at the 1 per cent level).
Taking a closer look at the de facto female-headed households suggests
that they are strongly concentrated to particular regions and countries with
longstanding migrant labour histories. De facto female-headed households
account for a substantial share of total female-headed households in the
Centre region (54 per cent) in Mozambique, and Nyeri (30 per cent) and
Kakamega (38 per cent), both in Kenya. Together these three regions account
for two-thirds of the de facto female-headed households. While the differ-
ences between household types must be borne in mind, in general therefore
the de facto female-headed households contribute a very minor share of the
female-headed households outside these regions. At the national and
regional levels, the sample sizes are too small to test the differences between
de facto and de jure female-headed households statistically, but where relevant
differences between the two household types will be discussed using the
full sample.
Analytical Methods and Definitions of Key
Terms Used in the Book
All chapters in the book are based on a common dataset, the Afrint dataset, but
not all authors use the datasets for the full periods. Moreover, the depth of
statistical analysis varies—some chapters rely on descriptive statistics, cover-
ing trends primarily in the cross-sectional data, whereas others use panel-level
data to model causal patterns related to the overarching topics of the book:
rural livelihoods and gender.
Aside from the dataset, a few unifying definitions should be noted. We use
the term head of household to refer to the farmmanager, hence opting for a de
facto rather than de jure use of the term. The terms landholder, farm manager,
and head of household are used interchangeably in the text to denote the de
facto head of household.
A further point of classification refers to the use of the terms diversification.
Here we use the term crop diversification to denote the broadening of crop-
ping patterns—growing additional types of crops—while agricultural diversi-
fication refers to the inclusion also of livestock-based production. Income
diversification describes the process of moving outside agriculture, and here
we opt for the sectoral use of the terms non-farm and farm, such that farm
income also includes income generated from engagement in casual farm
labour on others’ farms.
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The geographical scope of the study is the six countries covered by the project.
The discussion of findings is contextualized in relation to the broader literature
on rural livelihoods in sub-Saharan Africa. At times we refer to Africa (and
African conditions)—here the term is synonymous with sub-Saharan Africa.
Structure of the Book
Following this introductory chapter the book is divided into two parts: the first
part covers the dataset as a whole and contains Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5. The
first three of these capture dynamics in the cross-sectional data. Chapter 2
follows up on corresponding chapters in the first two volumes (Larsson 2005,
Jirström et al. 2011), describing broad trends in terms of land use, production,
agricultural technology, commercialization, and non-farm diversification.
Chapters 3 and 4 focus on gendered patterns of changes in asset ownership
on the basis of a regional perspective and commercialization dynamics,
respectively. Chapter 5 uses panel data in modelling the drivers as well as
the distributional characteristics of three key processes related to structural
transformation: intensification, commercial crop diversification out of staple
crops, and non-farm diversification.
The second part of the book contains country studies of five of the countries
covered by the quantitative dataset. Three chapters trace the role of agricul-
tural policies for rural livelihoods over time. Chapter 6 analyses the response
of the sampled farmers to input subsidies in Tanzania over time using a gender
as well as geographical perspective. The linkages between agricultural policies
aimed at intensification as well as crop diversification and their implications
for gendered patterns of production in Malawi are discussed in Chapter 7.
Finally, Chapter 8 addresses the role of price incentives versus state interven-
tions in a comparative analysis of Zambia and Malawi.
Two chapters then focus on the linkages between agricultural productivity
and non-farm incomes. Chapter 9 traces the linkages between earnings from
the non-farm sector and agricultural labour productivity in Ghana from a
gender perspective in combination with a regional contextualization. Simi-
larly, Chapter 10 analyses the impact of non-farm incomes on agricultural
investments and technology use for maize in Kenya.
Finally, Chapter 11 concludes the book by summarizing the empirical
trends found in the dataset and reflecting on their implications for theory as
well as policy.
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African Smallholder Farmers on the Move:
Farm and Non-Farm Trends for Six
Sub-Saharan African Countries, 2002–15
Magnus Jirström, Maria Francisca Archila Bustos, and Sarah Alobo Loison
Introduction
Agricultural development in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) remains high on the
global development agenda. Having predominantly agriculture-based econ-
omies, the agricultural sector’s role in the development and transformation of
the subcontinent’s economies deserves much attention in view of existing
challenges regarding food insecurity and widespread poverty. Despite encour-
aging economic growth and transformation that has brought millions out of
extreme poverty and into food security during the past fifteen years, high
levels of poverty and food insecurity continue to plague Africa. With more
than 40 per cent of its population, approximately 415 million, living in
extreme poverty and approximately a fourth being undernourished, the SSA
region faces enormous challenges (FAO 2014, ECA 2016, World Bank 2016).
Several transformational trends are currently affecting the countries of SSA
and will contribute in shaping the development of their agricultural sectors in
the coming decades. These trends include demographic change, rapid urban-
ization, and a shift in the labour force from farming to non-farm jobs. In the
same way as the more recent years of successful development and change has
varied between regions and countries in SSA, so, we may assume, will the
impacts of the mentioned trends. Acknowledging vast regional and country
differences, the broad trends mentioned can, however, be expected to bring
change affecting the whole subcontinent.
The SSA population is estimated to grow from currently more than 950
million people to approximately 2.1 billion by 2050 (OECD/FAO 2016). While
the rural share of the population is declining and estimated to reach 50 per cent
within the next ten years, the absolute number of rural people is expected to
increase for another two decades and by 2050 amount tomore than 900million
(Hazell 2013, United Nations 2014). Continued rapid population growth will
affect agriculture in several ways. As shown by Losch et al. (2012), between 2010
and 2025 some 330 million new labour market entrants need to be absorbed in
the SSA economies. The rural share of these—195million youngpeople—will be
looking for rural employment and if unsuccessful will leave the rural areas. In
many rural settings, land fragmentation and declining farm sizes are growing
phenomena and signs of growing land pressure (Jayne et al. 2014), and ques-
tions about current and future viability of minuscular farms are being raised
(Hengsdijk et al. 2014).
Urbanization represents another transforming force affecting smallholder
agriculture through several mechanisms. Urban consumers purchase much of
the food they require, thereby potentially increasing the demand for food
produced by smallholders in the rural areas. Although food imports continue
to provide a very high share of overall food supply, the increasing global
demand for food, fibre, and fuel from agriculture have made food imports a
more expensive and risky source of supply for the growing African population.
For African smallholders, this development could offer opportunities. Further-
more, urban—and increasingly also rural—people in SSA are changing diets
and consuming more high-value foods such as vegetables, fruits, milk, meat,
etc. These ongoing dietary shifts may provide opportunities for smallholders
supplying such produce.
Urbanization in SSA is mostly characterized by the rapid growth of small
and medium-sized cities. This offers opportunities for rural households to
diversify their income sources and generate some of their income directly
from urban and peri-urban activities without abandoning the rural areas. As
will be shown later in this chapter, having access to non-farm income sources
can improve smallholder household income substantially. Exiting agriculture
in SSA may, as in other parts of the world, be a gradual process and there is
currently strong interest in questions related to the improvement of oppor-
tunities for smallholders’ income diversification into non-farm income
sources (Haggblade et al. 2010, Frelat et al. 2016). Smallholders’ livelihood
diversification forms part of the overall structural transformation taking
place in SSA. Based on a sample of more than twenty-four countries in SSA,
McMillan and Harttgen (2014) estimate the share of the labour force in the
agricultural sector to have declined by approximately 10 percentage points
between 2000 and 2010.
A large share of the labour force in SSA agriculture is female. In a recent
assessment of the contribution of women to labour in crop production across
six SSA countries, Palacios-López, et al. (2016), estimate the average share at
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40 per cent. Female-managed farms (FMFs) play a significant role in SSA and
make up close to 30 per cent of the farms in the Afrint III sample. The final
section of this chapter presents data pointing at several gender gaps contrib-
uting to the challenges facing smallholder agriculture in SSA.
This chapter uses data from the three Afrint surveys described in the meth-
odology in Chapter 1. While panel data from the surveys are used in several
chapters, this chapter reports on the data from the cross-sections. For produc-
tion, the focus is set on two major SSA cereal staples—maize and rice—the
production of which are of central importance for the great majority of
households in the sample. As will be shown, the share of smallholder house-
holds completely depending on farming for their livelihoods remains high. At
the same time, for approximately half (55 per cent) of the farm households
studied, non-farm income sources provide more than half of total household
cash income. While in a cross-sectional analysis of smallholder agriculture for
the Afrint I and Afrint II periods, Jirström et al. (2011) could only identify
flickering signs of dynamism, the presentation in the following sections will
point at several important signs of dynamism, although they are clearly
heterogeneous in character.
Increasing Farm Sizes: Relatively Stable Crop Portfolios
For Afrint III, the mean and median farm size, here defined as the area under
cultivation, had increased substantially compared to the Afrint II survey
round (Table 2.1). The Afrint III mean farm size was 2.3 ha which, compared
to the Afrint II figure of 1.7 ha, represents a 36 per cent increase. The increase is
significant1 in four countries—Ghana, Tanzania, Zambia, and Mozambique—
ranging between 24 per cent to 70 per cent. These countries can be categorized
as relatively land-abundant in an African context (Jayne et al. 2014) and
we assume that farmers in these countries have brought fallow land into
production. In contrast, Kenya and Malawi, where the sampled households
report small changes in farm size between the two survey rounds, belong to
the growing number of land-constrained African countries. As shown in
Table 2.1, the Kenyan and Malawian farm households cultivate substantially
smaller farms than farmers in the other four countries.
Table 2.2 shows data for an analysis of the present household landholding
size per capita, as well as a closer look at land distribution, by dividing the
1 Statistical levels of significance are set at below 1 per cent (***), 5 per cent (**), and 10 per cent
(*), respectively, throughout the book, but extreme cases have been handled differently by the
authors and the treatment of extreme cases are discussed individually in each chapter.
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Table 2.1. Land under cultivation, ha (mean and median)
Change over time (%)
Afrint I Afrint II Afrint III Afrint I to II Sig. Afrint II to III Sig. Afrint I to III Sig.
Ghana Mean farm size (ha)a 2.41 1.99 2.84 17 *** 43 *** 18 ***
Median farm size (ha)a 2.00 1.60 2.09
No. of cases 412 565 538
Kenya Mean farm size (ha)a 0.97 0.98 1.02 1 3 5
Median farm size (ha)a 0.80 0.75 0.82
No. of cases 300 298 300
Malawi Mean farm size (ha)a 1.24 1.18 1.21 5 3 2
Median farm size (ha)a 1.01 1.01 1.00
No. of cases 387 393 388
Tanzania Mean farm size (ha)a 1.96 1.72 2.14 13 ** 24 *** 9
Median farm size (ha)a 1.60 1.40 1.62
No. of cases 399 392 390
Zambia Mean farm size (ha)a 3.01 2.64 3.55 12 ** 35 *** 18 ***
Median farm size (ha)a 2.30 2.00 2.50
No. of cases 395 397 473
Mozambique Mean farm size (ha)a 2.02 1.33 2.25 34 *** 70 *** 12 *
Median farm size (ha)a 1.50 1.00 1.75
No. of cases 381 400 424
Group total Mean farm size (ha)a 1.98 1.69 2.30 15 *** 36 *** 16 ***
Median farm size (ha)a 1.50 1.21 1.60
No. of cases 2,274 2,445 2,513
Notes: a. Cases above 25 ha removed.
Table 2.2. Landholding size per capita
Change over time (%)
Afrint I Afrint II Afrint III Afrint I–II Sig. Afrint II–III Sig. Afrint I–III Sig.
Ghana Mean farm size (ha)a per capita, total sample 0.37 0.30 0.48 18 ** 57 *** 29 ***
Means for household quartiles ranked by
farm size (ha)a
per capita by village
Q1 0.09 0.09 0.12
Q2 0.21 0.18 0.26
Q3 0.33 0.30 0.42
Q4 0.82 0.63 1.06
Kenya Mean farm size (ha)a per capita, total sample 0.20 0.14 0.21 30 *** 50 *** 6
Means for household quartiles ranked by
farm size (ha)a per capita by village
Q1 0.05 0.03 0.07
Q2 0.10 0.07 0.12
Q3 0.17 0.13 0.19
Q4 0.43 0.31 0.43
Malawi Mean farm size (ha)a per capita, total sample 0.31 0.29 0.26 5 11 * 16 ***
Means for household quartiles ranked by
farm size (ha)a per capita by village
Q1 0.12 0.12 0.09
Q2 0.21 0.21 0.17
Q3 0.31 0.30 0.25
Q4 0.57 0.53 0.52
Tanzania Mean farm size (ha)a per capita, total sample 0.39 0.36 0.50 8 40 *** 28 ***
Means for household quartiles ranked by
farm size (ha)a per capita by village
Q1 0.14 0.13 0.16
Q2 0.25 0.22 0.29
Q3 0.39 0.34 0.46
Q4 0.75 0.72 1.06
Zambia Mean farm size (ha)a per capita, total sample 0.43 0.38 0.50 10 29 *** 16 *
(continued )
Table 2.2. Continued
Change over time (%)
Afrint I Afrint II Afrint III Afrint I–II Sig. Afrint II–III Sig. Afrint I–III Sig.
Means for household quartiles ranked by
farm size (ha)a per capita by village
Q1 0.15 0.12 0.15
Q2 0.27 0.22 0.27
Q3 0.43 0.38 0.43
Q4 0.81 0.77 1.08
Mozambique Mean farm size (ha)a per capita, total sample 0.38 0.29 0.43 22 *** 48 *** 15 **
Means for household quartiles ranked by
farm size (ha)a per capita by village
Q1 0.12 0.09 0.12
Q2 0.24 0.18 0.23
Q3 0.36 0.27 0.39
Q4 0.75 0.58 0.95
Group total Mean farm size (ha)a per capita, total sample 0.35 0.30 0.41 14 *** 36 *** 17 ***
Means for household quartiles ranked by
farm size (ha)a per capita by village
Q1 0.12 0.10 0.12
Q2 0.22 0.19 0.23
Q3 0.34 0.29 0.37
Q4 0.70 0.60 0.88
No. of casesb 2,231 2,384 2,478
Notes: a. Cases above 25 ha removed. b. The number of cases in each quartile group varies as all households with the same per capita farm size are automatically placed in the same group in this
SPSS routine.
sample into quartiles ranked by per capita farm size and by village. As can be
seen, per capita access to land is very limited—in Afrint III it was 0.16 ha per
capita or less for the bottom quartile (Table 2.2). For Afrint I, the correspond-
ing figure was 0.15 ha. Under rain-fed conditions and with limited use of other
land-augmenting technologies such as adequate application of inorganic and
organic fertilizers, the small per capita farm size experienced by a quarter of
the sample is worrying. This raises the question of whether such a limited
access to farmland is sustainable, not least in light of the growth of the rural
African population which is projected to continue for another two to three
decades (Masters et al. 2013).
Differences between the four quartiles are large, with a range in Afrint III of
six to nine times more land per capita for the highest quartile compared to the
lowest one. In relation to the situation in Afrint II, the mean per capita farm
size in Afrint III was 36 per cent larger, corresponding exactly to the increase in
the mean farm size over the same period. Out of the six countries only the
Malawi sample shows falling per capita farm sizes (11 per cent). To our
surprise, the Kenya sample does not confirm the pattern of declining per
capita farm size in Kenya (Jayne et al. 2006b). Instead we find that the mean
per capita access to land of the Kenyan households has risen by 50 per cent
during the period. The explanation perhaps lies in the declining mean house-
hold size in the Kenyan sample from 7.0 in Afrint II to 6.1 persons per
household in Afrint III.
Turning to the emergence of growing land inequalities as reported in the
literature (Jayne et al. 2006a), the increasing difference in per capita farm size
between the bottom and the top 25 per cent of the three Afrint samples also
points in the direction of gradually growing land inequality, although the
change seemsmoderate in the Afrint villages. For Afrint I, the per capita access
to land for the bottom 25 per cent was 0.12 ha per capita and this was also the
per capita size in 2013. However, the top 25 per cent expanded from amean of
0.70 ha to 0.88 ha per capita. As a consequence, the gap between the
two extreme groups has increased—in Afrint I the top quartile accessed
6.0 times as much land as the bottom quartile while in Afrint III they accessed
7.3 times as much land (see Table 2.2).
Shifting attention to land use and crop portfolios, the increase in total
cultivated area between Afrint II and Afrint III corresponds to the general
increase in the cultivated area of the five different categories of crops studied
(Table 2.3). For Afrint III, 92 per cent of all households grew maize and the
crop remained the most important crop in terms of land allocation, with an
average of a little over 1 ha. Both the share of households growing maize and
the maize area have increased since Afrint II.
Approximately a quarter of all households grow rice, a share which
remained stable over the study period. Also in the case of rice, there has
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Table 2.3. Land under cultivation (total and per crop) and share of households cultivating by type of crop
Change over time (%)a
Afrint I Afrint II Afrint III Afrint I– II Sig. Afrint II–III Sig. Afrint I–III Sig.
Maize Mean crop area (ha)b 0.80 0.81 1.08 1 32 *** 34 ***
Median crop area (ha)b 0.50 0.60 0.80
Households cultivating (%) 84 86 92 2 ** 6 *** 8 ***
No. of cases 1,951 2,136 2,348
Sorghum Mean crop area (ha)b 0.73 0.67 0.81 8 * 21 *** 11
Median crop area (ha)b 0.50 0.50 0.50
Households cultivating (%) 21 20 16 1 4 *** 5 ***
No. of cases 487 495 409
Rice Mean crop area (ha)b 0.70 0.65 0.83 8 29 *** 18 ***
Median crop area (ha)b 0.50 0.40 0.60
Households cultivating (%) 22 23 24 1 1 2 *
No. of cases 508 570 614
Other food crops Mean crop area (ha)b 0.56 0.51 0.79 9 55 ** 42 ***
Median crop area (ha)b 0.40 0.30 0.40
Households cultivating (%) 84 79 90 5 *** 11 *** 6 ***
No. of cases 1,943 1,954 2,291
Non-food crops Mean crop area (ha)b 0.79 0.77 0.88 2 14 12
Median crop area (ha)b 0.40 0.40 0.48
Households cultivating (%) 34 23 32 11 *** 9 *** 2
No. of cases 795 579 817
Total Mean crop area (ha)b 1.98 1.69 2.30 15 *** 36 *** 16 ***
Median crop area (ha)b 1.50 1.21 1.60
Households cultivating (%) 100 100 100 n.a. n.a. n.a.
No. of cases 2,325 2,473 2,544
Note: a. Change in percentage of households cultivating is absolute not percentage change.
b. Cases above 25 ha removed.
been a significant increase, 29 per cent, in mean hectarage. Sorghum growers
also allocate more land to the crop, but the share of farmers growing the crop
has dropped. Between Afrint II and Afrint III, the share dropped from 20 per
cent to 16 per cent of the sample.
The single biggest increase in cropped area pertains to the category ‘other
food crops’, which includes all food crops but maize, sorghum, and rice.2 Land
allocated to this category grew by 55 per cent between Afrint II and Afrint III,
and also the proportion of households growing such crops grew from 79 per
cent to 90 per cent. The category includes high-value crops including veget-
ables and fruits, and the increase in the cultivation of such crops can be seen as
a strategy among farm households to increase the value of output per hectare.
The non-food crop category, including cash crops such as coffee, tobacco, tea,
and sugarcane, engages approximately a third of the sample, up from a little
less than a quarter in Afrint II.
The aggregates for the six countries presented here will be explored in more
detail at the country level in the subsequent sections on production and
productivity for the two staples, maize and rice. We focus on these staple
crops because of their strategic importance for African agriculture. The
demand for food staples is growing rapidly and there is a potential for farmers
in Africa to capture a large share of this growth (Hazell and Poulton 2007).
Apart from contributing to growth and poverty reduction in itself, an increase
in the productivity of staples can ‘release land, water and labour for the
production of other cash and export crops’ (Hazell and Poulton 2007: 3). For
African smallholders who are often net buyers of staple foods, increasing
productivity in staple crop production can reduce poverty and increase food
security.
Production and Area Productivity
Maize
Maize is the most widely grown staple food crop in SSA. It accounts for 30 per
cent of cereal production area and about 40 per cent of cereal production
(Hazell and Poulton 2007, Cairns et al. 2013). Since the early 1960s, growth in
maize production has been driven mainly by area expansion, while yield
growth explains only a third of the average annual growth rate of 3 per cent
for the period 1961–2008 (Smale et al. 2011). However, maize yields in SSA
2 In the Afrint III survey, cassava was included in the category ‘other food crops’, whereas in
Afrint I and Afrint II it was not. This was due to the uncertainties and problems encountered when
collecting data on cassava production in the Afrint I and II surveys. It is assumed that this change
has contributed to the increasing area under ‘other food crops’.
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Table 2.4. Maize production (t/farm) and cultivated area (ha)
Change over time (%)a
Afrint I Afrint II Afrint III Afrint I–II Sig. Afrint II–III Sig. Afrint I–III Sig.
Ghana Proportion of farmers growing maize (%)b 43 53 71 10 *** 18 *** 28 ***
Mean area under maize (ha), 3-season averagec 1.08 0.63 1.11 42 *** 76 *** 3
Mean maize production (t/farm), 3-season averaged 0.89 0.61 0.85 32 *** 40 *** 4
Median maize production (t/farm), 3-season averaged 0.63 0.37 0.50
No. of cases 179 301 382
Kenya Proportion of farmers growing maize (%)b 74 59 85 15 *** 26 *** 11 ***
Mean area under maize (ha), 3-season averagec 0.52 0.61 0.51 16 15 ** 2
Mean maize production (t/farm), 3-season averaged 1.19 1.08 0.68 9 37 *** 43 ***
Median maize production (t/farm), 3-season averaged 0.42 0.45 0.33
No. of cases 222 176 255
Malawi Proportion of farmers growing maize (%)b 94 94 93 0 1 1
Mean area under maize (ha), 3-season averagec 0.30 0.74 0.84 144 *** 13 * 176 ***
Mean maize production (t/farm), 3-season averaged 0.70 0.83 0.89 19 *** 7 27 ***
Median maize production (t/farm), 3-season averaged 0.53 0.53 0.62
No. of cases 376 376 375
Tanzania Proportion of farmers growing maize (%)b 82 82 82 0 0 0
Mean area under maize (ha), 3-season averagec 1.06 0.90 0.88 15 ** 3 17 ***
Mean maize production (t/farm), 3-season averaged 0.98 1.18 1.29 20 ** 9 31 ***
Median maize production (t/farm), 3-season averaged 0.63 0.70 0.84
No. of cases 332 328 324
Zambia Proportion of farmers growing maize (%)b 77 83 88 6 ** 4 * 11 ***
Mean area under maize (ha), 3-season averagec 1.36 1.30 1.71 4 32 *** 26 ***
Mean maize production (t/farm), 3-season averaged 1.58 2.13 3.37 34 *** 58 *** 113 ***
Median maize production (t/farm), 3-season averaged 0.90 1.17 1.93
No. of cases 313 336 423
Mozambique Proportion of farmers growing maize (%)b 79 63 78 15 *** 15 *** 0
Mean area under maize (ha), 3-season averagec 0.95 0.71 1.17 25 *** 64 *** 23 ***
Mean maize production (t/farm), 3-season averaged 0.48 0.50 0.92 5 83 *** 93 ***
Median maize production (t/farm), 3-season averaged 0.35 0.35 0.50
No. of cases 313 255 334
Total Proportion of farmers growing maize (%)b 75 72 82 3 ** 11 *** 8 ***
Mean area under maize (ha), 3-season averagec 0.86 0.84 1.09 3 29 *** 26 ***
Mean maize production (t/farm), 3-season averaged 0.95 1.08 1.43 13 ** 32 *** 50 ***
Median maize production (t/farm), 3-season averaged 0.55 0.60 0.73
No. of cases 1,735 1,772 2,093
Notes:
a. Change in proportion of households growing maize is absolute not percentage change.
b. Based on a sub-sample including maize growers who cultivated an average of at least 0.1 ha. The sample also excludes cases with a sixfold or higher yield increase between consecutive Afrint
rounds.
c. Average of area under maize during the last growing season at the time of data collection and the two previous growing seasons before that one. Extreme values removed at the dataset level for
each year.
d. Average of maize production during the last growing season at the time of data collection and the two previous growing seasons before that one. Extreme values removed based on average
area criteria.
Table 2.5. Maize yields
Change over time (%)e
Afrint I Afrint II Afrint III Afrint I–II Sig. Afrint II–III Sig. Afrint I–III Sig.
Ghana Mean maize yield (t/ha),a 3-season averageb 1.09 1.01 0.84 7 17 *** 23 ***
Median maize yield (t/ha),a 3-season averageb 0.75 0.95 0.67
No. of cases 175 300 382
20% best-performing farmers’ mean yield (t/ha) maizec 2.54 1.84 1.71 28 ** 7 33 ***
5% best-performing farmers’ mean yield (t/ha) maizec 4.14 2.72 2.42 34 * 11 41 **
Average yield gap,d compared to 20% best-performing farmers 57 42 44 15 *** 2 13 ***
Average yield gap,d compared to 5% best-performing farmers 74 59 56 16 *** 2 18 ***
Kenya Mean maize yield (t/ha),a 3-season averageb 1.70 1.50 1.25 12 17 ** 26 ***
Median maize yield (t/ha),a 3-season averageb 1.05 1.20 0.90
No. of cases 220 176 255
20% best-performing farmers’ mean yield (t/ha) maizec 3.46 2.79 2.59 19 7 25 **
5% best-performing farmers’ mean yield (t/ha) maizec 4.51 3.62 3.43 20 5 24
Average yield gap,d compared to 20% best-performing farmers 52 47 52 5 5 0
Average yield gap,d compared to 5% best-performing farmers 64 58 61 5 * 2 3
Malawi Mean maize yield (t/ha),a 3-season averageb 2.22 1.17 1.16 47 *** 1 48 ***
Median maize yield (t/ha),a 3-season averageb 1.96 0.99 0.92
No. of cases 374 376 372
20% best-performing farmers’ mean yield (t/ha) maizec 4.11 2.19 2.33 47 *** 6 43 ***
5% best-performing farmers’ mean yield (t/ha) maizec 5.11 2.88 3.27 44 *** 13 36 ***
Average yield gap,d compared to 20% best-performing farmers 45 44 51 1 7 ** 6 **
Average yield gap,d compared to 5% best-performing farmers 56 57 62 1 5 ** 6 ***
Tanzania Mean maize yield (t/ha),a 3-season averageb 0.97 1.33 1.46 37 *** 10 * 51 ***
Median maize yield (t/ha),a 3-season averageb 0.79 1.10 1.15
No. of cases 332 322 323
20% best-performing farmers’ mean yield (t/ha) maizec 1.85 2.59 2.83 40 *** 9 53 ***
5% best-performing farmers’ mean yield (t/ha) maizec 2.57 3.30 3.58 28 ** 8 39 ***
Average yield gap,d compared to 20% best-performing farmers 47 49 51 2 2 4
Average yield gap,d compared to 5% best-performing farmers 61 60 61 1 1 0
Zambia Mean maize yield (t/ha),a 3-season averageb 1.14 1.47 1.82 29 *** 24 *** 59 ***
Median maize yield (t/ha),a 3-season averageb 1.00 1.31 1.61
No. of cases 310 336 423
20% best-performing farmers’ mean yield (t/ha) maizec 2.09 2.72 3.30 30 *** 21 *** 58 ***
5% best-performing farmers’ mean yield (t/ha) maizec 2.72 3.39 4.28 24 *** 26 *** 57 ***
Average yield gap,d compared to 20% best-performing farmers 45 47 45 2 2 0
Average yield gap,d compared to 5% best-performing farmers 57 57 58 0 1 0
Mozambique Mean maize yield (t/ha),a 3-season averageb 0.53 0.83 0.89 58 *** 6 68 ***
Median maize yield (t/ha),a 3-season averageb 0.46 0.67 0.62
No. of cases 313 254 331
20% best-performing farmers’ mean yield (t/ha) maizec 1.04 1.69 2.09 63 *** 24 ** 102 ***
5% best-performing farmers’ mean yield (t/ha) maizec 1.45 2.39 3.31 65 *** 38 ** 128 ***
Average yield gap,d compared to 20% best-performing farmers 49 51 56 2 5 8 **
Average yield gap,d compared to 5% best-performing farmers 63 64 69 1 5 6 **
Total Mean maize yield (t/ha),a 3-season averageb 1.30 1.21 1.25 6 ** 3 4
Median maize yield (t/ha),a 3-season averageb 0.94 1.01 0.94
No. of cases 1,724 1,764 2,086
20% best-performing farmers’ mean yield (t/ha) maizec 2.49 2.29 2.49 8 * 9 ** 0
5% best-performing farmers’ mean yield (t/ha) maizec 3.36 3.02 3.39 10 12 ** 1
Average yield gap,d compared to 20% best-performing farmers 48 47 49 2 3 ** 1
Average yield gap,d compared to 5% best-performing farmers 61 59 61 3 ** 2 ** 1
Notes:
a. Based on a sub-sample including maize growers who cultivated an average of at least 0.1 ha. The sample also excludes cases with a sixfold or higher yield increase between consecutive Afrint
rounds.
b. Average of maize yield during the last growing season at the time of data collection and the two previous growing seasons before that one.
c. Based on village aggregates.
d. The yield gap is calculated as the difference between the household’s 3-season average yield and the average of the best-performing farmers in the village.
e. Change in average yield gap is absolute not percentage change.
remain far behind the global average, and at around 1.8 t/ha only reach a third
of the global mean maize yield of around 5.5 t/ha (CIMMYT 2016, USDA
2016). The mentioned average maize yield of 1.8 t/ha stems from Food and
Agricultural Organization (FAO) data. Serious criticism of the quality of the
national agricultural statistics in SSA on which the FAO data build, has been
levelled (Carletto et al. 2014). The farm household survey data on which our
figures build also point at significant discrepancies in comparison with the
FAO data. When making comparison with national-level data this should be
kept in mind.
The three-season average production per farm in our sample of six countries
increased substantially from 1.08 t per farm in Afrint II to 1.43 t in Afrint III
(Table 2.4). The overall growth in production of 32 per cent is largely the result
of an increase in the maize area which grew by 29 per cent during the period.
The level of median production volume, 0.60 t in Afrint II and 0.73 t in Afrint
III, indicates that, in spite of substantial growth, there is not much, if any-
thing, to market for many households considering that maize is an important
food for most households. Except in Zambia where themaize area is larger, the
median total production is in the range of 0.33 t to 0.84 t.
The overall mean yield of maize for the entire sample of maize growers of
1.25 t/ha for Afrint III does not indicate any significant change in yields since
Afrint I (1.30 t/ha) or Afrint II (1.21 t/ha) (Table 2.5). Variation in production
and productivity among the six countries is substantial. In Ghana, Mozam-
bique, and Zambia the mean maize area, mean production, and share of
households growing maize increased substantially between Afrint II and
Afrint III (Table 2.4).
In Zambia, the mean maize yield increased by 24 per cent between Afrint II
and III, a positive change which is close to the national increase of 22 per cent
for the same period (FAO 2016). For Mozambique, change during the period
was not statistically significant, while for Ghana area expansion outpaced
production increase to the extent that the three-year average yield of 0.86 t/
ha for the Afrint III period represents a decrease of 17 per cent compared to the
Afrint II level. Also, national figures for Ghana show that the average maize
yields are among the lowest in the world and remain much lower than the
average for SSA (Ragasa et al. 2014). As shown by Dzanku and Sarpong (2014),
regional differences in the Ghana sample are substantial, with farmers in the
four villages situated in the Eastern Region achieving yields approximately
twice as high as those in the Upper East Region in the northern and more arid
parts of the country.
In Kenya, the proportion of households planting maize in the Afrint III
sample had increased since Afrint II. However, the mean maize area decreased
by 15 per cent and the production fell evenmore (37 per cent) and, thus, the
mean maize yield declined by 17 per cent from 1.5 t/ha to 1.25 t/ha in our
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study regions between Afrint II and III. At a national level, yields have
remained steady, at around 1.5 t/ha over the period of our study, setting
Kenya, together with Tanzania, apart from neighbouring Eastern African
countries such as Ethiopia, Uganda, and Malawi where maize yields have
risen since 2003 (Aylward et al. 2015).
In Tanzania and Malawi, change between Afrint II and Afrint III has been
limited and is not statistically significant. For Tanzania, the mean yield of
1.46 t/ha in Afrint III is close to the national level of 1.38 t/ha for 2012–14
and, as in our sample, the change in mean yields since 2006–8 has
been marginal (FAO 2016, FAOSTAT). In the case of Malawi, the sampled
households reported maize yields only about half the level of the national
three-year mean yields of approximately 2.2 t/ha for the Afrint III period.
A possible explanation for this difference may relate to the sampling criteria
for the Malawi sample, where maize was the major crop only in some of
the villages.
As previously indicated, averagemaize yields in SSA are low by international
comparison. This is true also in comparison to most other tropical regions
where maize is grown under rain-fed conditions. But yield variability also sets
SSA apart. According to Byerlee and Heisey (1997), yield variability is almost
always higher in SSA countries than in other developing countries with similar
mean yields. While climatic factors such as major regional droughts are
important explanations, price variability and government policies as well as
interventions can be assumed to play a role as well. Yield variability does,
however, not only occur between countries and regions. As shown in
Table 2.5, differences in maize yields at the village level are significant. The
six-country three-season average for Afrint III shows that the yield gap at the
village level is substantial. The best-performing 20 per cent of farmers in each
village achieve, on average, the double maize yield compared to each individ-
ual farmer in the village. When comparing each farmer’s yield with the 5 per
cent best-performing farmers’ yield, the gap widens and reaches around 60 per
cent. In a subsequent section, we will return to the yield gap discussion in
more detail. First, we turn to the second most important cereal among the
Afrint farm households, namely rice.
Rice
The importance of rice is growing rapidly in SSA, and demand is growingmore
rapidly than in any other continent (Nasrin et al. 2015). Although production
increased at an annual rate of 3.3 per cent over the period 1970–2009, the gap
between consumption and production widened as consumption grew by an
annual rate of 4 per cent and thus outpaced production. In 2009, 37 per cent
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Table 2.6. Rice production (t/farm) and cultivated area (ha)
Change over time (%)a
Afrint I Afrint II Afrint III Afrint I–II Sig. Afrint II–III Sig. Afrint I–III Sig.
Ghana Proportion of farmers growing rice (%)b 40 29 33 11 *** 4 7 **
Mean area under rice (ha), 3-season averagec 0.66 0.59 0.87 10 46 *** 32 **
Mean rice production (t/farm), 3-season averaged 0.51 0.30 0.88 41 *** 194 *** 72 ***
Median rice production (t/farm), 3-season averaged 0.35 0.17 0.35
No. of cases 165 163 177
Malawi Proportion of farmers growing rice (%)b 31 25 26 6 ** 1 5 *
Mean area under rice (ha), 3-season averagec 0.44 0.48 0.54 10 13 24 **
Mean rice production (t/farm), 3-season averaged 0.76 1.07 0.91 40 *** 15 19
Median rice production (t/farm), 3-season averaged 0.66 0.97 0.67
No. of cases 93 74 77
Tanzania Proportion of farmers growing rice (%)b 44 43 42 1 1 2
Mean area under rice (ha), 3-season averagec 0.99 0.97 1.13 2 16 ** 13 *
Mean rice production (t/farm), 3-season averaged 1.51 1.89 2.65 25 ** 41 *** 75 ***
Median rice production (t/farm), 3-season averaged 1.17 1.37 2.09
No. of cases 176 171 170
Zambia Proportion of farmers growing rice (%)b 1 0 0 1 0 1
Mean area under rice (ha), 3-season averagec 0.32 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Mean rice production (t/farm), 3-season averaged 0.23 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Median rice production (t/farm), 3-season averaged 0.23 n.a. n.a.
No. of cases 4 0 0
Mozambique Proportion of farmers growing rice (%)b 11 15 24 4 9 *** 13 ***
Mean area under rice (ha), 3-season averagec 0.41 0.29 0.59 29 *** 103 *** 45 ***
Mean rice production (t/farm), 3-season averaged 0.14 0.23 0.22 63 ** 5 55 **
Median rice production (t/farm), 3-season averaged 0.10 0.15 0.16
No. of cases 44 60 103
Group total Proportion of farmers growing rice (%)b 21 19 21 2 2 0
Mean area under rice (ha), 3-season averagec 0.71 0.67 0.85 5 26 *** 19 ***
Mean rice production (t/farm), 3-season averaged 0.89 0.99 1.33 11 34 *** 49 ***
Median rice production (t/farm), 3-season averaged 0.56 0.50 0.53
No. of cases 482 468 527
Notes: a. Change in proportion of households growing rice is absolute not percentage change.
b. Based on a sub-sample including rice growers who cultivated an average of at least 0.1 ha. The sample also excludes cases with a sixfold or higher yield increase between consecutive Afrint
rounds.
c. Average of area under rice during the last growing season at the time of data collection and the two previous growing seasons before that one, extreme values removed at the dataset level for
each year.
d. Average of rice production during the last growing season at the time of data collection and the two previous growing seasons before that one, extreme values removed based on average area
criteria.
of consumption was imported and SSA has become a major importer of rice
with almost a third, 11.8 million tons, of rice traded globally (Nasrin et al.
2015). Rice is now the second largest source of food in SSA and since the turn
of the century has gradually come close to maize as a provider of food calories
in the subcontinent. The growing popularity and consumption of rice can be
traced to a combination of population growth, urbanization and urban
growth, and changing diets.
Approximately a fifth of the Afrint sample cultivate rice, the share of which
has been stable since Afrint I (Table 2.6). Out of the six countries, two—Kenya
and Zambia—lacked households growing rice during the Afrint III period.
Among the remaining four, Ghana and Tanzania together accounted for
more than 70 per cent of the 527 rice-farming households during the Afrint
III period. In the two countries, there has been a significant increase in the
mean cultivated rice area, mean farm production, and mean yields over
the three-season periods of Afrint II and Afrint III (Tables 2.6 and 2.7). The
recorded growth tallies well with the national-level data for the two periods
(FAO 2016, FAOSTAT). Data on milled rice consumption per capita for Ghana
and Tanzania show a very rapid increase between 1982 and 2012 (Nasrin et al.
2015), and it can be assumed that the strong growth in demand for rice
contributes to the substantial increases in production and productivity
among the surveyed farms in Ghana and Tanzania.
In the Mozambique sample, the share of households growing rice increased
from 15 per cent to 24 per cent between Afrint II and Afrint III. The area under
rice approximately doubled from 0.29 ha to 0.59 ha per farm but production
remained at around 0.22 t/farm. Consequently, the mean three-season rice
yield fell from 0.90 t/ha in the Afrint II period to 0.52 t/ha in the Afrint III
period. FAO data indicate a similar situation at the national level, with a
dramatic increase in the national rice hectarage accompanied by a sharp fall
in the average national rice yield during the period (FAO 2016, FAOSTAT). In
Malawi, finally, the fifth of the surveyed households cultivating rice saw their
yields declining by, on average, 19 per cent, from 2.25 t/ha to 1.81 t/ha, during
the period. National data point at stable rice production and productivity for
the period (FAO 2016, FAOSTAT).
Yield Gaps
One out of several ways to conceptualize the term yield gap is to view it as the
differences between the average crop yield (area productivity) achieved by
farmers and what is achievable using more optimal cultivars, inputs, and
other management practices. The level of productivity in staple crop
Agriculture, Diversification, and Gender in Rural Africa
34
production across countries in SSA is generally far below that of developing
countries in other regions. While this situation has been observed for many
years, more recently attention has also been drawn to the large differences in
crop yields achieved within the subcontinent. Yield gaps in sub-Saharan
Africa are large, among the largest globally, and particularly so in the case
of maize (Mueller and Binder 2015). Tittonell and Giller (2013) estimate
current yield gaps for major food crops in Africa, and conclude that yield
gaps for almost all crops in all regions remain wide and are likely to increase
if soil degradation continues.
One reason for the surging focus on yield gaps relates to the growing
awareness that yield growth in already cultivated areas of the world needs to
increase at a fast rate in order for global food production to keep pace with
demand. Demand is expected to grow substantially in the coming years due to
a combination of population and income growth. The realization that yield
growth has begun to stagnate in many areas in both developed and develop-
ing countries explains the growing research interest in agricultural intensifi-
cation and, as a part of this complex, in the analysis of existing yield gaps
(Beddow et al. 2014, FAO and DWFI 2015). Narrowing yield gaps in SSAmight
also contribute to the post-2015 global Sustainable Development Goals of
ending hunger and achieving food security by 2030.
The Afrint data on yields for the two staple crops, maize and rice, concur
with the observations about large yield gaps in SSA. In order to get an indica-
tion of what is achievable under local conditions, we have defined the attain-
able yield as the mean yield of the 20 per cent best-performing farmers per
crop and village (outliers excluded). The average difference between that level
and each individual farmer’s yield we label the yield gap. Unlike the more
common use of the term, we do not refer to the difference between the actual
and the agronomic yield potential of the crop (FAO and DWFI 2015). Rather
we use the concept yield gap to capture the difference between what is already
the attainable yield under local conditions and realities—bio-physical as well
as socio-economic—and what is the actual yield for each farmer in the village.
This, we think, gives a clear indication of the potential for improvement of
yields at the local level.
The aggregates based on village means of the top 20 per cent farms with the
highest yields for the three staple cereals are presented in Tables 2.5 and 2.7.
As shown, the gaps are substantial in Afrint III—49 per cent for maize and 46
per cent for rice. The percentages indicate the discrepancy between the village
attainable yield and the yield of the farmers in the village. For maize, the data
for Afrint III show that the top 20 per cent of farms attained yields on average
two times higher than the individual farmers’ yield. Comparing the situation
over the three different time periods, we observe no marked change. The gaps
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Table 2.7. Rice yields (ton/ha)
Change over time (%)e
Afrint I Afrint II Afrint III Afrint I–II Sig. Afrint II–III Sig. Afrint I–III Sig.
Ghana Mean rice yield (t/ha),a 3-season averageb 0.98 0.48 0.88 51 *** 81 *** 11
Median rice yield (t/ha),a 3-season averageb 0.76 0.35 0.62
No. of cases 164 163 177
20% best-performing farmers’mean yield (t/ha) ricec 2.03 0.90 1.61 56 *** 79 *** 20 ***
5% best-performing farmers’ mean yield (t/ha) ricec 2.64 1.15 1.97 56 ** 71 ** 26
Average yield gap,d compared to 20% best-
performing farmers
50 46 44 4 2 6
Average yield gap,d compared to 5% best-
performing farmers
61 60 57 1 3 4
Malawi Mean rice yield (t/ha),a 3-season averageb 1.79 2.25 1.81 26 ** 19 ** 1
Median rice yield (t/ha),a 3-season averageb 1.57 2.26 1.56
No. of cases 93 74 77
20% best-performing farmers’mean yield (t/ha) ricec 3.28 3.53 3.62 8 *** 2 10 ***
5% best-performing farmers’ mean yield (t/ha) ricec 4.19 3.63 4.86 13 34 16
Average yield gap,d compared to 20% best-
performing farmers
48 49 55 1 6 7
Average yield gap,d compared to 5% best-
performing farmers
63 59 65 3 6 3
Tanzania Mean rice yield (t/ha),a 3-season averageb 1.52 1.95 2.24 28 *** 15 ** 47 ***
Median rice yield (t/ha),a 3-season averageb 1.45 1.61 2.09
No. of cases 176 171 170
20% best-performing farmers’mean yield (t/ha) ricec 2.58 3.31 3.55 28 *** 7 37 ***
5% best-performing farmers’ mean yield (t/ha) ricec 3.08 4.00 4.61 30 15 50 ***
Average yield gap,d compared to 20% best-
performing farmers
42 40 37 3 3 5
Average yield gap,d compared to 5% best-
performing farmers
54 52 52 2 0 2
Zambia Mean rice yield (t/ha),a 3-season averageb 0.47 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Median rice yield (t/ha),a 3-season averageb 0.40 n.a. n.a.
No. of cases 4 0 0
20% best-performing farmers’mean yield (t/ha) ricec 0.77 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
5% best-performing farmers’ mean yield (t/ha) ricec 0.77 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Average yield gap,d compared to 20% best-
performing farmers
34 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Average yield gap,d compared to 5% best-
performing farmers
34 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Mozambique Mean rice yield (t/ha),a 3-season averageb 0.39 0.90 0.52 134 *** 42 *** 36
Median rice yield (t/ha),a 3-season averageb 0.25 0.63 0.33
No. of cases 43 60 103
20% best-performing farmers’mean yield (t/ha) ricec 0.76 1.90 1.20 150 *** 37 * 58 ***
5% best-performing farmers’ mean yield (t/ha) ricec 0.72 2.61 1.59 262 *** 39 121 **
Average yield gap,d compared to 20% best-
performing farmers
49 49 56 0 6 7
Average yield gap,d compared to 5% best-
performing farmers
57 60 64 3 4 7
Total Mean rice yield (t/ha),a 3-season averageb 1.28 1.35 1.38 5 2 8
Median rice yield (t/ha),a 3-season averageb 1.06 0.97 1.05
No. of cases 480 466 525
20% best-performing farmers’mean yield (t/ha) ricec 2.30 2.37 2.42 3 *** 2 5 ***
5% best-performing farmers’ mean yield (t/ha) ricec 2.60 2.78 2.87 7 3 10
Average yield gap,d compared to 20% best-
performing farmers
47 45 46 2 1 1
Average yield gap,d compared to 5% best-
performing farmers
58 57 58 1 1 0
Notes: a. Based on a sub-sample including rice growers who cultivated an average of at least 0.1 ha. The sample also excludes cases with a sixfold or higher yield increase between consecutive
Afrint rounds.
b. Average of rice yield during the last growing season at the time of data collection and the two previous growing seasons before that one.
c. Based on village aggregates.
d. The yield gap is calculated as the difference between the household’s 3-season average yield and the average of the best-performing farmers in the village.
e. Change in average yield gap is absolute not percentage change.
are within the range of 47 per cent to 49 per cent for maize and 45 per cent to
47 per cent for rice.3
One argument in favour of a stronger focus on yield gaps relates to poverty
reduction, and suggests that by closing or reducing yield gaps, poor farmers
trapped in low-productivity farming would benefit. As shown by Dzanku et al.
(2015), drawing on Afrint panel data for twenty-one regions in eight SSA
countries, poverty gaps do increase as yield gaps grow. Whether investment
made to close such gaps would be the most efficient way to reduce poverty
among African smallholders remains, however, uncertain. The same question
also seems relevant when addressing another and related argument, namely
that, by closing yield gaps, food security would improve for smallholders,
particularly among subsistence farmers. As discussed in a comprehensive
analysis of more than 13,000 small farms in seventeen SSA countries,4 a
strategy to improve market access and to increase off-farm opportunities
would be more efficient in improving food security than a focus on agricul-
tural production and closing yield gaps (Frelat et al. 2016). Among the several
possible factors explaining yield gaps, the use of productivity-increasing tech-
nologies is often emphasized. Among these, the use of improved seed varieties
and fertilizers receive a lot of attention. In the following section, the focus is
set on these technologies.
Technology Adoption
Sustainable intensification has become a lead concept in agricultural develop-
ment generally, and specifically in the discussion of agricultural development
in SSA. Although area expansion will remain important for increased food
production for several decades to come, it is broadly recognized that there is
an urgent need for strategies targeting sustainable intensification of already
cultivated land. This recognition is partly the result of two current and simul-
taneous trends, namely the growing land pressures in many countries and
regions within countries and the unsustainability of current low-productivity
agriculture which is based on nutrient mining, causing different forms of land
degradation and stagnating yields.
3 If comparing each farmer’s yield with the 5 per cent top-yielding farms the yield gaps increase
to between 59 per cent to 61 per cent for maize and 57 per cent to 58 per cent for rice. Because the
Afrint village samples contain between thirty and fifty farms, a 5 per cent subsample will contain
one to three farms only and the statistical error could be high, so we prefer to use the 20 per cent
level when analysing the village sample yield gaps; however, we provide the 5 per cent values here
to maintain comparability with previous publications.
4 The Afrint dataset forms part of data used in the study.
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It is in this context that new technology and technology adoption becomes
particularly important in an SSA perspective. Globally, the introduction of
new productivity-increasing technologies has been central for agricultural
development during the past half century. Large parts of tropical and sub-
tropical Asia and Latin America benefited tremendously from intensification
processes popularly referred to as the Green Revolution (Djurfeldt and Jirström
2005). During the same period, development and diffusion of new technolo-
gies in Africa generally lagged behind, although there are several well-
documented examples of productivity spurts sharing several features with
those of the Green Revolution (Holmén 2005). Adoption rates are therefore
currently lower in SSA than in countries in Asia and Latin America; neverthe-
less, many African smallholders are familiar with, for example, new seed and
fertilizer technologies (Sheahan and Barrett 2014).
Focusing in this section on the adoption of seed technology and the use of
inorganic fertilizer, we show that adoption rates of improved maize seeds and
for fertilizer were quite high during the period studied (Table 2.8).5 In the
Afrint III period, 50 per cent of maize farmers used improved seeds and 55 per
cent applied inorganic fertilizer. The use of improved rice varieties was 20 per
cent in Afrint III, a halving since Afrint II. Fertilizer application had, however,
become more common with 30 per cent of farmers applying it in Afrint III
compared to 19 per cent in Afrint II. For the two crops, the share of households
investing in fertilizer use has grown and the usage in the Afrint III period is
quite high.
Possibly related, it can also be noted that since the mid-2000s several
African countries subsidize fertilizer at high rates. Despite what may seem a
somewhat confusing stand by the World Bank as to whether governments
should or should not subsidize fertilizer programmes (Mellor 2014), all but
Mozambique of the Afrint countries have such programmes. In Mozambique,
where the use of fertilizer is very low and most farmers are not familiar with
the technology, there is not a general programme but pilot tests have been
conducted and an expansion of test areas is taking place (Simtowe 2015).
Technical advances such as the use of improved seed or employment of
improved nutrient management can trigger and drive increases in surplus
farm production that can be marketed. According to Wiggins et al. (2011),
technical advances can be seen as one of two important drivers of the com-
mercialization of small-scale farming, the other being higher prices and better
access to markets. We now turn our attention to these issues.
5 Some caution is warranted in the interpretation of the figures presented in Table 2.8. Farmers
reporting on the use of improved seed sometimes refer to recirculated seeds. On the other hand,
farmers sometimes refer to improved seed as traditional because they have used it for several years
and consequently label it traditional technology.
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Table 2.8. Seed and fertilizer use (share of famers using)
Change over time
Afrint I Afrint II Afrint III Afrint I–II Sig. Afrint II–III Sig. Afrint I–III Sig.
Maize All farmers Proportion using improved
seed (%)
45 53 50 8 *** 3 ** 5 ***





47 62 54 15 *** 8 ** 7 **





53 61 55 8 7 1
Proportion using fertilizer (%) 48 50 59 2 9 11
Rice All farmers Proportion using improved
seed (%)
18 40 20 21 *** 20 *** 2





18 45 24 28 *** 21 *** 7





15 42 23 27 *** 19 * 8
Proportion using fertilizer (%) 24 23 33 1 10 8
Note: a. Based on mean yield, 3-season average.
Commercialization and Market Integration
Although far from all observers consider commercialization as an inherently
positive process,6 the most common policy stand taken by governments and
international development organizations like the World Bank is to promote
the commercialization of the smallholder sector. This standpoint is based
on the notion that commercialization generally will benefit the farmers
involved, and also contribute to economic growth and improved livelihood
opportunities outside the farm economy (World Bank 2007). Considering
Africa’s population growth rate and the increasing numbers of urban residents
depending on the market for their food needs, it would be hard not to
appreciate the importance of agricultural commercialization.
Given the heterogeneity in terms of access to land, capital, labour, and skills
found in many smallholder communities, commercialization does not unfold
evenly across farms. This should be kept in mind when analysing data on
commercialization. When right after the harvest, for example, a low-income
farm household sells a high share of its maize in spite of knowing that it will
soon have to buy maize but at a higher price, its level of commercialization
may indeed have increased, but such a distress sale tells us that it may not
represent a positive change for that household.
With this reflection as a cautionary backdrop, data on crop producers’
participation in the market as well as the share of produce marketed are
presented in Table 2.9. We also show the absolute amount of staple cereals
sold. The greatmajority (84 per cent) of all households sold some of their crops
in Afrint III. The share has grown over the period studied. As expected, non-
food crop producers are very market-oriented, with 87 per cent participating
in the market. Also, the share of commercialized growers of food crops other
thanmaize, sorghum, and rice is large, with 70 per cent of these producing for
the market. By generating immediate income through the year for cash-
strapped households, the sale of crops like vegetables, beans, and potatoes is
important. Looking at its overall importance as a source of cash income for the
entire sample (not only growers), the category made up on average 20 per cent
of total cash income in the Afrint III sample, and sale of these types of food
crops was thereby the second most important source of cash income.
The cereal staples, for which we have richer data, continue to be important
sources of cash income for many households. Since Afrint II, the proportion of
growers selling cereal crops has increased. Approximately half of all maize
growers, which includes 92 per cent of all households, sell maize. For rice
6 Stockbridge (2006) and Wiggins et al. (2011) offer reviews of agricultural commercialization in
Africa which include discussions of different and sometimes competing perspectives on the social
and economic impacts of commercialization.
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Table 2.9. Share of farmers selling and amount marketed by type of crop
Change over time (%)a
Afrint I Afrint II Afrint III Afrint I–II Sig. Afrint II–III Sig. Afrint I–III Sig.
Maize Proportion of growers who sell the crop (%) 35 45 49 11 *** 4 *** 15 ***
Average amount sold, sellers (t)b 0.63 0.98 1.44 55 *** 47 *** 127 ***
Median amount sold, sellers (t)b 0.30 0.36 0.51
Average proportion of total production sold, all farmers (%) 16 39 23 23 *** 16 *** 7 ***
Sorghum Proportion of growers who sell the crop (%) 20 4 10 16 *** 6 *** 10 ***
Average amount sold, sellers (t)b 0.21 0.10 0.18 53 *** 86 * 13
Median amount sold, sellers (t)b 0.11 0.06 0.10
Average proportion of total production sold, all farmers (%) 6 2 3 5 *** 2 ** 3 ***
Rice Proportion of growers who sell the crop (%) 61 51 58 9 *** 7 ** 3
Average amount sold, sellers (t)b 0.59 0.69 1.32 18 89 *** 123 ***
Median amount sold, sellers (t)b 0.30 0.42 0.60
Average proportion of total production sold, all farmers (%) 26 25 30 1 5 *** 4 **
Other food cropsc Proportion of growers who sell the crop (%) 65 73 70 8 *** 2 * 6 ***
Non-food cropsc Proportion of growers who sell the crop (%) – 96 87 n.a 9 *** n.a
Any type of cropc Proportion of growers who sell the crop (%) 71 80 84 8 *** 4 *** 12 ***
Notes: a. Change in proportion of growers who sell the crop and average proportion of total production sold is absolute not percentage change.
b. Extreme values removed at the dataset level.
c. Data on amount sold was not available.
growers the share is higher (58 per cent), while only a tenth of sorghum
growers market the crop. Part of the explanation for the low share of marketed
sorghum may be the popularity of the crop for beer production, which opens
up possibilities for on-farm processing and sale at the local level.
Between Afrint II and III, the average amounts of maize and rice sold
increased substantially and, for the Afrint III sample, 1.44 t of maize and
1.32 t of rice were the average amounts sold per farm (all sellers considered).
Comparing means and medians, the skewed distribution of marketed output
implies that, for the great majority, the amounts marketed are modest, and in
most cases limited to a few bags. As noted earlier, this implies that, for many,
the sale of these staples is followed by later purchases, eventually turning
many sellers into net buyers. The average proportion of total production
sold was very low for sorghum, presumably for the reason previously men-
tioned. For maize and rice we can note that some 23 per cent of all maize
produced and 30 per cent of rice were marketed. In the study by Frelat et al.
(2016) referred to earlier, covering more than 13,000 small farms in SSA, the
share of food crops sold was 20 per cent, a level that our results tally well with.
An indication of the relative importance of cereals staples as a cash earner is
that in both Afrint II and Afrint III staple food sales constituted the single most
important sourceof cash income,with anaverage share of 24per cent inAfrint II
and26per cent inAfrint III. For the six countries, only inKenyawere staple crops
not themost or secondmost important cash income source. Taken together, the
sale of crops on averagemade upmore than half (54 per cent) of all cash income
in the Afrint III sample. Adding the share from the sale of animal products (9 per
cent), agricultural production represented 63 per cent of total cash income
among the Afrint households. When including agricultural work on others’
farms as a part of farm income, the total share of farm income in relation to
total cash income reaches 70 per cent, ranging from 49 per cent inMozambique
to 85 per cent in Zambia. This share comes close to estimates by Haggblade et al.
(2007) and Jayne et al. (2006a). The relative importance of farm income sources
has not changed since Afrint II, a sobering reminder of the heavy reliance on
agriculture in the livelihoods of African smallholders.
Non-Farm Linkages and Diversification
African smallholders in rural areas7 are often farming in regions where
economic sectors other than agriculture are significant. Estimating the
non-farm share of the rural economies across the developing world,
7 Long neglected, African urban farmers are increasing in number and importance. In this
volume, however, the focus is on smallholders in rural areas.
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Haggblade et al. (2010) show that 35 per cent of rural household income in
Africa is derived from non-farm sources. Moreover, in their review, Barrett
et al. (2001) indicate an even larger figure of between 40 per cent and 45 per
cent for rural Africa. For Asia and Latin America their estimate is approxi-
mately 50 per cent. Landless and near-landless households are particularly
dependent on the rural non-farm economy, but non-farm income sources are
also important for smallholders who have access to more land.
Much hope is presently being pinned on the development and growth of
the rural non-farm economy in SSA. By providing pathways out of poverty,
such a development seems imperative in order to meet challenges such as
pervasive rural poverty, decreasing farm sizes, and the rapid growth in the
number of young rural people entering the labour market (Losch et al. 2012).
In its analysis of the role of agriculture in contributing to poverty reduction
and inter-sectoral growth in SSA, theWorld Development Report 2008 is explicit
when pointing out that agriculture cannot be expected to drive the growth
and transformation of the rural economies in all regions where smallholders
operate (World Bank 2007). In areas with low potential for agricultural devel-
opment, other development strategies must, according to the report, be
sought, including the provision of safety nets by governments. Not even in
the more medium- and high-potential areas (in terms of agro-ecology and
market access) can all smallholders be expected to farm their way out of
poverty. The World Development Report 2008 does not, however, enter into
the challenging questions of how to finance the proposed safety nets.
For resource-poor smallholders, the diversification of livelihoods is often a
necessity caused by economic distress, rather than a strategy to seek attractive
income opportunities. Moreover, even for the non-farm sector, substantial
entry barriers limit access to high-return rural non-farm income to relatively
better-off households, while the poor are mainly confined to low-return non-
farm activities. In a review of rural livelihood diversification in SSA, Alobo
Loison (2015: 1134) concludes that while the benefits of the diversification
into non-farm income sources mainly favour the better-off, diversification
‘still provides a safety net for the rural poor and sometimes offers a means
for upward mobility’.
The Afrint II and Afrint III surveys provide data on different types of cash
incomes sources. In Table 2.10 these are grouped into farm and non-farm
sources. Following a classification of income sources according to economic
sectors, agricultural labour is here included in the overall category ‘farm
income’. On average, non-farm income sources account for 30 per cent of
total household cash income.8 There is variation between the country
8 Cash income only forms part of total household income for households retaining part of their
agricultural output for their own consumption, payment for hired labour, seeds, etc. If this part of
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aggregates, with the proportion of non-farm income (NFI) in the Afrint III
period being the lowest in Zambia (15 per cent) and the highest in Mozam-
bique (51 per cent). In the case of Zambia, it is the dramatic increase in food
staple production and sales that have reduced the overall share of NFI from
29 per cent to 15 per cent between Afrint II and Afrint III. In Mozambique,
the NFI share was stable over the period and its greater importance is due to
the domination of subsistence farming.
While on average NFI makes up an important share of total cash income,
still many households report not having any NFI at all (Table 2.10). As much
as 44 per cent of the Afrint III sample did not report any NFI. Ranging on
average between 50 per cent and 60 per cent, the share of households which
do generate NFI has been stable during the period. In Afrint III, two countries
diverged from this level. In Ghana, 75 per cent of households engaged in non-
farm activities, and in Zambia only 39 per cent reported having NFI. In
Zambia, the proportion of households participating in the non-farm sector
dropped from 56 per cent in Afrint II to 39 per cent in Afrint III, a change
which may reflect the boom in maize production. In Ghana, the share of
households engaging in micro-business increased significantly (16 per cent),
contributing to the growing importance of that source of income, which
increased from 8 per cent to 16 per cent of total household cash income
between the Afrint II and Afrint III periods.
Production, Commercialization, and Income Diversification
by Gender and Income Group
Following the two themes of this volume, this section of the chapter presents
findings from a cross-tabulation of indicators for production, productivity,
commercialization, and diversification comparing FMFs and male-managed
farms (MMFs) as well as four income groups. The analysis depicts income
patterns and income diversification among the sampled farm households on
the basis of these comparisons. More detailed analysis of gender differences of
production, commercialization, and income diversification at the country and
regional levels follows in Chapters 3 and 4.
Gender Differences
As noted in Chapter 1, FMFs constitute 29 per cent of the Afrint III sample. The
survey data show that landholdings held by women were only approximately
the production was to be valued at the price of marketed output and added to the amount of cash
income, the overall share of farm income would be markedly higher.
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Table 2.10. Non-farm income shares
Change over time
Afrint I Afrint II Afrint III Afrint I–II Sig. Afrint II–III Sig. Afrint I–III Sig.
Ghana NFI as a share of total income (%)  28 39 n.a. 11 *** n.a.
Share of households having NFI (%) 49 54 75 5 22 *** 26 ***
Kenya NFI as a share of total income (%)  18 26 n.a. 8 *** n.a.
Share of households having NFI (%) 70 32 56 38 *** 24 *** 14 ***
Malawi NFI as a share of total income (%)  32 23 n.a. 8 *** n.a.
Share of households having NFI (%) 67 60 52 7 * 8 ** 15 ***
Tanzania NFI as a share of total income (%)  33 26 n.a. 7 *** n.a.
Share of households having NFI (%) 71 50 50 21 *** 0 21 ***
Zambia NFI as a share of total income (%)  29 15 n.a. 14 *** n.a.
Share of households having NFI (%) 52 56 39 4 17 *** 13 ***
Mozambique NFI as a share of total income (%)  48 51 n.a. 3 n.a.
Share of households having NFI (%) 54 47 60 6 * 13 *** 6 *
Total NFI as a share of total income (%)  31 30 n.a. 1 n.a.
Share of households having NFI(%) 60 51 56 9 *** 5 *** 4 ***
half the size (56 per cent) of those held by men (Table 2.11). For maize, the
mean cultivated area of FMFs of 0.86 ha constitutes 69 per cent of that of
MMFs. This difference explains most of the gender difference in maize pro-
duction with male-headed households producing 1.64 t per farm compared
with 0.86 t for their female counterparts. In terms of area productivity, the gap
is not big. In Afrint III, FMFs achieved 90 per cent of the maize yield of MMFs,
a gap which was the same in Afrint I.
Gender-based differences in the adoption rate of seed and fertilizer technol-
ogy inmaize cultivationwere not very large in Afrint III (Table 2.11). The share
of FMFs using improved seeds and inorganic fertilizers was 45 per cent and
49 per cent respectively. For male-headed households, the corresponding
proportion of users was 51 per cent and 56 per cent. However, lacking detailed
data on use, for example, amounts and types of fertilizers, we cannot further
explore potential differences in technology application.
Turning to the indicators of commercialization, the difference is larger with
only 40 per cent of female farmmanagers sellingmaize while 53 per cent of the
male respondents sold some of their maize in the Afrint III period. Further-
more, FMFs tend to sell a smaller share of theirmaize—17 per cent compared to
25 per cent for the MMFs. In comparison to the Afrint II period, the share of
maize sold declined substantially to 32 per cent and 41 per cent for FMFs and
MMFs respectively, but the gap between the two remained at the same level.
The gap in the level of commercialization can perhaps be related to the much
smaller total production on FMFs and the fact that, inmanyhouseholds,maize
is a popular and important food staple. In this context, we can also note that
while male landholders on average set 45 per cent of the farm area to maize,
FMFs used 55 per cent of their land for maize in the Afrint III period. The
pattern formaize is similar for the crop category of other food crops. In the case
of non-food cash crops, the difference is smaller with 81 per cent of the FMFs
marketing their produce compared to 88 per cent of the MMFs.
Gender differences in income and income diversification are substantial,
with FMFs generating annual cash incomes/per adult equivalent to only
approximately 70 per cent of those of MMFs (see also Chapter 4). For MMFs,
on average 72 per cent of total cash income derives from farm sources while
for FMFs the share is 63 per cent. Being more dependent on NFIs for their total
income, FMFs also depend more on agricultural wages. For Afrint III, work on
others’ land generates 9 per cent of total income for FMFs while only 4 per cent
for MMFs.
Diversification by Income Group
By dividing the farm households into four groups according to their cash
income sources—farm only, non-farm only, both, or none—several important
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Table 2.11. Production, commercialization, and diversification by sex of farm manager
Afrint I Afrint II Afrint III
Male Female Diff. Sig. Male Female Diff. Sig. Male Female Diff. Sig.
No. of households 1,609 712 1,811 661 1,803 734
Proportion of sample 69 31 73 27 71 29
Mean farm size (ha) 2.21 1.45 0.77 *** 1.90 1.13 0.77 *** 2.63 1.49 1.13 ***
Mean area under maize (ha), 3-season averagea 0.96 0.67 0.28 *** 0.93 0.61 0.32 *** 1.19 0.82 0.37 ***
Mean maize production (t/farm), 3-season averageb 1.07 0.72 0.35 *** 1.21 0.72 0.50 *** 1.64 0.86 0.78 ***
Mean maize yield (t/ha),c 3-season averaged 1.34 1.20 0.14 ** 1.23 1.17 0.07 1.29 1.15 0.14 ***
Proportion using improved maize seed (%) 46 43 3 55 49 6 ** 51 45 6 ***
Proportion using fertilizer on maize (%) 39 45 6 ** 41 39 3 56 49 7 ***
Proportion of maize growers selling maize (%) 39 26 13 *** 48 38 11 *** 53 40 13 ***
Proportion of total maize production sold (%) 18 11 7 *** 41 32 9 *** 25 17 8 ***
Proportion of growers of other food crops selling (%) 68 56 12 *** 75 67 8 *** 74 60 14 ***
Proportion of growers of non-food crops selling (%) – – 96 96 0 88 81 7 **
Proportion selling any crop (%) 76 62 14 *** 83 72 11 *** 88 73 15 ***
Sale of staple crops as a proportion of total cash
income (%)
– – 26 19 7 *** 28 21 7 ***
Agricultural wage labour as a proportion of total cash
income (%)
– – 5 9 4 *** 5 9 4 ***
NFI as a proportion of total cash income (%) – – 29 39 10 *** 28 37 10 ***
Mean household income per adult equivalente, 2010
PPP-adjusted USDf
– – 281 297 16 317 226 91 ***
Notes: a. Average of area under maize during the last growing season at the time of data collection and the two previous growing seasons before that one.
b. Average of maize production during the last growing season at the time of data collection and the two previous growing seasons before that one.
c. Based on a sub-sample including maize growers who cultivated an average of at least 0.1 ha. The sample also excludes cases with a sixfold or higher yield increase between consecutive Afrint
rounds.
d. Average of maize yield during the last growing season at the time of data collection and the two previous growing seasons before that one.
e. The use of adult equivalents takes the age composition of the household into account, by assigning adult household members (16–60) a value of 1, whereas children (0–15 years of age) are
given value of 0.50 and elderly household members (61 years and above) are given a value of 0.75, when calculating the number of adult equivalents per household.
f. Afrint II incomes are adjusted from 2008 values; Afrint III incomes are adjusted from 2013 values for Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, and Zambia, and 2015 values for Tanzania and Mozambique.
Extreme values removed at the village level.
observations indicating substantial differences in terms of production, prod-
uctivity, and commercialization and total cash income can be made
(Table 2.12). The great majority of households belong either to the group
relying completely on agriculture for cash income (40 per cent) or the group
combining farm and NFI sources (49 per cent). Only 7 per cent of households
report that they depend completely on non-farm sources of income. The
remaining 5 per cent report no cash income at all.
Starting with the biggest group, households combining farm and NFIs, the
average total household income of this group is approximately double that of
the groups relying completely on either farm or NFI. This finding is broadly in
line with previous research pointing to the benefits of supplementing farm
incomes with NFIs among African smallholders (Alobo Loison 2015). Com-
pared to the group relying completely on NFI to generate cash, the group
combining income sources has larger mean farm size (2.44 ha compared to
1.47 ha), attains higher mean maize yields (1.26 t/ha compared to 0.85 t/ha),
and more commonly uses improved maize seeds and fertilizer on maize.
The 40 per cent of farm households completely dependent on agriculture
for cash income do not show statistically significant differences from the ones
combining farm and NFI sources in terms of production, productivity, and
commercialization. The only significant difference is in the proportion using
improved maize where the farm-only group has a significantly higher propor-
tion of households using improved maize seeds than any of the other groups.
Likewise, the group of 116 households reporting not to have any cash
income shows no significant difference from the group that depends on NFI
in several characteristics, including farm size, maize yield, and a less common
usage of improved seeds and fertilizers. Both groups, however, show signifi-
cantly lower results for all of these factors as compared to the groups of
households whose cash incomes are specialized in agriculture and those hav-
ing both agricultural and NFIs. Conclusions about this group of households
reporting to have no cash income must, however, be drawn with care. Several
of the households reported that they sold or intended to sell some of their crop
produce, and thus the true number of households that belong to this group
can be questioned (see note in Table 2.12). Nonetheless, we note that this
group of households appears to be very resource weak.
Concluding this section, we emphasize the finding that the large group of
households that are completely dependent on farm activities for cash income,
on average have low cash incomes in spite of good access to land, a relatively
high share of households using improved seeds and inorganic fertilizer for
maize, and are comparatively commercialized. This prompts a question which
decision-makers and policymakers need to consider: would the farm house-
holds in this group be able to farm their way out of poverty if they had better
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Table 2.12. Production, commercialization, and diversification by income group





































No. of households 831 305 1,082 107 1,096 252 1,006 119 1,006 182 1,240 116
Proportion of sample 36 13 47 5 44 10 41 5 40 7 49 5
Mean farm size (ha) 2.30 1.31 1.98 1.39 1.72 1.07 1.86 1.27 2.37 1.47 2.44 1.38
Mean area under maize
(ha), 3-season averagea




0.96 0.48 1.13 0.58 1.03 0.59 1.25 1.18 1.68 0.64 1.37 0.62
Mean maize yield (t/ha),c
3-season averaged




43 24 54 38 55 24 61 30 57 22 49 28
Proportion using fertilizer
on maize (%)




43 5 40 13 51 13 51 16 56 5 54 6
Proportion of total maize
production sold (%)e
20 2 17 6 43 5 45 17 28 1 24 4
Proportion of growers of
other food crops selling
(%)e
76 10 73 21 78 22 79 39 78 18 74 35
Proportion of growers of
non-food crops selling
(%)e
    96 100 96 95 92 45 88 35
Proportion selling any
crop (%)e
85 13 82 19 89 25 86 45 93 25 89 35
Sale of staple crops as a
proportion of total cash
income (%)
    36 0 18 0 39 0 19 0
Agricultural wage labour
as a proportion of total
cash income (%)
    10 0 3 0 10 0 4 0
NFI as a proportion of total
cash income (%)





    243 141 371 0 213 179 373 0
Notes: a. Average of area under maize during the last growing season at the time of data collection and the two previous growing seasons before that one.
b. Average of maize production during the last growing season at the time of data collection and the two previous growing seasons before that one.
c. Based on a sub-sample including maize growers who cultivated an average of at least 0.1 ha. The sample also excludes cases with a sixfold or higher yield increase between consecutive Afrint
rounds.
d. Average of maize yield during the last growing season at the time of data collection and the two previous growing seasons before that one.
e. The data are based on households’ answers as to whether they had sold or intended to sell any maize following the most recent crop year. The classification of household in the four categories
shown in the table is based on respondents’ answers about incomes from different income sources during the past year. This explains why a number of households belonging to the income
categories ‘only non-farm income’ and ‘no income’ are included as sellers of crops. The number of cases in Afrint III for maize was 8 and 6 respectively, for other food crops 28 and 34, for non-
food crops 14 and 8, and for any crop sold 44 and 39. The number of cases in Afrint II for maize was 28 and 17 respectively, for other food crops 31 and 36, for non-food crops 10 and 20, and for
any crop sold 62 and 54.
f. The use of adult equivalents takes the age composition of the household into account, by assigning adult household members (16–60) a value of 1, whereas children (0–15 years of age) are
given value of 0.50 and elderly household members (61 years and above) are given a value of 0.75, when calculating the number of adult equivalents per household.
g. Afrint II incomes are adjusted from 2008 values; Afrint III incomes are adjusted from 2013 values for Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, and Zambia, and 2015 values for Tanzania and Mozambique.
Extreme values removed at the village level.
access to affordable technologies, better access to markets, and better credit
and insurance facilities?
Conclusion
Since Afrint II the approximately 2,500 farm households studied have
increased their agricultural production substantially. On average, the produc-
tion of maize, sorghum, and rice increased by more than 30 per cent. This was
made possible by a roughly corresponding expansion of the area cultivated
with these crops, but also other food crops such as vegetables, roots and
tubers, and fruits. Thus, the mean farm area cultivated increased by 36 per
cent and reached 2.30 ha in 2013. FMFs, whichmake up approximately 30 per
cent of all farms in the sample, are significantly smaller than male-held
landholdings, however. Cultivating only nearly half as large areas, and, in
the case of maize, attaining about 90 per cent of the yield per hectare of male-
headed households, female-headed households produce substantially less
farm output.
Productivity measured in terms of output per area did not change signifi-
cantly on average. There is variation between countries but broadly for the
whole sample and for the whole period between Afrint I and Afrint III,
changes in production depend generally on corresponding changes in the
area cultivated. While yields for the main cereal staples remain low, the gap
between the top performers in each of the fifty-six villages and the great
majority is substantial, with the top 20 per cent of farms producing approxi-
mately twice as much per area. This indicates that higher yields are attainable
under local conditions and realities—biophysical as well as socio-economic—
and thus there is a clear potential for raising local yields.
The general increase in crop production resulted in significant increases in
the maize and rice volumes marketed. The overall proportion of farm house-
holds who marketed some share of their different crops harvested increased
since the Afrint II survey, reaching 84 per cent in Afrint III. Taken together, the
sale of crops, on average, makes up more than half of total household cash
income and, adding to this other agricultural income sources, the proportion
of farm income to total income reaches 70 per cent.
To the extent that this description of increases in production and the levels
of commercialization signals positive change since Afrint II, a broader view of
smallholders’ livelihoods shows that farm households relying entirely on
income from agricultural sources are faring much worse than those able to
combine farm and non-farm cash income sources. Making up some 40 per
cent of the total sample, smallholder farms lacking NFI generate only about
half as much cash income as those farm households also able to find
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employment and opportunities in the non-farm economy. In spite of culti-
vating, on average, more than 2.3 ha and participating in the different crop
commoditymarkets, these households do not, under current conditions, seem
to be able to farm their way into the income levels of households with more
diversified income sources.
Returning to this chapter’s introduction, and the several major transforma-
tory trends affecting the predominantly agrarian economies of SSA, the pic-
ture emerging from our broad description of development in the smallholder
sector of six SSA countries clearly points to the need for reinforced support to
the sector. At the same time, we have shown that by supplementing farm
income with NFI, half of the households studied are able to increase their total
income significantly. This points to the opportunities for supportive policies
and initiatives targeting the development of the rural non-farm economy to
contribute to improved conditions for African smallholders.
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Assets, Gender, and Rural Livelihoods
Agnes Andersson Djurfeldt
Introduction
A growing body of literature details the importance of assets to poverty
reduction as well as enhanced welfare and empowerment. A sub-field of this
scholarship recognizes the constraints to women’s control and ownership of
assets (Quisumbing and Maluccio 2003, Deere and Doss 2006) and the impact
as well as importance of assets in agricultural development interventions
focusing on gender (Quisumbing et al. 2015, Johnson et al. 2016).
Given that this is a relatively new field, the empirical evidence on asset
ownership and control is limited in general and the evolution of assets over
time even more so. This chapter therefore has a largely descriptive aim of
presenting trends in asset control and ownership over time in the six countries
covered by the study. The chapter should be seen as complementary to
Chapters 2 and 4, with the focus being physical assets of importance to rural
livelihoods. This choice stems from the limitations of the dataset and the
mainly quantitative methodology of the study, which does not permit the
analysis of more intangible assets such as access to kinship networks or
associational capital. All data will be discussed on the basis of gender, where
asset ownership, access, and control will be compared on the basis of the sex of
farm manager. As noted in Chapter 1, this includes both de facto and de jure
female-headed households. Where relevant the two groups of female-headed
households will be compared.
While the limitations of this approach were recognized in Chapter 1, unfor-
tunately the data do not permit an analysis of intra-household ownership and
control over assets. This would clearly have been preferable as numerous
studies attest to the importance of cultural norms in restricting women’s
ownership as well as control over assets within households (Meinzen-Dick
et al. 2014, Johnson et al. 2016).
A second caveat relates to the limited possibilities for addressing aspects of
asset control (rather than just ownership)—with the exception of land, the
dataset does not contain information on asset control. Bearing these short-
comings in mind, we are able to trace changes in asset ownership among the
smallholders in the study over time to assess whether livelihoods have
improved or stagnated, and whether these changes have affected male- and
female-managed farms (MMFs and FMFs) differently.
While assets enable raising incomes, the accumulation of assets over time
also indicates improvements in livelihoods. The analysis therefore reflects on
both the changing potential to generate income (whether in cash or kind) and
withstand shocks, but also the outcome of this potential over time. After a
brief review of key concepts and previous literature, the chapter is structured
according to this logic, starting with a discussion of the key agricultural assets
of land, labour, livestock, and water resources, followed by an analysis of non-
agricultural assets that can be used to generate incomes. Finally, outcomes of
livelihood strategies are considered through analysing data on non-productive
consumer durables and the ability to save.
Gender, Assets, and Rural Livelihoods
I define the term assets as resources that enable engagement in agricultural
production as well as non-farm activities. This is broadly in keeping with the
notion of capitals found in the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (Chambers
and Conway 1992, Scoones 1998, Scoones 2009). More recently, contribu-
tions have gendered the livelihoods framework, with the work of Meinzen-
Dick et al. (2014) being especially inspiring in this regard (see Meinzen-Dick
et al. 2014: 100).
Broadly speaking the livelihood literature that has inspired as well as built
on the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (Chambers and Conway 1992,
Scoones 1998, Bebbington 1999, Rakodi 1999, Scoones 2009, Meinzen-Dick
et al. 2014), identifies a set of ‘capitals’ through which households and indi-
viduals are able to source their livelihoods. The composition of livelihoods
therefore depends on the availability and use of these different types of
capitals, something that in turn is also related to the natural resource base,
the institutional environment, and access to public goods. Aspects of culture
and religious norms related to gender roles may also influence who has access
to and control over particular capitals.
Several variants of the original framework exist, each recognizing slightly
different types of capital. Scoones (1998) in an early working paper identifies
four types of capital: natural, economic/financial, human, and social, but notes
that this is not an exhaustive list. Bebbington’s (1999) work distinguishes
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between natural and produced capital, adds cultural capital, but excludes
economic capital. Meinzen-Dick et al. (2014) describe six key capitals: natural,
physical, human, financial, social, and political capital. Other recent studies
distinguish between agricultural and non-agricultural assets, and household
durables and agricultural durables (Quisumbing et al. 2015).
For the purpose of this chapter, one key distinction that cuts across the
various types of capital is the difference between agricultural and non-
agricultural assets. Figure 3.1 presents a schematic representation of how the
division between agricultural and non-agricultural assets can be reconciled
with the capitals commonly used as a point of departure in livelihood studies.
The analysis in what follows focuses on natural, physical, and human
capital and to a lesser extent financial capital. The dataset, moreover, has a
strong slant towards agricultural rather than non-agricultural assets.
Deere (2010) identifies a number of ways in which assets are linked to
poverty: productive assets can be used to generate incomes, rent, interest,
and profits. In the case of agriculture, production can also be used for own
consumption, while assets provide use value. Assets can be used as collateral
for credit and also constitute a safeguard against shocks and possibilities for
storing value. In the context of strong seasonality and widespread vulnerabil-
ity, asset ownership can therefore smooth the impact of crises, while enabling
households to take hold of opportunities that arise when economies grow
(Deere and Doss 2006: 1).
In feminist economic theory, the ownership over assets is linked to the fall-
back position of the individual within the household. While households are
sites of cooperation as well as conflict, access and control over resources
increases the individual’s bargaining power, since the person in control of
assets can threaten to leave the household, hence diminishing the resource
base of the household as a whole (Quisumbing 2010). Asset ownership is

















































Figure 3.1 Capitals and assets.
Notes: a. Examples of assets are included in the figure—these are not exhaustive.
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decision making and enhancing their opportunities both within and outside
the household. Moreover, increased female control over assets is empirically
connected to improvements in several development metrics, both for women
individually as well as their families (Quisumbing and Maluccio 2003). While
increasing women’s access to and control over assets holds substantial poten-
tial for poverty reduction, the literature demonstrates that men generally hold
more assets as well as higher-value assets than women, a situation attributed
to gender biases in the norms that regulate ownership of assets (Deere and
Doss 2006).
Agricultural Assets
As suggested by Figure 3.1, agricultural assets cut across several capitals,
although the importance of each particular capital to local livelihoods varies
depending on broader institutional and environmental contexts. As noted
initially, data are not available for all assets, which limits the analysis in terms
of the amount and type of assets that can be discussed. Referring back to
Figure 3.1, data on storage facilities are limited, as are data on social capital.
Moreover, the inability to discuss aspects of asset control clearly restricts the
depth of analysis, a fact that is especially problematic in contexts character-
ized by ‘bundles of rights’ to basic agrarian resources, such as land and water.
Keeping such reservations in mind, the following sections discuss the key
agricultural assets of land, labour, water, livestock, and technology use.
Land
Several gender asset gaps are noted in the literature, with most attention
having been paid so far to gender gaps in land access and control over land.
In general, private ownership of land is limited among African smallholders,
with land rights being based largely on community land allocations, where
holders have user rights to land tied to their membership of a particular tribe,
clan, or lineage.
LANDHOLDERS, LAND RIGHTS, AND SECURITY OF TENURE
As with many other parts of the world, women generally access land through
marriage, with female land rights being secondary in the sense that their
husbands hold the right to cultivate the land. Communal land rights in
many parts of sub-Saharan Africa are based on patrilineal systems where
land transfers exclude women. Marital regimes across most African countries
follow separation of property, meaning that property is held individually and
upon dissolution of the union assets revert to each party. In practice this
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means that following a divorce, women in many countries do not have access
to land brought by their husbands into the marriage. Widow’s rights to land
are also generally weak, especially for women who are not indigenous to the
particular community (Lastarria-Cornhiel et al. 2014).
There are exceptions to these general patterns, however, with the matrilineal
land systems found in parts of Malawi, Zambia, and Mozambique being
perhaps the most obvious. Even in these contexts, however, the rights to
land and control over the proceeds from that land vary considerably. Peters
(2010) notes that post-marital residence is a crucial aspect of tenure, with
matrilineal descent and uxorilocal settlement (in the wife’s village) being
connected to the strongest female rights to land. Another exception is pro-
vided by parts of Ghana, where the inheritance of land by daughters means
that both spouses bring land into marriage and continue to use and control
particular plots within the household also during marriage. In the Tanzanian
study sites, clan-based land rights provide generally secure rights for women,
even if land systems are patrilineal. Finally, several of the study countries,
most obviously Kenya and parts of Zambia, have examples of private freehold
tenure, although the rights for women within these systems are not necessar-
ily stronger than those found in areas under community-based tenure.
Available agricultural census data depart from the FAO definition of a land-
holder, which is defined as the person who ‘makes major decisions regarding
resource use and exercises management control’. The landholder therefore
can be, but is not always the owner of the land, as the landholder may be
using land under communal tenure, or renting or borrowing land. As suggested
by Lastarria-Cornhiel et al. (2014: 126), the assumption ismade that the house-
hold controls the holding, which ‘does not take into account the cultivation of
separate plots by men and women, and the possibility that men and women
may have different rights to land, even within the same household’.
The FAO definition of landholder largely overlaps with the sex of farm
manager that we use to classify farms as male-managed or female-managed.
The data reported from the Afrint survey are therefore largely comparable with
the FAO statistics. Lastarria-Cornhiel et al. (2014) present data from the FAO
gender and land rights database for four of the countries covered by the Afrint
study: Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia.
On average, for Afrint III, 29 per cent of the sample consisted of FMFs, with
country-level shares varying little over time. Based on the variation in female
land rights noted in the literature and the data compiled by Lastarria-Cornhiel
et al. (2014), the expectation would be that Malawi, Zambia, andMozambique
would have relatively high shares of female land-holders. Mozambique indeed
stands out,with 43 per cent FMFs, which diverts strongly from the FAO data
where 23 per cent of landholdings were held by women. The FAO data are
quite old (from 1999/2000), however, and the post-conflict movement and
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loss of men in the civil war may explain the higher figure for Afrint III. The
share of female farm managers for Malawi (31 per cent) corresponds almost
exactly with that reported by the FAO (32 per cent), whereas the Afrint data
for Zambia show a substantially higher share (23 per cent) than the figure of
15 per cent reported by the FAO for 1990. Tanzania, with a share of 24 per cent
FMFs, corresponds quite closely to the FAO data (20 per cent). In Kenya,
36 per cent of the farms in the sample were managed by women, but this
may be related to migration patterns in the particular sample sites, where men
have traditionally left to work outside the villages. Finally, the lowest share of
female farm managers is found in Ghana (21 per cent). The admonitions
provided by Lastarria-Cornhiel et al. 2014 regarding female land rights within
male-headed households are in order for the final case, since several of the
sample sites are part of land use systems in which particular plots are indi-
vidually managed within the household.
While the share of FMFs provides information on the land cultivated by
female farm managers and their family members, security of tenure may
be different for female landholders and land use may also be differentiated
by gender. The property rights literature discusses the ‘bundles of rights’ that
pertain to land and distinguishes between use rights, rights to the proceeds
generated from the land, decision-making rights over land management, and
the right to transfer land to other people (Meinzen-Dick and Mwangi 2009,
Lastarria-Cornhiel et al. 2014).
The dataset contains information on some of these rights: the issue of
control has been addressed in all survey rounds, with respondents in general
stating that they have full control over the land that they cultivated, not
needing to obtain permission for cultivation or changes in crops and land
use. For Afrint I, 8 per cent of the sampled respondents stated that they needed
permission, whereas the remainder claimed to have full control. By the time of
Afrint II, the share of the sample who were required to get permission had
increased somewhat to 12 per cent, but dropped slightly to 10 per cent for
Afrint III. Statistically significant differences based on gender of farmmanager
emerged only for the last data collection round, with 11 per cent of the male
farmmanagers stating that they needed permission compared with 9 per cent
among the female farmmanagers (significant at the 10 per cent level). For the
latest data collection round, female farmmanagers had slightly stronger rights
to use the land without interference from persons outside the household.
Formal titles to land or certificates of registration were held by 23 per cent of
the respondents during Afrint II, with a slight increase by the final data
collection round, when the corresponding figure was 29 per cent for male
farm managers, compared with 25 per cent for female farm managers (signifi-
cant at the 5 per cent level). To the extent that formalization of tenure has
increased, it has therefore biased MMFs.
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A tenth of the households surveyed during the third phase stated that they
had lost land that they considered they had the right to cultivate, but there
were no statistically significant differences based on the sex of the farm
manager. Somewhat surprisingly—given that land is commonly accessed
through husbands or male kin—there were no statistically significant differ-
ences in land losses or control over land between de facto and de jure female-
headed households.
While female farm managers are in the minority across all the sampled
countries, their user rights and control over land appear to be largely equal
to those of male farm managers. The gender asset gap may in this respect be
larger within some male-headed households than between the two farm types,
as suggested by qualitative work from Malawi which shows the limited right
exercised by women to returns from land both in terms of food and income in
male-headed households.
SIZE OF LANDHOLDINGS
Gendered patterns of landholding size can shed light on the gender asset gap
in the study areas as well as the relative possibilities for women and men to
engage in agriculturally based livelihoods.
Numerous studies attest to the regional nature of agriculturally based live-
lihoods, with production patterns being based both on physical aspects such
as soil fertility and rainfall, as well as institutional characteristics tied to tenure
systems and economic factors such as access to markets and infrastructure
(Wiggins 2000). With respect to gender specifically, the point is often made
that cultural and social norms that influence women’s access to and control
over natural resources are highly contextual, sometimes varying from one
village to another. Because of the small sample sizes at the village level (and
the even smaller number of female farm managers sampled at this level), the
data will be treated at the regional rather than the village level, however.
As noted in Chapter 1, the data were collected in fifty-six villages across
fifteen regions. While data were collected in two regions in Ghana, Kenya,
Tanzania, and Zambia, in Malawi households were surveyed in four regions
and in Mozambique in three regions. Figures 3.2a through 3.2f shows the
number and share of FMFs and MMFs respectively by region. The data pre-
sented in the tables that follow is presented by region following the same
country order (Ghana first and Mozambique last) as found in Figure 3.2.
As can be seen in Figures 3.2a through 3.2f, the number and share of female
farm managers varies not only between countries, but this distribution also
has a strong regional slant. Four regions have a strikingly high share of FMFs:
Kakamega in Kenya, Shire Highlands inMalawi, and the Centre and the South
in Mozambique. By contrast, the Upper East in Ghana, Ntchisi in Malawi,
Morogoro in Tanzania, and Mazabuka in Zambia have a high share of MMFs.
































Figure 3.2c Number of male and female farm managers by region, Malawi, Afrint III.
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Table 3.1 shows the average cultivated area by sex of farm manager for the
different regions at the three points of data collection. A number of key points
can be made on the basis of this table. First, although female farm managers
held smaller parcels of land in the majority of regions, there are exceptions, as
illustrated by both regions in Kenya and also the South inMozambique, where



























Figure 3.2e Number of male and female farm managers by region, Zambia, Afrint III.
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Table 3.1. Mean and median size of cultivated area (ha) by region and sex of farm manager
Country Region Afrint I Afrint II Afrint III
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Male N Female N Diff Sig. Male Female Male N Female N Diff Sig. Male Female Male N Female N Diff Sig. Male Female
Ghana Eastern 2.73 152 1.60 47 1.12 *** 2.30 1.30 1.90 208 1.17 62 0.73 *** 1.40 1.00 3.71 188 1.85 57 1.86 *** 3.36 1.68
Upper East 2.15 187 1.76 23 2.00 1.60 2.16 240 1.60 48 0.56 *** 1.80 1.40 2.16 227 1.62 56 0.54 *** 2.00 1.40
Kenya Kakamega 1.19 89 1.13 58 1.00 0.93 1.02 91 0.88 47 0.80 0.65 1.05 83 0.89 59 0.92 0.82
Nyeri 0.67 80 0.64 68 0.60 0.50 0.83 94 0.65 56 0.18 * 0.69 0.55 0.89 102 0.81 47 0.82 0.62
Malawi Ntchisi RDP 2.04 63 1.53 34 0.51 ** 1.82 1.42 1.58 74 1.37 23 1.42 1.01 1.60 78 1.12 18 0.49 ** 1.50 1.20
Thiwi Lifidzi 1.05 61 0.79 30 0.26 ** 1.01 0.71 1.28 59 0.98 40 0.30 *** 1.21 0.91 1.19 63 1.04 34 1.20 0.90
Bwanje Valley 1.26 64 1.08 32 1.21 1.01 1.33 58 0.96 40 0.38 *** 1.21 0.81 1.25 67 0.86 25 0.39 ** 1.20 0.80
Shire Highlands 0.93 45 0.74 54 0.18 ** 0.81 0.66 1.03 29 0.69 68 0.34 *** 1.01 0.63 0.94 57 0.63 41 0.31 *** 0.80 0.40
Tanzania Morogoro 1.83 160 1.33 31 0.51 ** 1.70 1.20 1.60 170 1.14 31 0.46 *** 1.40 0.81 2.14 160 1.52 37 0.62 ** 1.77 1.21
Iringa 2.05 151 1.29 48 0.76 *** 1.70 1.00 1.71 142 1.20 42 0.51 *** 1.60 1.05 2.04 128 1.31 56 0.73 *** 1.72 1.21
Zambia Mkushi 2.30 134 2.04 74 2.00 1.75 1.95 182 1.34 46 0.62 *** 1.74 1.25 2.79 175 1.82 71 0.97 *** 2.10 1.40
Mazabuka 3.85 152 2.24 28 1.61 *** 3.50 2.00 3.58 129 1.91 30 1.67 *** 3.00 1.44 4.25 169 2.26 38 1.99 *** 4.00 1.50
Mozambique North 2.53 97 1.89 58 0.64 ** 2.00 1.50 1.45 130 1.05 24 0.40 ** 1.28 0.81 2.28 134 1.62 38 0.66 ** 1.87 1.00
Centre 2.04 90 1.79 56 2.00 1.55 1.00 114 0.79 42 0.21 ** 0.88 0.67 3.05 86 2.54 81 0.52 * 3.00 2.00
South 1.33 32 1.26 43 1.00 1.00 1.00 23 1.26 54 -0.26 * 1.00 1.00 0.76 16 0.80 60 0.70 0.60
Note: a. Extreme cases have been removed by region.
landholding size that emerged in some regions between Afrint I and II have on
the whole been retained during the second period. Third, although national
data suggest increasing land fragmentation in Kenya and Malawi, only three
regions show sizeable, statistically significant decreases in land size between
Afrint I and III: Kakamega in Kenya, Ntchisi in Malawi, and the South in
Mozambique. While average landholding size fell in all of these regions,
only in the case of Ntchisi has it also been accompanied by a gender gap.
By the third phase of the project, MMFs were on average nearly half a hectare
larger than FMFs in Ntchisi.
While few regions have experienced declines in cultivated area between
Afrint I and III, in one region—Bwanje Valley in Malawi—the mean farm
size of female farm managers shrunk, but the size of the landholdings of
male farm managers were unchanged. In this region, FMFs contracted by
around a fifth of a hectare.
In the four regions where land sizes increased on average—the Eastern
Region in Ghana, Morogoro in Tanzania, Mazabuka in Zambia, and the
North in Mozambique—the gender gap in land size widened considerably.
This is especially apparent in the Eastern Region in Ghana and Mazabuka in
Zambia, where by the time of Afrint III MMFs were on average nearly 2 ha
larger than FMFs. A methodological note can also be made at this stage:
extreme cases (removed by region) are more likely to have been tied to male-
headed households. With the number of extreme cases increasing from thirty
to sixty-six cases between Afrint I and III, the gender gap is likely to be
underestimated for the latter phase of data collection.
Although the data suggest that gender-based differentials in tenure security
and control and use of land areminor, it does also point to clear gender gaps in
terms of the number of FMFs and the relative size of holdings under female
management. Land size changes have in general also affected FMFs negatively
when compared with male landholders. In the four regions where farms have
grown for both male and female farm managers the gender gap has widened.
A gender gap has, moreover, emerged in one of the three regions where land
sizes declined for both male and female farm managers. Furthermore, FMFs
have shrunk in one region that shows no overall change in land size.
The tendency for declining land sizes to affect FMFs disproportionately is
worrying. As suggested by Peters and Kambewa’s (2007) work from Malawi,
with growing pressure on land, women’s rights to land may become more
precarious over time.
For land size, moreover, there is a difference between de facto and de jure
female-headed households, with a slightly larger cultivated area among the
de facto female-headed households for Afrint III: 1.7 ha compared with 1.4 ha
for the de jure female-headed households (significant at the 5 per cent level).
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Labour
Until recently, the point was often made in the literature that in land-
abundant Africa, labour—and the control over others’ labour—was a more
decisive factor in raising agricultural productivity and generating wealth than
access to land. More recently such claims have been outpaced by rapidly
decreasing land sizes, especially in dynamic and well-placed areas (Jayne
et al. 2014). At the same time, an emergent class of middle-size and middle-
class farmers is being encouraged by policies in Zambia, Ghana, and Tanzania
for instance, prompted also by the dwindling of prospects in Africa’s urban
areas. As suggested by Table 3.1, land sizes have increased considerably in
certain regions and labour in these regions is likely to be a differentiating
factor, especially in labour-intensive systems of production. Conversely,
shrinking farm size may be compensated for through higher inputs of
labour, provided that soil fertility can be maintained in the face of rising
population pressure.
Whether gender-based gaps in farm size are compounded by differences in
access to labour is a crucial question in the context of widening land gaps.
Peterman et al. (2014) review gender differences in non-land agricultural
inputs and note that there are comparatively few studies of gender-
differentiated access to labour in sub-Saharan Africa. The studies that do
exist generally document labour constraints among female-headed house-
holds, however.
Horrell and Krishnan (2009) use data from three provinces in rural
Zimbabwe and find a significant difference in the availability of working-
age adults between male-headed households (4.14 persons) and de facto
female-headed households (3.12 persons). Given the longstanding history
of labour migration in Zimbabwe this is not surprising, however. Although
there are few empirical studies of this sort, the received wisdom on studies of
female-headed households holds that these households are smaller and
contain more dependants than households headed by men (see Chant
2007 for a discussion).
When the full sample is considered, this notion is confirmed: the house-
holds of female farm managers have on average 2.8 members of working age
compared with 3.4 in households headed by men, thus pointing to a gender
gap of 0.6 working-age adults, a difference that is strongly statistically signifi-
cant. Dividing the data by region suggests that the gender gap in labour
resources is concentrated in particular regions, and that such differences vary
over time, however. Nonetheless, the number of regions with gender-based
differences in the number of working-age adults has increased since Afrint II,
with nine out of fifteen regions having such gaps by the final round of data
collection. Four regions show a persistent gender gap in labour resources since
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the second survey—the Upper East Region in Ghana, Shire Highlands in
Malawi, Iringa in Tanzania, and Mazabuka in Zambia. In the case of the
Upper East and Mazabuka this may be explained by polygamy, and in the
case of the Upper East also male southward migration.
Comparing de jure and de facto female-headed households shows a statistic-
ally significant difference of 0.5 working-age adults, with de facto female-
headed households on average containing 3.2 working-age adults during the
last round of data collection, compared with 2.7 for de jure female-headed
households.De facto female-headed households hence appear to be somewhat
better placed in terms of labour resources, although less so than male-headed
households.
Another persistent claim revolves around the quality of labour available in
female-headed households, with the presumption often being that these
lack access to male labour in particular. In the labour-intensive context
of smallholder agriculture this may lower productivity in general on FMFs.
Gender-biased taboos and norms surrounding the division of labour, more-
over, may delay or even completely exclude the undertaking of certain
tasks, thus affecting FMFs negatively (Quisumbing and Pandolfelli 2010,
FAO 2011).
The labour of an absent husband can, however, be replaced by the work of
other male relatives, for instance adult sons or brothers. With respect to male
labour the data suggest that this is not the case, however. The demographic
composition of female-headed households is fundamentally different from
male-headed households in more or less all regions and countries, showing a
persistently lower share of male adults.
As suggested by Figure 3.3, in male-headed households, male family mem-
bers constitute around half of the adults across the regions. By contrast, the
share of male labour in female-headed households was around a third or lower
in all regions in Malawi (Ntchisi, Thiwi Lifidzi, Bwanje Valley, and the Shire
Highlands) and Tanzania (Morogoro and Iringa), and also in the Eastern
Region (Ghana) and the North and South (Mozambique).
De facto female-headed households replicate the patterns of male-headed
households. They have a much higher share of male adult labour than the de
jure female-headed households: indeed at the time of Afrint III, half the adult
labour was male in the former compared with 38 per cent for the latter
(significant at the 1 per cent level). As pointed out in Chapter 1, de facto
female-headed households are concentrated to three particular regions char-
acterized by a long history of male labour migration. Qualitative fieldwork
from Kakamega in Kenya suggests that the circular mobility of husbands can
balance the labour peaks of the agricultural seasons, which may explain the
higher availability of labour in de facto female-headed households (Andersson
Djurfeldt 2012).
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In the usufruct land tenure systems found in many of the study sites, the
relative lack of male labour may explain smaller farm sizes as well as themore
limited ability to produce a marketable surplus (a topic discussed in
Chapter 4) among female farm managers. This difference also appears to be
reflected in the smaller land sizes of de jure female-headed households noted
earlier. Where rights to land are based on the ability to use land, access to
labour may be important to stake claims to land and also to expand culti-
vated area. This presumes that labour is the constraining factor on land
expansion, however.
During the third data collection round a question was added to address the
aspect of labour shortages. While the data in Table 3.2 suggest that female-
managed households in general have fewer male members, the data on labour
shortages contradict the notion that this leads to labour constraints. Only four
regions (both regions in Ghana, Shire Highlands in Malawi, and the Centre in
Mozambique) showed gender-based differences in the share of farmers who
had experienced labour shortages over the past year. Moreover, in the Eastern
Region of Ghana, 48 per cent of the male farm managers experienced labour
shortages compared with only 29 per cent of the female landholders. In






































































Figure 3.3 Male adult members as share of total household members of working age
(16–60), by region and sex of head of household, Afrint III.
Notes: a. The figure shows only regions where there were statistically significant differences
between MMFs and FMFs. All levels of statistical significance were below 5 per cent.
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Table 3.2. Mean and median number of working-age adults by household, by sex of head of household
Country Region Afrint I Afrint II Afrint III
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Male N Female N Diff Sig. Male Female Male N Female N Diff Sig. Male Female Male N Female N Diff Sig. Male Female
Ghana Eastern 3.8 155 3.6 44 3 3 3.7 213 3.1 63 0.6 * 3 3 3.14 191 3.16 57 3 3
Upper East 5.0 176 4.9 21 4 4 4.1 243 3.1 48 1.0 *** 4 3 4.14 228 3.05 56 1.1 *** 4 3
Kenya Kakamega 4.3 90 3.2 59 1.1 ** 3 3 4.8 99 4.6 48 4 4 4.01 90 3.17 60 0.8 ** 4 3
Nyeri 2.5 76 2.4 68 2 2 4.3 97 3.9 56 4 4 3.02 102 2.59 46 2 2
Malawi Ntchisi 2.6 62 2.1 37 0.5 ** 2 2 2.4 77 2.0 23 2 2 2.32 77 1.63 19 0.7 ** 2 1
Thiwi Lifidzi 2.3 64 1.3 34 0.9 *** 2 1 2.0 46 2.0 13 2 2 2.19 64 2.06 35 2 2
Bwanje Valley 2.5 67 2.1 33 2 2 2.4 58 2.1 40 2 2 2.64 70 2.50 22 2 2
Shire Highlands 2.2 45 1.9 56 2 2 2.4 29 2.0 69 0.4 ** 2 2 2.91 56 1.93 41 1.0 *** 3 2
Tanzania Morogoro 3.2 166 2.8 33 2 2 3.0 165 2.7 31 3 2 2.66 159 2.29 38 2 2
Iringa 2.6 152 2.0 47 0.6 *** 2 2 2.7 136 1.9 39 0.8 *** 2 2 2.79 134 2.00 57 0.8 *** 3 2
Zambia Mkushi 4.0 135 3.6 75 3 3 4.1 194 4.0 46 4 4 4.09 189 3.26 72 0.8 *** 4 3
Mazabuka 4.7 163 5.3 28 4 6 4.7 130 2.8 31 1.9 *** 4 2 4.89 175 3.50 38 1.4 *** 5 3
Mozambique North 3.3 100 2.7 60 0.6 ** 3 2 2.4 136 1.5 24 0.9 *** 2 1 2.51 132 2.05 39 2 2
Centre 3.7 94 3.3 65 3 2 3.2 119 2.7 43 3 2 3.99 86 3.45 82 4 3
South 3.4 33 3.0 45 3 2 3.7 24 2.9 53 3 2 4.00 20 2.66 56 1.3 ** 3 2
Notes: a. Extreme cases were removed at the regional level—for Afrint II these cases were heavily concentrated to Thiwi Lifidzi, with forty-one out of fifty-five cases removed in this particular region.
b. For Afrint III, twenty-two extreme cases were removed at the regional level.
c. N equals the number of respondents who answered the questions in that category.
shortages—ranging from 12 per cent of the sample in Iringa, Tanzania stating
that they had experienced shortages of labour, to 65 per cent in Ntchisi,
Malawi. In turn, this suggests that factors external to the household may be
more consequential to labour availability than access to family labour.
Access to Water and Irrigation
As noted by Peterman et al. (2014), few studies exist that quantify gender
differentials in water access and use of irrigation, although a large scholarship
details the legal, cultural, and practical aspects of women’s relatively limited
access to water (Zwarteveen 2008). Only two studies related to the gendered
use of water in sub-Saharan Africa are found by Peterman et al. (2014): one
covers the access to piped water in Limpopo (Hope et al. 2003) and the other
the distance to the main irrigation channel among forty-five rice farmers
in Benin (Kinkingninhoun-Mêdagbé et al. 2010). Both of these find that
women (either women farmers or female-headed households) are disadvan-
taged in their access to water.
We have aimed to identify a broad range of techniques to capture use and
control of water in agricultural production. Information was therefore col-
lected on the access to land that was particularly favourable in terms of natural
endowments of water, in addition to data on more technical issues of water
control and management. These data are only available for Afrint III.
For the sample as a whole, two types of water sources are the most frequently
accessed: 30 per cent of the respondents stated that they cultivate on low-lying
swampy land and 29 per cent that they had access to water from a dam, river,
canal, or lake and used this water to irrigate crops. A smaller proportion—21 per
cent—cultivated on riverbanks or riverbeds. The cultivation either on swampy
land or on riverbanks is relatively common in all regions, with a couple of
exceptions (Nyeri, Kenya and Mazabuka, Zambia), whereas access to dams,
rivers, canals, or lakes is more concentrated geographically. All of these water
sources relate closely to bundles of rights that may have different implications
for men and women depending on local context.
Gendered inequalities in access to water vary strongly across the regions.
Indeed, there are regions (Morogoro (Tanzania), Mazabuka (Zambia), North
and South (both in Mozambique)) where no statistically significant differ-
ences in access to water sources can be found based on the sex of the farm
manager. Nonetheless, in nine of the fifteen regions, male farm managers
had superior access to water resources when compared with female farm
managers. In two of the regions—Kakamega in Kenya and the Shire High-
lands in Malawi—this related both to cultivation on well-watered land as
well as to open water sources, suggesting a double exclusion of female farm
managers. For the other regions, access to other water sources could
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somewhat compensate for the gender bias found with respect to a particular
source of water.
Further sources of gender bias arise from the use of particular irrigation
techniques. In seven of the regions a higher share of male farm managers
reported watering their crops through lifting water from open sources. In
three of these regions the gender gap was sizeable—a difference of 20 per cent
ormore in the proportion of farms usingwater in this way. Lower availability of
male labour onFMFsmaybe affecting female farmmanagers’ ability tousewater
due to gendered bundles of rights, but can also be connected to theheavy labour
involved in irrigating largely through manual lifting and carrying of water.
The largest gap in use of water was found in Shire Highlands (Malawi),
where 37 per cent of the male respondents watered their crops through lifting
water from a dam, lake, river, or canal, compared with 9 per cent of the female
farm managers. Female farm managers in Shire Highlands have poorer access
to all types of water sources, pointing to the regionalized ways in which
gendered access to and use of particular resources intersect.
The use of irrigation techniques that entail some investment in equipment,
for instance water pumps or drip irrigation, is generally less differentiated by
gender. There were no gender-based differences in the use of drip irrigation or
sprinkler irrigation, while a higher share of male farm managers used water
pumps only in two regions. Moreover, in the Centre and North regions in
Mozambique and in Ntchisi in Malawi, there were female biases in the use of
particular techniques. The explanation for this is related to the extremely
low use of any of these technologies: only 2 per cent of the households used
drip irrigation, 4 per cent had access to a water pump, and 3 per cent used
sprinkler irrigation.
Comparing the two types of female-headed households shows biases
towards de jure female-headed households with respect to water access, with
cultivation on low-lying swampy land or riverbeds and access to water from a
dam, pond, or canal being more common among these households. Two
irrigation techniques (watering through lifting of water and through the use
of a water pump) were also more frequent among de jure female-headed
households. The explanation for the lower access to water resources and use
of irrigation among de facto female-headed households seems to lie in the
geographical concentration of these households in particular regions where
these types of irrigation are less important.
Other Non-Land Assets
As suggested by the regional farm size data, mean cultivated area increased in
some regions, while farm sizes fell in others. Under conditions of shrinking
farm sizes, the possibility for intensifying agriculture, or at least preventing
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decreases in soil fertility, is intimately connected to assets that can preserve, if
not raise, productivity—either in terms of production volume or themonetary
value realized from land.
IMPROVED SEED
Peterman et al. (2014) note that research on inorganic fertilizer, and to some
extent improved seed varieties, constitute the majority of studies on gender
gaps in input use. Most of these studies find that gender in itself is not a
significant explanation for differences in input use, with other factors such as
education and wealth being more relevant.
The data contain longitudinal information on the use of improved varieties
of maize, sorghum, and rice, as well as the use of inorganic fertilizer. The latter
data are of limited value, however, since nearly a fifth (18 per cent) of maize
farmers report refraining from the use of fertilizer, as they perceive their soils
to be fertile. While data on maize are the most comprehensive—maize being
grown by 93 per cent of the Afrint III sample—the relative importance of
maize in regional crop patterns varies considerably. To address this variability,
and the regional importance of rice and sorghum, I combine the data on
improved varieties for the three grain crops (maize, rice, and sorghum), creat-
ing a variable showing whether households used or did not use improved seed
varieties for any of these crops. This does not detail the amounts used on each
farm, but nonetheless provides information on technology use among male
and female farm managers respectively.
For the sample as a whole, there were no differences in the use of improved
seed varieties related to the sex of the farm manager for Afrint I. Only two
regions—Iringa in Tanzania and Mkushi in Zambia—showed any significant
differences in seed technology uptake based on gender, with 32 per cent of the
male respondents in Iringa using improved seed, compared with 9 per cent of
the female farm managers (significant at the 1 per cent level). In Mkushi,
by contrast, the gender gap was reversed, with 61 per cent of female farm
managers using improved seed varieties compared with only 42 per cent
among male farm managers (significant at the 1 per cent level). In general,
the interregional variation in the use of improved seed was extremely wide,
however, with near universal use of improved varieties in Nyeri (93 per cent)
in Kenya and Mazabuka (92 per cent) in Zambia, compared with 1 per cent in
the South region of Mozambique.
By the time of Afrint II, gender-based differences in the use of improved seed
had emerged for the sample as a whole: 50 per cent of female farm managers
used improved seed compared with 54 per cent among male landholders
(significant at the 5 per cent level). Breaking down the data by region only
shows significant differences based on gender in one region, Ntchisi inMalawi,
where 61 per cent of male farmmanagers used improved seed, compared with
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26 per cent among female farmmanagers (significant at the 1 per cent level). In
themeantime regional disparities increased further, with no households using
improved seed varieties in the South region in Mozambique, and the share of
households using improved varieties in Nyeri rising further to 96 per cent.
The share of respondents in the full sample that used improved seeds fell
for both male farm managers (51 per cent) and female farm managers (44
per cent) for Afrint III, while the gender gap widened from 4 per cent to
7 per cent (significant at the 1 per cent level). At the regional level again,
however, there was a statistically significant difference only in one region, the
Shire Highlands in Malawi, where 80 per cent of male farm managers used
improved seed varieties, compared with 57 per cent of female farmmanagers
(significant at the 5 per cent level). Regional differences were again
pronounced and on the whole stable over time, with Nyeri (96 per cent)
and Mazabuka (95 per cent) having the highest share of households using
improved seed, and the regions in Mozambique again having the lowest
use of improved seed. In this sense differences in use of improved seed
varieties are based on geography rather than gender. There were no differ-
ences in the use of improved seeds between the two different types of female-
headed households.
AGRICULTURAL TECHNIQUES
In the Afrint II round of data collection, several variables on agricultural
techniques were introduced. Unfortunately, this information proved to be
difficult to collect and it is not possible to use the data as a baseline. A new
attempt made for Afrint III produced more reliable results. While these data
cannot provide a longitudinal perspective on the gender dynamics of tech-
nology uptake, they can nonetheless shed light on the technology available to
male and female farm managers respectively.
Data were collected on a number of agricultural techniques: crop rotation,
intercropping use of chemical fertilizer, pesticides, and herbicides, use of
animal manure and crop residues, composting, fallowing, no-till agriculture,
agroforestry, and techniques used to prevent soil loss due to rain. In general,
the use of agricultural technology is quite high, with intercropping and use of
inorganic fertilizer being most prevalent, used by 65 per cent and 59 per cent
of the households respectively. Zero-till techniques were the least common,
but of regional importance in the two regions in Zambia and in the Eastern
Region in Ghana (which is also confirmed by qualitative fieldwork carried out
in these regions, see Andersson Djurfeldt et al. 2014, Andersson Djurfeldt and
Hillbom 2016).
At the overarching level there is a clear gender bias in the use of almost all
of the techniques, the exceptions being intercropping and agroforestry.
As cautioned earlier, however, production systems as well as gender dynamics
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differ appreciably across space, with particular techniques being more import-
ant to local and regional livelihoods than others. In turn, gender-based access
to assets may differ depending on norms that regulate the use of land and
commons, for instance practices related to the planting of trees or cultural
restrictions surrounding the keeping of livestock.
Running the data by region shows that only one region (the Centre in
Mozambique) has no gender gaps in technology use. For the remaining
regions, technology gaps that bias MMFs exist for a varying number of tech-
nologies, ranging from one to seven techniques. The two regions in Zambia
have the largest number of gender gaps in technology use (see Figure 3.4). In
the North region in Mozambique there is a female bias in the use of no-till
agriculture, but only three female farm managers use this technique so the
reliability of the results is questionable in this case.
Even if regional technology use varies noticeably, a few patterns deserve
mention: alongside agroforestry, the use of animal manure and pesticide
application are the techniques where gender gaps are most prevalent. This
confirms broader patterns noted in the literature with respect to gendered
patterns of livestock ownership (Kristjanson et al. 2014). The review by
Peterman et al. (2014) identifies only two studies from sub-Saharan Africa




























































































Figure 3.4 Regions with significant differences in gendered use of agricultural
techniques.
Notes: a. The share of male farm managers using the technique is higher than the share of female
farm managers using the technique, Afrint III.
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Uganda (Jagger and Pender 2006) finds no differences in adoption between
male- and female-headed households. A smaller study by Kinkingninhoun-
Mêdagbé et al. (2010) of forty-five rice farmers in Benin documents gender-
based inequalities in adoption of pesticides, however. Drawing on qualitative
fieldwork from two villages in Mkushi and one in Mazabuka carried out
in November 2012, a number of possible sources of gender gaps in these
particular regions spring to mind. Focus group discussions among male farm-
ers suggested that lower literacy levels among women prevents their use of
pesticides, since they are not able to read the instructions printed on the
pesticide containers, while the equipment used for spraying is too heavy for
women to carry. Contract farming arrangements for cotton (a crop which if
grown conventionally has high pesticide requirements) meanwhile discrim-
inate against female farmers. Gender-based discriminationmay therefore arise
both by default as well as by design, depending on the characteristics of
cropping systems and use of particular inputs, as well as marketing arrange-
ments (Andersson Djurfeldt 2017).
Agricultural techniques are remarkably similar among de facto and de jure
female-headed households, with a few exceptions: crop rotation and the use
of chemical fertilizers are lower among the former, but pesticide use, the use of
green manure, and agroforestry were higher among the latter. It appears that
these differences are related to the nature of the production systems found in
the regions where de facto female-headed households are concentrated, how-
ever, and it therefore becomes spurious to draw any conclusions on the basis
of this variation.
LIVESTOCK
In their review of the literature on gender and livestock, Kristjanson et al.
(2014: 210) note a ‘dearth of quantitative information on this subject, espe-
cially for mixed crop-livestock systems where most livestock and livestock
keepers are found’. While the data cannot specify the channels through
which women acquire livestock or the extent to which women control the
proceeds generated from sale of livestock or animal products, they do enable
us to quantify livestock ownership by the sex of farm manager.
A first point relates to regional differences in livestock ownership: four
regions stand out in this respect, Mazabuka in Zambia, the Upper East Region
in Ghana, and Kakamega and Nyeri in Kenya. In the remaining regions the
importance of livestock to livelihoods is more marginal, with households on
average holding one tropical livestock unit or less. While gender gaps have
widened—especially during the latest period, the size of these gaps are small
in regions where livestock are of limited importance, but more sizeable in
those regions where livestock ownership is largest. Nonetheless, persistent
gender gaps in livestock ownership are found in regions where livestock is
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relatively less important (Mkushi, Zambia, and Iringa, Tanzania), as well as in
the Upper East, Ghana where households on average held 3.5 tropical live-
stock units by the time of Afrint III. For the first round of data collection there
were statistically significant differences in livestock ownership based on the
sex of farm manager in five regions, a number that remained unchanged for
Afrint II (although the particular regions shifted to some extent) and increased
to eight regions by the final survey, as shown in Figure 3.5.
While gender gaps had emerged in numerous regions by the time of the
final survey, as illustrated in Figure 3.5, the disparity betweenMMFs and FMFs
is largest in the case of Mazabuka, Zambia. Here female farm managers on
average had herds around half the size of male farm managers. In this region
there had been continuous restocking following outbreaks of East Coast fever
just before the first survey. The average herd size was just above 2 tropical
livestock units for Afrint I, increasing to roughly 5 by the time of the second
survey round.
Methodological issues related to the number of extreme cases that were
removed in the various years suggests that the gender gaps may be under-

















































Figure 3.5 Tropical livestock units by sex of farm manager in regions where there were
statistically significant differences between MMFs and FMFs, Afrint III.
Notes: a. Eastern and Upper East is in Ghana, Kakamega in Kenya, Shire Highlands in Malawi,
Morogoro and Iringa in Tanzania, and Mkushi and Mazabuka in Zambia. The 2013 livestock data
for Mozambique are not possible to use, since coding errors in the data prevent comparability with
other countries as well as over time.
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with around eighty cases removed for the first two rounds, but as many as 119
cases were removed for the Afrint III data. Out of these 101 were MMFs, and
only eighteen FMFs.
The assumption is often made that women keep small stock—for instance
goats, sheep, and poultry—while men own larger types of livestock, such as
cattle. The data from Afrint III modify this impression. In those regions where
livestock ownership is high (Mazabuka in Zambia especially, as well as the
Upper East, Ghana), male farm managers have higher access to several types
of livestock, both cattle as well as small stock. Comparatively, ownership of
goats, sheep, and poultry are as biased towards MMFs, as is ownership of
cattle. Even if there are examples of female farm managers holding all types
of livestock, at the aggregate level there are large gender-based differentials in
livestock ownership regardless of animal type. The data therefore suggest that
on the whole female farm managers are not able to compensate for lacking
cattle ownership through keeping small stock. There are no differences in
ownership of livestock among the two types of female-headed households.
Non-Agricultural Assets
While agricultural assets are clearly important in generating income in the
context of livelihoods that rely greatly on farming, non-agricultural assets can
be used as a basis for diversification away from farming into potentially more
lucrative opportunities. Moreover, non-agricultural assets may, in the strongly
seasonal context of smallholder-based farming systems, enable offsetting
shortfalls in farm-based income and food during the lean season.With respect
to gender specifically, access to non-farm assets may also compensate for
women’s relatively poorer foothold in relation to agricultural assets.
Non-Farm Assets that Can Be Used for Income Generation
Longitudinal data are available for a handful of assets with income-generating
potential: data on ownership of mobile or stationary phones, bicycles, and
sewing machines have been collected at all three points in time. For Afrint III,
data were also collected on the ownership of cars.
The massive expansion of information and communication technologies
(ICTs) in rural Africa is reflected in the data: at the start of the project, only
3 per cent of the sampled households reported that they had access to
a mobile or stationary phone. By the final round of data collection, 67 per cent
stated that they had access to a phone, but regional disparities are wide: only
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19 per cent of households in Bwanje Valley (Malawi) possessed a phone,
compared with 97 per cent in Nyeri (Kenya). At the country level, Malawi
stands out with the lowest share of phone ownership.
The ICT revolution has been largely gender neutral, with some exceptions: in
regions with very low rates of phone ownership the gender gaps were pro-
nounced. This characterized three of the four regions in Malawi: in Bwanje
Valley, 25 per cent of the male farm managers owned a phone compared with
4 per cent the female farm managers (significant at the 5 per cent level). Simi-
larly, inThiwi Lifidzi,where only21per cent of the respondents ownedaphone,
there was a large gender gap—27 per cent of the male farm managers reported
owning a phone compared with 11 per cent of the female respondents
(significant at the 10 per cent level). In Ntchisi, where 30 per cent of all the
sampled households owned a phone, the gender gap was 14 per cent—with
only 11 per cent of the female farm managers having a phone (significant at
the 5 per cent level). Also in the North region inMozambique, the gender gap
was pronounced with 41 per cent of male farm managers owning a phone,
compared with 13 per cent of the female farm managers (significant at the
1 per cent level).
For the transportation assets (car, motorbike, and bicycle), only data on
bicycle ownership are available for all three rounds, whereas data were col-
lected for car and motorbike ownership only in the third phase of the project.
The ownership of cars is extremely limited—only 4 per cent of the sampled
households owned a car, with a concentration of car ownership in Nyeri in
Kenya and the Eastern Region in Ghana. This variable is therefore not a
reliable reflection of income-generating assets for the sampled households.
Ownership of motorbikes is restricted to 9 per cent of the sample, preventing
any meaningful analysis of gender gaps.
Bicycle ownership is more inclusive—already during Afrint I, half of the
sample reported owning bicycles, a figure that increased to 60 per cent by the
second survey and remained at that level until the final round of data collec-
tion. For the sample as a whole, there are large and growing gender-based
differences in bicycle ownership: for Afrint III, 69 per cent of male farm
managers had a bicycle, compared with 39 per cent of female farm managers
(significant at the 0.1 per cent level). Gender-based differences in bicycle
ownership are large and widespread, and found in all regions except one
(the Upper East in Ghana). This may be an indicator both of a generally
lower asset base among female farm managers, but could also be suggestive
of the more restricted mobility of women. A final asset that can enable raising
non-farm income is the sewing machine. Again, however, the ownership of
sewing machines is limited, with only 9 per cent of the households having
a sewing machine by the time of Afrint III.
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Housing Standard, Other Consumer Durables, and Savings
While the consumer durables discussed in the preceding section can be used
to improve livelihoods, others may be indicative of the accumulation of
wealth (and in that sense they can be seen as livelihood outcomes).
One obvious indicator of wealth is housing standard, for which we have
data since the start of the project. The share of households living in
‘advanced housing’, defined as block and brick houses with corrugated iron
roofs, has been increasing steadily, from 18 per cent in Afrint I to 36 per cent
in Afrint III. Whereas this type of housing was heavily concentrated to just
three regions (Nyeri in Kenya, Morogoro in Tanzania, and Eastern Region in
Ghana) in the first round, by the time of the last surveymore than 20 per cent
of the households in ten regions lived in advanced housing. Gender gaps in
housing standard were generally absent—only in four regions,Mazabuka and
Mkushi in Zambia, Iringa in Tanzania, and the Shire Highlands inMalawi did
female farmmanagers have a poorer housing standard than their male coun-
terparts. Moreover, in two of these regions, statistical significance was only
possible to establish at the 10 per cent level.
In addition to housing standard, we have data on four other consumer
durables, as well as the ability to save (whether the household was able to
save or not). Longitudinal data are available for ownership of TVs andmodern
stoves, while this information was complemented by data on sofa sets during
the final round of data collection. Data on savings are available for all three
surveys. In general, ownership of both TV sets and modern stoves was sparse
for the first two rounds of data collection (between 10 per cent and 15 per cent
of the households had these assets), with the possibilities for analysing gender
gaps being limited by small sample sizes. By the time of Afrint III a quarter of
the sample owned a TV, but these households were strongly concentrated to
the regions of Nyeri (71 per cent) in Kenya, Mazabuka (50 per cent) in Zambia,
and the Eastern Region (41 per cent) in Ghana, and to a lesser extent to the
other two regions in Zambia (Mkushi, 35 per cent) and Kenya (Kakamega,
30 per cent). The largest gender gap existed in Mkushi, where 43 per cent of
the male respondents had a TV, compared with only 14 per cent of the female
farm managers. Kakamega and the Eastern Region had no gender gaps in TV
ownership. The data on sofa sets replicate the data on TV ownership—Eastern
Region, the two regions in Kenya, and the two regions in Zambia have the
highest share of households with sofa sets, but for this variable there was a
gender gap only in the two Zambian regions.
The longitudinal data on saving ability show that this generally increased
during the period, with 42 per cent of the households stating that they could
save for future needs at the start of the project, compared with 55 per cent by
the time of the final data collection round. During the same period the gender
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gap widened from 10 per cent to 14 per cent (all differences significant at the
1 per cent level). Breaking down the data by region suggests a different picture,
however. In general, during the first phase, the ability to save was much less
regionally concentrated than data for consumer durables at the corresponding
point in time, from a low in Thiwi Lifidzi in Malawi, where 22 per cent of the
households reported that they could save, to 58 per cent in the Eastern Region,
Ghana. Moreover, there were significant gender differentials in the ability to
save in only three regions. By the time of the second survey, gender gaps in
saving ability (biased against female farmmanagers) were found in six regions,
pointing to increasing gender-based differentiation amid general improve-
ments in the ability to save. Interestingly, however, in the case of Kakamega,
Kenya, savings ability was higher among female farm managers than among
male farm managers (a gap of 19 per cent).
During Afrint III, somewhat surprisingly, the lowest ability to save was
found in Kakamega, where 29 per cent of the households stated that they
saved, whereas the two regions in Zambia (where 83 per cent and 72 per cent
of the respondents saved), Nyeri (71 per cent) in Kenya, and the Eastern
Region (71 per cent) in Ghana held the largest share of savers. Five regions
had significant gender-based gaps in the ability to save. Overall, the data on
savings suggest improvements over time, with regional disparities closing and
gender gaps being maintained only in a handful of regions.
Advanced housing as well as consumer durables weremore common among
the de facto female-headed households than the de jure ones—but again, this
may be related to regional effects, where the concentration of consumer
durables in the two Kenyan regions overlaps with a high share of de facto
female-headed households. There were no differences in the ability to save.
Conclusions
A few initial observations can be made regarding the trends in the data. Sources
of gender-based asset gaps vary regionally—most likely depending on local
production systems. Moreover, gender gaps shift over time—there are few per-
sistent trends in the data stretching as far back as the first round of data collec-
tion, although in several regions gaps have emerged between Afrint I and II that
have been sustained or widened during the latest period of data collection.
With respect to particular asset types, agricultural assets, especially land
and water, were generally biased against female farm managers. Female farm
managers were fewer than male farm managers in all regions and on average
held smaller farms than male farm managers in eleven out of the fifteen
regions. Moreover, changes in land size—whether positive or negative—had
a disproportionately negative effect on FMFs when compared with MMFs.
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Somewhat surprisingly, however, control over land was not biased against
female farm managers—indeed a slightly higher share of these respondents
stated that they had full control over land, compared with male farm man-
agers. Moreover, female farm managers had not experienced loss of land to a
greater extent than their male counterparts. Gender biases with respect to land
appear therefore to lie primarily in the sizes of cultivated areas, which in
usufruct systems is related to the ability to control labour.
The demographic data show few statistically significant differences when it
comes to the size of the households managed by women and men respect-
ively, but the share of male labour is much lower on FMFs across all regions,
except one. In turn, this appears to be connected to smaller land sizes as well
as the lower use of particular irrigation techniques that depend on the manual
lifting of water. While the importance of livestock varies strongly between the
regions, in those regions where livestock are most important, the gender gaps
are also pronounced. Moreover, in these regions male farm managers domin-
ate all types of livestock ownership. Overall, therefore, the results suggest that
the ownership or access to agricultural assets are in general concentrated in
MMFs, with the importance of particular types of capital varying depending
on the characteristics of regional production system.
In general, the data on housing standard, consumer durables, and savings
suggest that assets that capture livelihood outcomes are less prone to gender-
based differentials than agricultural assets that enable raising incomes and
securing livelihoods. The explanation for this discrepancy may lie in the differ-
ences in household size—since female farmmanagers in general command less
male labour the land that they cultivate and the livestock herds that they keep
appear to be adjusted to their labour resources. Incomes generated (whether
from agriculture or not) by these households are invested in improved housing,
consumer durables, and savings, rather than used to accumulate agrarian
assets. In terms of policy recommendations this suggests that labour-saving
technologies and crops may be more important interventions for FMFs than
labour-intensive packages focused primarily on raising yields. Moreover, the
tendency among female farm managers to invest in non-agricultural assets
also points to the need for encouraging income opportunities related to such
assets, for instance the possibility of engaging in local processing of agricul-
tural products to add value.
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As noted in Chapter 1, the smallholder-based rural development model
strongly emphasizes commercialization. In this sense, linking small farmers
to agricultural output markets—whether domestic or global—constitutes a
pivotal aspect of strategies aimed to encourage pro-poor agricultural growth.
The possibilities of linking smallholders to markets rest on supply-side as
well as demand-side factors, related to the production of a marketable surplus
as well as the functioning of markets in themselves. Much research has been
concerned with the gendered patterns of agricultural production, tied to
aspects such as cropping patterns (Doss 2002, Carr 2008), technology uptake
(Doss and Morris 2001, Doss 2001, Peterman et al. 2010, Quisumbing and
Pandolfelli 2010, Bergman Lodin 2012), gender gaps in productivity, and
access to extension services (Kilic et al. 2015). With the exception of the global
value chain literature (Barrientos et al. 2003, Maertens and Swinnen 2009),
much less interest has been devoted to the gender dynamics of commercial-
ization, both in the mainstream developmentalist literature and in feminist
post-structuralist work.
Gender-based studies of rural livelihoods, meanwhile, tend to depart from
land and labour markets, whether dealt with through the economic perspec-
tives of allocative inefficiencies (Udry et al. 1995, Udry 1996) or as seen
through the structuralist lens of political economy (Razavi 2009), rather
than the empirical question of how women and men make a living in rural
areas. Given the well-known male bias in land tenure systems in most of
Africa, the relative discrimination of women under these tenure systems is by
now well documented (Peters 1997, FAO 2010, Peters 2010, FAO 2011, Peters
2013). Less is known, however, regarding how, or even if, such biases translate
into exclusion from agricultural output markets too, and how this in turnmay
be connected to women’s access to non-farm sources of livelihood.
This chapter uses a cross-country comparative perspective in analysing
gendered patterns of agricultural commercialization and rural livelihoods.
A first research question addresses whether female farm managers are in fact
excluded from agricultural commercialization (and by implication incomes)
when compared to their male counterparts. Whether the sources of this
exclusion can be found in the functioning of markets themselves or factors
inherent to the household constitutes an important sub-question. Second, the
chapter analyses if and how access to non-farm incomes (NFIs) varies by
gender, and by extension whether incomes from the non-farm sector can
compensate for poorer access to agricultural incomes among female farm
managers. Third, how the prospects for commercialization and livelihood
diversification among the two different types of female-headed households
(de facto and de jure) vary will be considered. Finally, the income-generation
patterns of those women who live in male-headed households will be
addressed. The analysis in what follows will be guided by these questions,
and positioned in relation to existing theoretical and empirical research fron-
tiers and gaps.
Theoretical Points of Departure
As suggested initially, two main tenets underpin pro-poor growth approaches
to agricultural development in sub-Saharan Africa: inclusivity and commer-
cialization. In the grey area literature, prospects for enhancing inclusivity
among female farmers are centred on closing the gender gap in agriculture
(World Bank et al. 2009, FAO 2011) through redressing productivity differ-
entials arising from differences in access to productive resources and non-
land inputs.
Policy perspectives in turn draw on a vast literature on gendered access to
agrarian resources, especially with respect to factor markets, both among
agricultural economists in what is sometimes referred to as the mainstream
feminist literature (Doss and Morris 2001) as well as political economy
approaches (Jackson 2003, Razavi 2003, Razavi 2009, Peters 2013). While
the latter bring to the fore issues of power, social relations, and historical
change that are generally absent in the former, both bodies of scholarship
demonstrate a dividing line in the command over agrarian resources based
at least in part on gender.
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More surprising, given the aspirations of pro-poor growth strategies to ‘link
smallholders to markets’ (Bernstein and Oya 2014), is the limited literature
available on gendered aspects of commercialization, especially for food
crops—crops that (often mistakenly) are assumed to be ‘women’s crops’
(Doss 2002, Carr 2008). While women’s relatively limited commercialization
at one level is strongly connected to the productivity constraints identified in
the literature, situating commercialization in relation to broader livelihood
aspects can shed important light on commercialization dynamics, especially
with respect to food crops.
Agricultural Commercialization and Gender
In a recent review of studies of market engagement among African small-
holders, Wiggins and Keats (2013) identify a number of explanations for the
limited commercialization among smallholders in general. Ill-fitting tech-
nologies and high transportation costs suppress potential marketable surplus
or restrict the profitability of trading. High-risk environments characterized by
insecure rights of tenure and erratic government policies supress commercial-
ization; credit constraints and inflated transaction costs provide further
explanations. Monopsonistic output markets in some countries lower produ-
cer prices, hampering the incentives for selling produce.
Out of these aspects, the ones that have received the most interest in the
literature on gender and commercialization are farm-based constraints related
to technology uptake, extension services, and insecurity of tenure, tied expli-
citly or implicitly to lower productivity and the poorer possibilities for the
generation of a marketable surplus.
Beyond the supply-side factors connected to poorer female productivity,
two main bodies of literature have emerged in relation to women’s commer-
cialization in sub-Saharan Africa. On the one hand numerous studies, both
contemporary and historical, concern the male dominance over cash crop
production and sales as well as the growing male control over women’s crops
as they become commercialized (Von Braun and Webb 1989, Moore and
Vaughan 1994, Lilja et al. 1996, Sørensen 1996, Kasente et al. 2002, Negin
et al. 2009, Bergman Lodin 2012).
A second body of literature departs from (global) value chain analysis
and concerns gendered aspects of various value chains as well as the gen-
dered outcomes of different types of marketing arrangements, for instance
cooperatives or farmers’ groups (see Rubin and Manfre 2014 for a recent
review) in such value chains. The bias against women in terms of their
relatively limited access to productive assets, technology, credit, informa-
tion, and social networks explain their inability to engage in value chains of
higher-value or contract farming arrangements (Maertens and Swinnen
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2009, Schneider and Gugerty 2010). Demands to meet increasingly taxing
food safety and quality standards, and the inability to fulfil the volume
requirements of large-scale buyers, raise the entry costs for high-value mar-
kets in particular (Reardon et al. 2009).
Studies concerned with the gender dynamics of market coordination
arrangements that enable access to value chains are limited. A study from
Tanzania suggests that farmers’ marketing groups dominated by women are
less successful in accessingmarkets thanmale groups, although the reasons for
this, as cautioned by the authors, maywell rest with the lack of access to natural
resources (Barham and Chitemi 2009). Fischer and Qaim (2012) show how
collective action among Kenyan small-scale banana farmers is tied to increased
male dominance over revenues generated from sales, but also that female
membership in farmers’ groups can counteract these tendencies. Intra-
household aspects can prevent women in male-headed households from
joining marketing cooperatives however, as members need to overcome ‘lack
of trust and suspicion concerning their whereabouts’ and the husbands’ fear
of ‘losing control over them, restricting their engagement in groups’ (Gotschi
et al. 2009: 272), as noted in the context of Mozambique. Finally, Handschuch
andWollni (2013) identify a general empirical gap in relation to the marketing
of food crops, while showing the potential of collective action among female
farmers of finger millet in Kenya to increase market participation as well
as prices.
Complementarities and Commercialization
While studies of value chains, commercialization, and market participation
focus on particular crops, complementary perspectives are concerned with
shifts in intra-household relations and production dynamics connected to
processes of commercialization. In this vein, studies of intra-household div-
ision of labour show how women withdraw their labour from production of
crops whose commercialization predominantly benefits their husbands, to
engage instead in food crop production or non-farm activities (Whitehead
and Kabeer 2001). In this context it can be noted that a common argument for
enhancing women’s participation in output markets relates to the perceived
potential for augmenting independent female incomes that in turn benefit
women through increasing their bargaining power within households (Doss
2013, Doss 2014, Rubin and Manfre 2014).
Political economy perspectives contextualize households and intra-
household gender dynamics, stressing the joint as well as conflicting activ-
ities, interests, and responsibilities of wives and husbands over the life cycle
(Jackson 1999, Jackson 2007, O’Laughlin 2007, Okali 2012). The necessity of
placing the household in a broader economic as well as institutional context is
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highlighted by these perspectives. The contextual nature of both gender
relations and production systems also raises the need for geographical
contextualization.
Rural Livelihoods, Gender, and Non-Farm/Farm Interaction
In this respect, studies of diversification (and livelihood perspectives more
broadly) offer a valuable contribution to studies of gender and agricultural
commercialization. As noted earlier, the sources of female exclusion from
agricultural livelihood opportunities are manifold and varied, involving limi-
tations in the access to productive assets and less tangible resources, as well as
restrictions tied to lacking individual mobility and time poverty. Understand-
ing if and how this exclusion interacts with a marginalization from non-farm
activities, or may indeed be compensated for through engagement in non-
agricultural pursuits, is crucial to analysing gender relations in rural areas and
may also shed light on gendered patterns of commercialization.
Nonetheless, Whitehead and Kabeer (2001: 13), summarizing the literature
from the 1990s, note that ‘there is little systematic research on women’s non-
farm income activities in sub-Saharan Africa, but what data there is testifies to
their active involvement’. As suggested by a recent review by Alobo Loison
(2015), numerous studies document the segmentation of non-farm activities
into low-entry low-return and high-entry high-return activities respectively
(Barrett and Bezuneh 2001, Marenya et al. 2003, Reardon et al. 2007). Only a
limited number of studies analyse the gender dynamics of this segmentation
(Canagarajah et al. 2001, Lay and Mahmoud 2008), and even fewer consider
the gendered ways in which farm- and non-farm activities are linked in rural
livelihoods (Yaro 2006, Andersson Djurfeldt et al. 2013).
Data Sources, Reliability, and Analysis
The analysis in this chapter relies heavily on the quantitative data as described
in Chapter 1, with qualitative data from three villages in Malawi and Zambia
respectively (collected in 2012), two Kenyan villages (collected in 2007), and
four villages in Ghana (collected in 2011) being used mainly to illustrate and
explain the tendencies identified in the quantitative data. The data collection
methods are described in detail in Chapter 1.
Variables are used that concern three aspects of rural livelihoods in parti-
cular: commercialization, cash incomes, and cash income composition. For
maize—the only grain staple that is grown across the six countries—
commercialization ismeasured throughmarket participation, share of produce
sold, and volume sold for the three data collection rounds, by sex of farm
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manager. For other food crops, data are only available formarket participation,
and for cash crops only data onwhether the cropwas grown are available (with
the presumption that cash crops are always sold). Production and commercial-
ization data for particular crops are only available at the farm level.
For cash income composition, however, two sources of data are available for
the Afrint III data: first, the farmmanager was asked to estimate the size of cash
income for the household as a whole; and second, individual cash income
data, by source, were collected for all adult household members by sex within
each household. Although the lack of individual data for Afrint II prevents
outright comparison, differences in size and composition of cash income by
sex of farm manager can be traced over time, while gender patterns of intra-
household sources of livelihoods can be described for the final round of data
collection at least.
The drawbacks of relying on cash income data to analyse livelihoods in
contexts where subsistence production is widespread were acknowledged in
Chapter 1. Nonetheless, the varied nature of production systems across
regions and countries, and the lack of detailed production data for roots and
tubers, prevent the calculation of total household income.
Statistically the analysis is descriptive: data on commercialization and
incomes are compared by sex of farm manager, with differences of means
between the two groups analysed through ANOVA (analysis of variance) tests.
Given the risk of type 1 errors connected to the high number of statistical tests
carried out, differences that are statistically significant above the 1 per cent
level need to be interpreted very cautiously.
Agricultural Commercialization and Gender
Patterns of commercialization for maize, non-grain food crops, and cash crops
are analysed in what follows. While the dataset also contains information on
rice and sorghum, maize is the only grain crop that is grown across all of the
countries, although its national and regional importance varies greatly.
Maize
Even at the national level and for one particular crop (in this case maize) it is
difficult to draw any clear-cut conclusions with respect to commercialization
or gendered patterns of the same.
COMMERCIALIZATION TENDENCIES
Whereas food crops such as maize are frequently described as ‘women’s crops’
(Sachs 1996, Arndt and Tarp 2000), commercialization in terms of market
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participation in maize is widespread among both male and female farm
managers, especially in Tanzania and Zambia. While market participation was
biased towardsmale farmmanagers inGhana and Tanzania at the time of Afrint
I, this bias disappearedby the second survey,withmarketparticipation formaize
generally falling for bothhousehold types inGhana since the start of the project.
In the case of Malawi, market participation has increased for male farm man-
agers, but decreased for their female counterparts since Afrint II.
By contrast, commercialization by all measures has increased for both male
and female respondents, especially in Zambia between the third and second
rounds of data collection, while marketed volumes were higher in Ghana for
both household types compared to Afrint II (see Table 4.1).
Maize commercialization in Zambia was disproportionately favouring male
farm managers already by the second survey, with 61 per cent of maize-
growing households in this category participating in the market compared
to 46 per cent of the female farm managers. This gap in market participation
had expanded further by the time of Afrint III, although both groups of
households became increasingly commercialized. Whereas the gap in share
marketed was largely similar for the second and third phase, again the share
marketed had increased for both household types by the time of Afrint III,
with male-headed households marketing 56 per cent of their production,
compared with 46 per cent for the female-headed households. The disparity
in amounts sold was also much larger by this time, suggesting that the sources
of increased differences in commercialization can be traced to differences in
marketable surplus rather than market segmentation or differences in market-
ing behaviour as such.
The demographic data discussed in Chapter 3 point to lower access to male
labour on FMFs. Qualitative fieldwork carried out in Zambia and Malawi also
confirms the notion of lower labour availability in female-headed households.
In the case of two of the Zambian study sites (Chilekwa and Nikantaka) visited
in 2012, the introduction of conservation farming in 2010/11, as well as the
reintroduction of fertilizer subsidies, were perceived to be sources of increased
production and yields as expressed in individual as well as group interviews.
Conservation farming was being promoted by an NGO, the Conservation
Farming Unit (CFU), in collaboration with the Ministry of Agriculture and
was based on the construction of basins, which was perceived to be very
labour intensive. While representatives from the CFU in the two sites sug-
gested that female farmers were more actively embracing conservation farm-
ing the labour intensity of conservation farming adds to the workload of
women. Lack of labour resources was identified by female focus groups as
the major constraint to production on FMFs. As noted by Haggblade et al.
(2010), the labour intensity of conservation farming falls over time but is high
in the short term as basins are constructed.
Gender, Commercialization, and Diversification
87
Table 4.1. Commercialization in maize, by country and sex of farm manager
Afrint I Afrint II Afrint III
Male N Female N Diff. Sig. Male N Female N Diff. Sig. Male N Female N Diff. Sig.
Ghana Market participation 0.97 156 0.87 46 0.10 ** 0.67 296 0.74 73 0.58 337 0.54 81
Share sold of production 0.61 150 0.59 40 0.65 199 0.68 54 0.57 197 0.54 44
Sale of maize (kg) 481 142 337 39 143 ** 516 190 380 54 137 ** 655 187 420 44 234 ***
Kenya Market participation 0.21 171 0.16 128 0.31 196 0.33 104 0.34 193 0.34 107
Share sold of production 0.39 36 0.34 20 0.51 60 0.46 34 0.44 65 0.38 36
Sale of maize (kg) 513 34 513 20 588 57 315 33 273 ** 687 63 440 35
Malawi Market participation 0.07 239 0.03 160 0.39 224 0.33 171 0.41 275 0.27 125 0.14 ***
Share sold of production 0.17 16 0.09 5 0.25 85 0.20 56 0.22 113 0.24 34
Sale of maize (kg) 167 14 81 5 300 79 206 55 94 * 267 103 220 33
Tanzania Market participation 0.55 286 0.34 70 0.21 *** 0.48 294 0.47 64 0.57 275 0.59 82
Share sold of production 0.41 155 0.35 24 0.46 128 0.43 29 0.43 156 0.50 47 0.07 *
Sale of maize (kg) 570 150 384 23 711 121 489 29 892 152 695 46
Zambia Market participation 0.24 270 0.25 92 0.61 354 0.46 89 0.15 ** 0.79 366 0.59 108 0.20 ***
Share sold of production 0.35 65 0.33 23 0.49 215 0.41 41 0.08 ** 0.56 290 0.46 64 0.10 ***
Sale of maize (kg) 524 59 324 23 200 * 1,880 202 1,079 41 801 ** 2,926 275 1,175 63 1,750 ***
Mozambique Market participation 0.36 197 0.27 145 0.09 * 0.33 231 0.17 113 0.16 *** 0.26 229 0.27 174
Share sold of production 0.42 70 0.40 39 0.36 77 0.20 19 0.15 *** 0.30 57 0.22 46 0.08 *
Sale of maize (kg) 218 67 198 39 269 75 136 19 133 * 226 51 197 45
Notes: a. Market participation: share of producing households stating that they sold maize.
b. Share sold of production: share of total production sold.
c. Sale of maize (kg): total amount of maize sold.
d. Extreme cases for amounts of maize sold have been removed at the village level.
The ability tomake full use of conservation farming techniquesmay therefore
be limited by labour shortages on FMFs, especially in the short term (Andersson
Djurfeldt andHillbom2016). The shortage of labour on FMFswas also identified
as the distinguishing feature of female farmmanagers in the focus group discus-
sions across the threeMalawian villageswherefieldworkwas carried out in2012.
The individual interviewswithwomenwhowereheading their ownhouseholds
also attributed the loss of male labour as a result of divorce, separation, or
widowhood to a gradual loss of productivity, as soil fertility was not possible to
maintain over time.
MARKETS AND PRICES
Maize markets are generally not physically segmented by gender—maize was
sold exclusively within the village by both male and female farm managers in
all countries, except for Zambia. In Zambia, by contrast, 47 per cent of the
male farm managers sold maize within the village only, compared to 70 per
cent of the female farmmanagers (a difference that is statistically significant at
the 1 per cent level). Most farmers (79 per cent) in the Zambian sample rely
on the state marketing board as their main marketing channel, however, with
no statistically significant differences between MMFs and FMFs, suggesting
that market accessibility is not differentiated by sex, even if the location of
sales differs.
Further support for the interpretation that constraints to women’s commer-
cialization in maize can be found mainly in relation to factors endogenous to
the households, rather than in the discrimination of women in output mar-
kets, is provided by price data on average maize prices received. Table 4.2
shows that in general prices were the same for both male and female farm
managers, with two exceptions—in Ghana for the second round of data
collection, the average price received by the latter were actually higher than
the former, while the reverse was the case in Malawi. By the time of Afrint III
these differences had disappeared, however.
Table 4.2. Mean price of maize per 100 kg received, Afrint II and III (2010, PPP-adjusted
USD), by sex of farm manager
Afrint II Afrint III
Male N Female N Diff. Sig. Male N Female N
Ghana 65 195 71 52 6 * 66 195 66 44
Kenya 57 58 52 33 58 62 55 34
Malawi 39 75 36 42 3 * 22 107 22 31
Tanzania 47 132 48 26 28 153 28 47
Zambia 40 173 38 27 36 277 35 61
Mozambique 32 77 28 19 40 49 39 37
Note: a. Extreme cases have been removed by region.
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Even if price discrimination does not appear to be forthcoming, qualitative
data from the three villages in Malawi illustrate the limitations to women’s
mobility when compared with men. Here individual interview data with both
spouses as well as group interviews with women show how female mobility is
restricted by domestic chores, especially related to caring for young children
and family members suffering from ill-health. While the data underscore the
need for contextualization they also point to gendered differences in the
ability to participate in markets, related primarily to labour constraints and
the lack of marketable surplus.
Non-Grain Food Crops
The gender dynamics of both production and commercialization change over
time and are also to some extent country specific, as suggested by the data on
non-grain food crops. A few trends are suggested by the data in Table 4.3: first,
at a general level, despite the large number of crops covered, there are few
strongly significant differences in market participation based on the sex of the
farm manager; and second, patterns shift over time. For Ghana, a movement
into markets for plantains and out of groundnuts can be noted since the first
survey, with no statistically significant differences in market participation
based on the sex of farm manager. In Kenya, Irish potatoes have become
increasingly commercialized during the same period, again without any gen-
dered biases in production or market participation. For sweet potatoes and
millet, moreover, market participation is skewed towards FMFs with male
market participation declining and female market participation increasing
for these crops since Afrint I. In turn this suggests a feminization of these
particular markets over time.
In Malawi, male farm managers have increased their participation in the
sweet potato market relative to female farmmanagers. Market participation in
cassava meanwhile has increased disproportionately among male farm man-
agers, while both female and male farm managers have withdrawn from
vegetable markets. Although the production of vegetables has increased
among both household types since Afrint II, market participation has declined
(significant at the 1 per cent level) and a male-biased gender gap in market
participation has emerged in the process. In Tanzania, a gender-based differ-
ence in themarket for beans has re-emerged since the first phase of the project,
with male farm managers having significantly higher market participation
than their female counterparts by the time of the concluding survey. Mean-
while the female biases in three crops—peas, yams, and other food crops—
have disappeared. Here there seem to be some signs of the displacement
of female farm managers in these markets, as market participation of male
farm managers has increased at the same time. In Zambia, despite the large
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Table 4.3. Market participation for other food crops by sex of farm manager (share of growers participating in particular markets)
Crop Afrint I Afrint II Afrint III
Male N Female N Diff. Sig. Male N Female N Diff. Sig. Male N Female N Diff. Sig.
Ghana Cassava 0.95 157 0.85 46 0.10 ** 0.90 206 0.92 61 0.88 199 0.83 54
Plantains 0.47 47 0.67 12 0.79 154 0.73 40 0.87 158 0.88 43
Beans 0.39 188 0.42 24 0.28 226 0.40 35 0.31 218 0.40 48
Peas 0.20 10 0.50 2 0.07 15 0.00 3 0.21 24 0.29 7
Irish potatoes 0.50 2 0.00 4 0.00 2 0.00 1
Sweet
potatoes
0.40 105 0.56 9 0.25 72 0.00 3 0.29 73 0.17 6
Millet 0.26 172 0.20 20 0.06 142 0.05 22 0.10 228 0.06 54
Groundnuts 0.62 217 0.54 28 0.45 209 0.42 31 0.31 232 0.33 48
Yams 0.60 129 0.45 29 0.58 120 0.48 31
Cocoyams 0.80 165 0.87 38 0.80 153 0.79 38
Arrowroot
Vegetables 0.62 236 0.64 45 0.76 268 0.78 60 0.62 288 0.50 70 0.12 *
Fruits 0.59 37 0.67 3 0.81 47 0.67 9
Other 0.56 102 0.78 18 0.22 * 0.53 17 0.60 5 0.00 1
Kenya Cassava 0.25 4 0.50 2 0.05 65 0.09 35 0.20 83 0.31 51
Plantains 0.31 133 0.24 99 0.29 173 0.27 89 0.31 159 0.40 89
Beans 0.28 165 0.29 123 0.15 180 0.14 92 0.37 191 0.39 104
Peas 0.48 61 0.34 50 0.18 51 0.18 28 0.53 68 0.48 25
Irish potatoes 0.43 88 0.54 81 0.36 96 0.39 54 0.58 113 0.58 50
Sweet
potatoes
0.35 124 0.26 94 0.26 140 0.29 63 0.26 149 0.39 79 0.13 **
Millet 0.29 17 0.23 13 0.15 26 0.29 14 0.22 32 0.48 21 0.26 *
Groundnuts 0.25 40 0.17 23 0.12 42 0.15 26 0.22 32 0.16 19
Yams 0.14 37 0.19 16 0.19 26 0.14 14
Cocoyams 0.13 8 0.00 1
Arrowroot 0.04 69 0.20 30
Vegetables 0.69 162 0.60 111 0.76 157 0.64 69 0.12 * 0.56 176 0.58 93 0.02 **
Fruits 0.34 74 0.34 32 0.37 153 0.38 81
Other 0.25 50 0.16 45 0.28 25 0.20 15 0.20 5 0.33 3
(continued )
Table 4.3. Continued
Crop Afrint I Afrint II Afrint III
Male N Female N Diff. Sig. Male N Female N Diff. Sig. Male N Female N Diff. Sig.
Malawi Cassava 0.32 56 0.25 44 0.35 69 0.28 60 0.45 75 0.18 39 0.27 ***
Plantains 0.33 88 0.41 59 0.65 46 0.44 48 0.21 ** 0.50 105 0.49 41
Beans 0.22 139 0.28 94 0.43 134 0.55 110 0.12 * 0.64 151 0.55 74
Peas 0.21 63 0.26 43 0.38 37 0.51 55 0.40 100 0.27 48
Irish potatoes 0.57 51 0.32 19 0.25 * 0.72 50 0.52 23 0.80 56 0.79 19
Sweet
potatoes
0.19 151 0.12 88 0.41 91 0.32 73 0.52 158 0.28 61 0.24 ***
Millet 0.04 26 0.06 18 0.28 29 0.20 20 0.50 36 0.52 25
Groundnuts 0.28 97 0.15 54 0.13 * 0.64 92 0.60 45 0.73 138 0.59 54
Yams 0.00 1 0.00 1 0.00 6 0.00 1
Cocoyams 0.00 1 0.00 1 0.00 1
Arrowroot 0.00 2 0.00 3
Vegetables 0.31 155 0.21 96 0.10 * 0.68 79 0.62 63 0.45 182 0.28 82 0.17 **
Fruits 0.33 9 0.50 8 0.31 71 0.31 32
Other 0.22 23 0.10 10 0.61 128 0.56 91 0.84 56 0.79 14
Tanzania Cassava 0.50 68 0.30 10 0.37 35 0.38 8 0.28 102 0.15 20
Plantains 0.41 169 0.19 37 0.22 ** 0.48 83 0.25 12 0.35 141 0.27 30
Beans 0.48 143 0.16 45 0.32 *** 0.58 93 0.50 20 0.52 129 0.26 42 0.26 ***
Peas 0.34 145 0.33 30 0.39 57 0.83 6 0.44 ** 0.58 62 0.61 18
Irish potatoes 0.53 89 0.32 28 0.21 * 0.69 61 0.55 20 0.59 87 0.57 35
Sweet
potatoes
0.28 197 0.24 51 0.38 55 0.31 13 0.32 131 0.23 43
Millet 0.44 63 0.36 14 0.31 16 0.33 6 0.00 1
Groundnuts 0.37 68 0.58 12 0.47 32 0.00 3 0.45 47 0.36 11
Yams 0.14 7 1.00 1 0.86 * 0.17 12 0.40 5
Cocoyams 0.10 10 0.00 1 0.32 28 0.17 6
Arrowroot 0.00 3
Vegetables 0.37 219 0.29 58 0.68 85 0.59 17 0.46 184 0.49 55
Fruits 0.58 33 1.00 1 0.42 118 0.17 23 0.25 **
Other 0.49 43 0.67 6 0.59 41 0.89 9 0.30 * 0.62 56 0.60 20
Zambia Cassava 0.19 83 0.22 59 0.26 94 0.30 20 0.41 122 0.38 40
Plantains 0.40 47 0.75 4 0.54 41 0.50 4 0.45 109 0.29 24
Beans 0.30 115 0.17 41 0.38 117 0.33 24 0.44 142 0.36 44
Peas 0.67 3 0.25 4 0.46 13 0.75 4 0.00 7 0.00 5
Irish potatoes 0.50 10 0.00 2 0.48 21 0.50 4 0.65 20 0.67 3
Sweet
potatoes
0.55 244 0.49 89 0.66 238 0.71 52 0.63 291 0.53 83
Millet 0.22 87 0.30 54 0.50 44 0.50 14 0.50 24 0.41 17
Groundnuts 0.41 209 0.31 80 0.53 246 0.60 55 0.63 304 0.53 83
Yams 0.00 3 0.00 2 0.50 2
Cocoyams 0.00 1 1.00 1
Arrowroot 0.00 1
Vegetables 0.74 163 0.66 47 0.87 134 0.88 25 0.73 231 0.73 49
Fruits 0.67 12 0.00 1 0.29 72 0.22 23
Other 0.74 47 0.58 12 0.33 78 0.31 13 0.65 85 0.59 17
Mozambique Cassava 0.32 180 0.23 126 0.27 201 0.30 50 0.44 176 0.31 88 0.13 **
Plantains 0.42 64 0.40 29 0.46 57 0.36 11 0.47 102 0.44 36
Beans 0.24 127 0.18 104 0.11 164 0.08 72 0.42 166 0.24 118 0.18 ***
Peas 0.17 53 0.04 25 0.13 * 0.11 94 0.17 18 0.56 96 0.43 23
Irish potatoes 1.00 1 0.00 3 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.19 16 0.07 14
Sweet
potatoes
0.12 85 0.10 68 0.17 52 0.25 16 0.37 134 0.17 100 0.20 ***
Millet 0.00 8 0.00 4 0.20 20 0.00 5 0.11 18 0.00 1
Groundnuts 0.54 134 0.30 94 0.24 *** 0.54 136 0.43 30 0.56 165 0.24 95 0.32 ***
Yams 0.50 2 0.00 1 0.33 15 0.07 15 0.26 *
Cocoyams 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 1 0.00 1
Arrowroot 0.29 7 0.00 3
Vegetables 0.13 85 0.11 66 0.42 24 0.13 8 0.41 49 0.18 51 0.23 **
Fruits 0.83 6 0.80 5 0.40 50 0.33 18
Other 0.03 38 0.07 28 0.14 22 0.08 12 0.06 212 0.11 135
Note: a. Data on yams, cocoyams, and fruits were added to the survey in 2008, arrowroot in 2013.
gender-based differences in the commercialization of maize, there were no
statistically significant differences in market participation for any of the food
crops in any of the years. The largest number of gender gaps in market partici-
pation is found in Mozambique, breaking with the trends for Afrint I and II.
In terms of marketing arrangements, participation in contract farming for
other food crops has been very limited throughout the period from Afrint
I onwards, both forMMFs and FMFs. Only in Ghana, in the final survey round,
was the share of male farm managers participating in contract farming
(4 per cent) higher than for their female counterparts, among whom none
were engaged in contract farming (significant at the 5 per cent level).
What the data show is the need to address commercialization as a fluid
process—farmers move in and out of markets, as opportunities change often
in gender-neutral ways. Although the data do not detail amounts sold, the
limited evidence of male domination of markets as food crops are increasingly
commercialized (as seen in Tanzania) is counterbalanced by tendencies of
increasing female biases in market participation in Kenya. Some country-
level dynamics can be noted, however: Ghana and Zambia have few gender
gaps in market participation for any of the non-grain food crops, while
Mozambique and to some extent Malawi exhibit a growing masculinization
of market participation for numerous crops. In the latter cases, moreover, this
adds to male biases in maize commercialization found in these countries.
Non-Food Cash Crops
With respect to cash crops, again the patterns of production differ from coun-
try to country: although relatively few cash crops are grown in each country,
the type of crop and the gendered patterns of commercialization vary. Despite
such variation, the limited production of cash crops across the countries is
quite striking and connected in large part to the regional nature of particular
production systems. In Ghana only half the sampled villages are found in the
cocoa-producing regions, for instance, explaining the low country-level
involvement in cocoa production, despite its regional importance. With the
possible exception of Kenya, where sugar cane and coffee are grown by around
a quarter and a third of the sampled farmers respectively, cash crop production
hence is generally limited.
Despite the common perception in the literature (Hill and Vigneri 2014)
that traditional cash crops tend to be dominated by male farmers, Table 4.4
suggests that there are only three examples of cash crops whose production
over the period is predominantly engaged in by male farm managers: sugar
cane in Mozambique and Malawi, tobacco in Malawi, and cotton in Zambia.
In the case of tobacco in Malawi, this dominance is explained by membership
rules in the tobacco marketing association that discriminate against women,
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Table 4.4. Share of households producing cash crops, by country and sex of farm manager
Afrint I Afrint II Afrint III
Male N Female N Diff. Sig. Male N Female N Diff. Sig. Male N Female N Diff. Sig.
Ghana Cotton 0.01 342 0.00 69 111 113
Sugar cane 0.01 342 0.00 69 111 113
Cashew nuts 0.01 342 0.00 69 0.00 457 0.01 111 113
Cocoa 0.04 342 0.06 69 0.10 456 0.08 111 0.14 425 0.08 113
Tobacco 0.06 342 0.01 69 0.02 457 0.02 111 0.01 425 0.00 113
Coffee 0.02 342 0.00 69 0.01 457 0.01 111 0.00 425 0.00 113
Oil palm 0.11 425 0.03 113 0.08 ***
Other 0.05 316 0.03 64 0.01 457 0.01 111 113
Kenya Sugar cane 0.24 169 0.20 128 0.22 196 0.18 103 0.32 193 0.22 107 0.10 *
Tobacco 0.01 169 0.00 128 107
Coffee 0.20 169 0.25 128 0.18 196 0.21 103 0.19 193 0.22 107
Tea 0.12 170 0.13 128 0.12 196 0.16 103 0.13 193 0.09 107
Sisal 0.01 169 0.00 128 107
Pyrethrum 0.01 169 0.01 128 107
Fruits and
vegetables
0.11 196 0.07 103
Flowers 0.02 196 0.02 103 0.02 193 0.01 107
Spices 0.00 196 0.00 103 0.01 193 0.03 107
Other 0.08 167 0.05 128 0.02 194 0.01 102 107
Malawi Cotton 0.01 235 0.00 159 0.04 222 0.03 170 0.09 276 0.04 126 0.05 *
Sugar cane 0.18 235 0.10 159 0.08 ** 0.08 224 0.02 169 0.06 ** 0.15 276 0.06 126 0.09 ***
Cocoa 0.02 235 0.03 159 126
Tobacco 0.17 235 0.09 159 0.08 ** 0.15 224 0.02 170 0.13 *** 0.14 276 0.02 126 0.12 ***
Coffee 0.00 224 0.01 170 126
Sisal 0.00 224 0.01 170 0.02 276 0.02 126
Pyrethrum 0.31 235 0.15 159 0.16 *** 126
Other 0.00 233 0.01 157 126
Tanzania Cotton 0.01 322 0.00 0.00 318 0.01 74 0.01 ** 0.00 300 0.00 95
Sugar cane 0.04 322 0.00 81 0.04 * 0.05 318 0.00 74 0.05 ** 0.08 300 0.08 95
Cashew nuts 0.01 322 0.00 74 0.12 300 0.05 95 0.07 *
Cocoa 0.02 322 0.00 0.02 318 0.00 74 0.11 300 0.03 95 0.08 **
(continued )
Table 4.4. Continued
Afrint I Afrint II Afrint III
Male N Female N Diff. Sig. Male N Female N Diff. Sig. Male N Female N Diff. Sig.
Coffee 0.05 322 0.00 81 0.05 ** 74 0.00 300 0.00 95
Tea 0.01 322 0.01 81 74 0.01 300 0.00 95
Pyrethrum 0.02 322 0.01 81 0.01 300 0.02 95
Fruits and
vegetables
0.01 319 0.00 74
Oil palm 74 0.13 300 0.06 95 0.07 *
Flowers 74 0.01 300 0.00 95
Spices 74 0.02 300 0.00 95
Other 0.24 322 0.20 81 0.11 320 0.11 74 0.19 300 0.08 95 0.11 **
Zambia Cotton 0.35 300 0.16 102 0.19 *** 0.23 326 0.11 76 0.12 ** 0.30 366 0.11 110 0.19 ***
Sugar cane 0.01 299 0.00 102 0.01 325 0.00 76 0.04 366 0.00 110 0.04 **
Cashew nuts 0.01 326 0.00 76 110
Tobacco 0.00 299 0.01 102 0.01 * 76 110
Other 0.11 299 0.01 102 0.10 *** 0.12 326 0.09 76 0.01 366 0.00 110
Mozambique Cotton 0.02 227 0.00 170 0.02 * 121 0.02 242 0.00 183 0.02 *
Sugar cane 0.14 227 0.06 170 0.08 *** 0.11 281 0.02 121 0.09 *** 0.25 242 0.13 183 0.12 ***
Cashew nuts 0.25 227 0.19 170 0.20 281 0.05 121 0.15 *** 0.31 242 0.13 183 0.18 ***
Cocoa 0.01 227 0.02 170 0.01 242 0.01 183
Tobacco 0.03 227 0.01 170 0.02 * 0.01 281 0.00 121 0.02 242 0.00 183 0.02 **
Tea 0.01 242 0.03 183 0.02 *
Pyrethrum 0.00 242 0.01 183
Fruits and
vegetables
0.01 281 0.00 121
Oil palm 0.06 242 0.03 183
Spices 0.00 281 0.01 121 183
Other 0.01 227 0.01 170 0.06 281 0.02 121 0.04 ** 0.05 242 0.03 183
Notes: a. For Afrint I, there were many households that were coded as ‘do not know’ for cash crop production; it was assumed that these questions had been skipped rather than answered
negatively, and these answers were recoded as zero.
b. ‘Fruits and vegetables’ refers to fruits and vegetables produced for export only. This item was added for Afrint II and removed for Afrint III.
c. Flowers, spices, and sisal were added for Afrint II.
d. Oil palm was added for Afrint III.
while travel to centralized auction floors is impossible for manywomenwhose
mobility is restricted by domestic responsibilities and gender norms concern-
ing travel.
Cotton production in Zambia is contract based. Representatives of the two
contracting companies, Dunavant and Alliance Cotton, as well as two lead
farmers engaged in recruiting farmers by Dunavant in Nikantaka village,
identified labour constraints, rather than marketing arrangements, as the
major limit to women’s production. Both contract schemes reported an
increase in women growing cotton, although formal registration with the
schemes may be carried out through adult sons for instance. Out of the ten
lead farmers recruited by Dunavant in Chilekwa village to encourage cotton
contracting, three were women when the qualitative interviews were carried
out in late 2012. The quantitative data confirm widespread involvement in
contract farming for cash crops in Zambia: for Afrint III, 82 per cent of the
farmers who were involved in cash crop production grew cash crops on a
contract basis, with no statistically significant differences based on the sex of
farm manager. The major discrepancy between the two types of farms lies
instead in production: whereas 118male farmmanagers were involved in cash
crop production only twelve female landholders were growing cash crops.
While long-term trends are visible only for three particular crops, at the
country level the number of gender gaps in cash crop production are highest
for Malawi and Mozambique, aggravating the biases found against FMFs with
respect to maize commercialization as well as non-grain food crops in these
countries. In the case of Zambia, gender biases in maize commercialization
combine with poorer marketing possibilities for female farm managers with
respect to cotton. To the extent that sources of gender gaps in commercialization
can be identified, the constraints on maize marketing lies in the inability of
female farm managers to produce a marketable surplus that competes with the
volumes sold bymale respondents, while male biases in cash crops appear to be
connected to gender-segmented markets in the case of tobacco and to labour-
related production constraints in the case of cotton. For Ghana and Kenya,
again, few gender-based biases exist with respect to cash crop production,
while for Tanzania the period between Afrint II and III has seen the emergence
of a growing number of gaps between male and female farm managers.
Cash Incomes, Gender, and Diversification
Although the data on commercialization can tell us something about market
participation they only provide a partial picture of livelihoods. Especially for
those crops where data on volumes sold and prices received are lacking,
information on cash incomes is a necessary complement to analysing the
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effects of market participation on livelihoods. Given the widespread and
persistent bias against women in smallholder agriculture noted in the litera-
ture, the expectation would be that the combination of poorer assets and
smaller commercial opportunities for female landholders would translate
into lower cash incomes, especially from farm-based sources.
For Afrint II, when the size and age composition of the household are
controlled for, there were statistically significant gender-based differences in
cash incomes for two countries only:Malawi and Zambia.1 As suggested by the
data in Table 4.5, these income gaps persisted into the final survey round, with
gaps emerging also in Ghana and Kenya. In Kenya, with the largest gap,
members of female-headed households on average had cash incomes equiva-
lent to 53 per cent of their male counterparts, compared with 65 per cent
(Malawi) and 67 per cent (Ghana and Zambia) for the other countries.
Althoughmale-headed households were advantaged in Zambia with respect
to agricultural commercialization, especially in maize, in Kenya by contrast
there were no statistically significant gender-based differences with respect to
market participation in any of the crop types, except for sugar cane for which
there was a very weak statistical significance. In the case of Kenya, however,
the tenuous link between the data on commercialization and incomes can be
explained by the fact that with the exception of maize we do not have
information on the amounts sold for the particular crops. Similarly, the
male biases in market participation for other food crops and cash crops are
not reflected in the cash income data for Mozambique.
The farm-based sources of gender gaps in cash income in Ghana, Kenya,
Malawi, and Zambia can be found by breaking the cash income per adult
equivalent by the particular sources of income, as is done in Table 4.6. In the
case of Malawi, sales of all types of crops are biased towards male farm
managers in both years. For Zambia, the gender gap in maize sales is reflected
in the income data on staple sales. Higher male incomes from cash crop sales
are to be expected inMalawi and Zambia where production itself is segmented
by gender. In Kenya and Ghana sales of animal products have become biased
towards male-headed households, although for Ghana the largest gender gap
is found in incomes generated from the sale of other food crops. On the whole
therefore, countrywide trends in market participation and production of cash
crops are also reflected in the various income streams.
Juxtaposing farm-based sources of cash income with incomes from non-
agricultural activities points to some interesting differences between the
households of male and female farm managers. In Afrint II, although
1 This contradicts data presented in an earlier paper (AnderssonDjurfeldt et al. 2013). The reason
for the discrepancy is the treatment of extreme cases, which differs. In this chapter, extreme cases
have been removed only for the final variable.
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Table 4.5. Cash income per adult equivalent (mean and median), by country and sex of farm manager for Afrint II and Afrint III, in 2010 PPP-
adjusted USD for households that earned cash income
Afrint II Afrint III
Mean Median Mean Median
Male N Female N Diff. Sig. Male Female Male N Female N Diff. Sig. Male Female
Ghana 316 441 327 107 136 159 445 394 297 107 148 ** 161 148
Kenya 768 169 943 89 376 406 661 184 351 103 310 *** 351 178
Malawi 144 214 114 162 29 ** 102 61 94 257 61 115 33 *** 64 34
Tanzania 286 272 273 61 180 105 285 276 249 88 180 142
Zambia 202 286 151 71 52 ** 147 87 256 331 171 95 86 *** 154 135
Mozambique 92 246 82 89 34 38 190 211 238 146 90 88
Notes: a. Exchange rates, consumer price index, and PPP index used refer to 2015 for Tanzania and Mozambique, for the remaining countries 2013.
b. Data include only households that had a cash income; extreme cases have been removed for the final calculated variable at the village level.
c. For 2008, data on household members below age 15 and above 61 had many cases coded as uncodeable and missing; these were recoded as zero, which may underestimate the size of
households.
d. For 2013, the data quality was much higher and the uncodeable and do not know entries for household members below age 15 and above 61 were kept.
e. The large differences between median and mean cash incomes for both household types suggests that incomes are highly skewed, regardless of the sex of head of household.
Table 4.6. Cash incomes per adult equivalent by sex of farm manager and income source, Afrint II and Afrint III, in 2010 PPP-adjusted USD for
households who earned cash income
Afrint II Afrint III
Male N Female N Diff. Sig. Male N Female N Diff. Sig.
Ghana Staple sales 98 440 103 106 75 394 40 107 34 *
Sale of other food crops 89 441 90 107 189 394 79 107 110 **
Sale of non-food cash crops 8 440 5 107 20 394 11 107
Sale of animal produce 35 441 33 107 18 394 11 107 7 **
Leasing out machinery 1 441 0 107 1 394 0 107
Agricultural labour 1 441 3 107 4 394 2 107
Non-farm salaried employment 27 441 7 107 22 394 15 107
Micro-business 26 441 45 107 90 394 81 107
Large-scale business 11 441 9 107 0 394 0 107
Rent, interest 0 441 0 107 2 394 0 107
Pensions 5 441 0 107 5 394 0 107 5 *
Remittances 15 440 33 107 19 ** 19 394 57 107 38 ***
Kenya Staple sales 20 169 27 89 61 184 46 103
Sale of other food crops 223 169 273 89 70 184 51 103
Sale of non-food cash crops 146 169 143 89 140 184 75 103 65 *
Sale of animal produce 224 169 159 88 133 184 77 103 56 **
Leasing out machinery 0 169 0 89 5 184 1 103
Agricultural labour 27 169 60 89 22 184 16 103
Non-farm salaried employment 89 169 192 89 129 184 25 103 104 **
Micro-business 18 169 48 88 38 184 27 103
Large-scale business 1 169 7 89 6 184 0 103
Rent, interest 0 169 0 89 12 184 4 103
Pensions 7 169 15 89 22 184 3 103 19 *
Remittances 12 169 21 89 23 184 25 103
Malawi Staple sales 27 210 15 156 12 *** 18 257 7 115 11 ***
Sale of other food crops 33 214 16 161 18 *** 28 257 16 115 12 ***
Sale of non-food cash crops 20 213 3 161 17 *** 10 257 1 115 8 ***
Sale of animal produce 8 212 9 162 5 257 3 115
Leasing out machinery 2 213 1 161 1 * 1 257 0 115
Agricultural labour 6 214 5 162 3 257 7 115 4 ***
Non-farm salaried employment 30 213 40 162 15 257 14 115
Micro-business 15 212 21 160 12 257 8 115
Large-scale business 0 213 0 161 0 257 0 115
Rent, interest 0 214 0 160 1 257 1 115
Pensions 0 213 0 162 0 257 0 115
Remittances 4 210 6 159 2 257 3 115
Tanzania Staple sales 84 272 50 61 34 * 105 276 111 88
Sale of other food crops 41 272 10 61 30 ** 41 276 22 88 19 *
Sale of non-food cash crops 30 272 8 61 34 276 21 88
Sale of animal produce 21 272 11 61 13 276 10 88
Leasing out machinery 1 272 0 61 4 275 0 88
Agricultural labour 4 272 9 61 5 ** 7 276 10 88
Non-farm salaried employment 29 272 106 61 78 ** 9 276 5 88
Micro-business 68 272 60 61 60 276 61 88
Large-scale business 0 272 0 61 3 275 0 88
Rent, interest 4 272 1 61 3 275 1 88
Pensions 1 272 0 61 1 276 0 88
Remittances 2 272 17 61 15 *** 5 276 8 88
Zambia Staple sales 68 286 19 71 49 *** 138 331 71 95 68 ***
Sale of other food crops 33 286 21 71 31 331 22 95
Sale of non-food cash crops 22 286 13 71 14 331 5 95 9 **
Sale of animal produce 14 286 9 71 22 331 12 95
Leasing out machinery 3 286 2 71 2 331 2 95
Agricultural labour 9 286 18 71 10 331 11 95
Non-farm salaried employment 16 286 25 71 12 331 3 95
Micro-business 27 286 23 71 18 331 30 95
Large-scale business 0 286 0 71 3 331 0 95
Rent, interest 0 286 2 71 2 ** 1 331 1 95
Pensions 1 286 1 71 0 331 0 95
Remittances 9 286 20 71 10 * 4 331 14 95 10 ***
Mozambique Staple sales 12 247 7 89 20 210 11 145 9 *
Sale of other food crops 5 247 1 89 3 ** 17 208 14 144
Sale of non-food cash crops 4 247 1 89 11 210 12 145
(continued )
Table 4.6. Continued
Afrint II Afrint III
Male N Female N Diff. Sig. Male N Female N Diff. Sig.
Sale of animal produce 2 247 3 89 9 211 18 146
Leasing out machinery 0 247 1 89 1 *** 1 211 0 145
Agricultural labour 1 247 8 88 7 *** 7 211 6 146
Non-farm salaried employment 18 247 18 89 33 207 82 143 49 **
Micro-business 44 247 19 88 25 * 79 205 77 140
Large-scale business 0 247 0 89 3 211 1 146
Rent, interest 0 247 0 89 3 211 0 146
Pensions 7 247 7 89 5 211 6 145
Remittances 5 247 17 89 12 *** 6 211 17 146 11 **
Notes: a. Negative differences denote a bias towards female-headed households, positive differences a bias towards male-headed households.
b. No extreme cases were removed.
gender-based differences were few, they were all biasing female farm man-
agers, with the exception of micro-business in Mozambique. Incomes raised
from remittances were higher among female-headed households in all coun-
tries except Kenya and Malawi. In addition, non-farm salaried employment
was much higher for female respondents in Tanzania: 106 PPP (purchasing
power parity) adjusted 2010 USD (US dollars) per adult equivalent compared
with 29 for male farm managers. By the final survey round, remittances
were still predominantly a female source of income in Ghana, Zambia, and
Mozambique, whereas a relatively large male bias in salaried employment in
the case of Kenya had emerged, contributing to the overall gender gap in cash
incomes noted for Kenya. In general, however, the gendered segmentation
among non-farm activities noted in the literature, where women are confined
to low-entry, low-gain activities is not apparent from the data.
Commercialization and Livelihoods by Type of
Female-Headed Household
As demonstrated in Chapter 3, asset availability among de facto and de jure
female-headed households vary, especially with respect to land. The demo-
graphic profile of de facto female-headed households resembles that of
male-headed households more closely than that of de jure female-headed
households. On this basis, the expectation would be that there are differences
in patterns of commercialization between the two household types. The data
from Afrint III show no differences in the volume of maize sold, however, and
a significantly higher share of maize production sold for de jure female-headed
households, who sold 42 per cent of their harvest compared with 34 per cent
for the de facto female-headed households (significant at the 5 per cent level).
Mean output prices received for maize are the same for both household types.
For the other crop types, only two crops are grown by large enough numbers
of respondents to enable comparison: groundnuts and vegetables. For these
crops, commercialization is more pronounced among the de facto female-
headed households. Groundnuts were sold by 42 per cent of the latter,
compared with 22 per cent for the de jure female-headed households, while
58 per cent of the de facto female-headed households sold vegetables,
compared with 44 per cent of the de jure female-headed households. The con-
centration of particular crops to the regions where the de facto female-headed
households are strongly overrepresented (Nyeri andKakamega inKenya and the
Centre in Mozambique) may explain these tendencies, however.
The de facto female-headed households had considerably higher mean cash
incomes per adult equivalent than their de jure counterparts: 313 USD and 207
USD (PPP adjusted, at 2010 values) respectively. On average the incomes of
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the latter were more than 100 USD lower. While access to the incomes from
absent husbands may be one explanation for this difference, another may be
related to the concentration of de facto female-headed households to the
wealthier countries in the sample (especially Kenya) and the relatively large
share of de jure female-headed households in Malawi.
In terms of particular sources of income, two farm-based sources bias de facto
female-headed households: sale of animal products and cash crops (both of
which are important components of livelihoods in Nyeri and Kakamega).
For the NFI streams, salaries and micro-businesses are also skewed towards
these households, whereas somewhat counter-intuitively remittances favour
de jure female-headed households. This hints at an age component, with
remittances being likely to be related to transfers from adult children towards
widowed women.
Distributional Aspects of Commercialization
The data presented so far show the existence of gender-based differences in
commercialization in certain countries at particular points in time. In add-
ition, they also suggests some variation with respect to commercialization
between de jure and de facto female-headed households. Further variation
may also be found within the broad groups of male and female-headed house-
holds. While female farm managers generally cultivate smaller areas, and also
have lower access to other agricultural assets compared to male landholders
(as demonstrated in Chapter 3), considerable heterogeneity may exist within
these groups in terms of resources that affect productivity as well as oppor-
tunities for market engagement. As noted initially, maize is the most com-
monly grown and marketed crop across the six countries. Scrutinizing the
patterns of maize commercialization with respect to socio-economic differ-
ence within the broad groups of MMFs and FMFs can provide insights into the
variability of market engagement within these categories.
Housing standard constitutes a robust variable for tracing socio-economic
differences across time and space—this metric is not sensitive to differences
in cropping systems nor to fluctuations in exchange rates or PPP. While
housing standards may be generally higher or lower in certain countries,
the respondents with the highest housing standards are likely to be the best
off in relative terms.
Three standards of housing were identified in the survey: mud house with
thatched roof, mud houses with corrugated iron roof, and block/brick houses
with corrugated iron roof, or other advanced housing. Here country differ-
ences are pronounced: by the time of Afrint III, in Tanzania with the highest
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overall housing standard around 60 per cent of the sample lived in the
superior housing type, whereas in Mozambique just over a fifth did.
The ideal would have been to break the data down by the three types of
housing standard, sex of farm manager, and country, but unfortunately the
sample sizes are too small to enable this, so households with the highest
housing standard are compared with the rest of the sample for male and
female respondents respectively.
Some caution is needed when interpreting the results in Table 4.7: the
number of cases is very small for the commercialization indicators that are
based on production—especially for the female farm managers. This may
explain why statistical significance is not attained even though differences
with respect to commercialization are at times quite large between households
of female farm managers living in advanced and basic housing respectively.
While this is clearly a rough measurement of wealth and welfare, some
interesting results do emerge: for countries where market participation gener-
ally is high (Ghana, Zambia, and to some extent Tanzania), among the male
farm managers commercialization is tilted towards respondents living in
advanced housing. While there are few statistically significant differences for
female-headed households, this distributional profile is not replicated, with
the exception of volumes sold in Zambia, where differences are substantial
between the better-off female farm managers and the rest. In the case of
Zambia—where maize is most strongly commercialized, gender-based differ-
ences in commercialization are the most pronounced, as are the differences
within the two groups. Overall, commercialization in Zambia is therefore
biased towards male farmmanagers and towards the wealthier farmmanagers
within the two household groups.
Intra-Household Income Generation
The results presented so far have concerned gender-based differences in com-
mercialization and cash income sources between male- and female-headed
households. While this to date is the most common method of analysing
gender in studies of agriculture (Doss 2014), most women in rural Africa live
in households headed by men.
The dataset does not cover individual data on production and commercial-
ization, but it contains individualized cash income data by sex for Afrint III.
Although these data are clearly a fractional representation of intra-household
gender relations, they do enable identifying livelihood sources by sex, and
intra-household complementarities in this respect (Jackson 2007).
Figure 4.1 shows the share of cash income raised by male members in the
households of male farmmanagers. Here shares higher than 50 per cent point
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Table 4.7. Commercialization in maize by country, sex of farm manager, and housing standard, Afrint III, for households who produced maize
Male Female
Basic N Advanced N Diff. Sig. Basic N Advanced N Diff.
Ghana Market participation 0.51 252 0.80 85 0.29 *** 0.50 56 0.64 25
Share sold of production 0.52 129 0.65 68 0.13 *** 0.51 28 0.59 16
Sale of maize (kg) 601 126 765 61 164 ** 446 28 375 16
Kenya Market participation 0.40 85 0.29 108 0.29 52 0.38 55
Share sold of production 0.40 34 0.47 31 0.35 15 0.41 21
Sale of maize (kg) 727 33 643 30 357 15 503 20
Malawi Market participation 0.40 197 0.49 71 0.28 103 0.19 21
Share sold of production 0.20 78 0.25 35 0.05 * 0.22 29 0.30 4
Sale of maize (kg) 251 76 312 27 204 29 433 3
Tanzania Market participation 0.42 96 0.65 175 0.23 *** 0.54 41 0.67 39
Share sold of production 0.41 40 0.44 113 0.50 21 0.49 26
Sale of maize (kg) 834 40 910 109 761 20 643 26
Zambia Market participation 0.75 208 0.86 147 0.11 ** 0.57 82 0.68 25
Share sold of production 0.53 157 0.60 127 0.07 ** 0.46 47 0.47 17
Sale of maize (kg) 2,080 155 4,165 114 2,085 *** 974 46 1,721 17 747 **
Mozambique Market participation 0.20 147 0.42 26 0.22 ** 0.25 96 0.30 44
Share sold of production 0.26 28 0.46 11 0.20 ** 0.25 23 0.19 13
Sale of maize (kg) 202 28 230 6 127 22 291 13 163 **
to a male bias in particular income sources and those below 50 per cent
indicate a female bias. This assumes on average an equal number of male
and female members in the households of male farm managers, but given
the large number of households, a systematic bias is not likely.
All farm-based sources of cash income generate higher incomes for men
across the countries, pointing to a higher engagement with markets among
men in male-headed households. In turn this suggests an intra-household
division of labour where women are engaged mostly in unremunerated
work—whether in production or reproduction. Qualitative data from Malawi
confirm this division of labour—while agricultural production is carried out by
both spouses, often with the explicitly stated aim of feeding the family,
marketing decisions and the practicalities of commercialization, such as
reaching markets and selling products, were generally the responsibility of
the husband. The reasons for this were varied but revolved largely around the
limitations to female mobility imposed by domestic responsibilities, but also
in some cases the distrust expressed by husbands concerning their wives’
ability to handle incomes from sales.
For non-farm activities, the differentiation of highly remunerative pursuits
by gender referred to in the literature is only partially reflected in the data: in
general incomes raised fromnon-farm activities are dominated bymale house-













































































































Figure 4.1 Share of cash income raised by male members in male-headed households,
by income source and country, 2013.
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income from non-farm salaried employment more or less to the same extent,
while micro-business is biased towards women in Ghana. In Malawi and
Zambia female and male household members generate roughly equal
amounts of cash income from micro-business. On the whole though, the
data show a prevalent bias against female members of the households of
male farm managers, regardless of the type of income source.
Theoretical perspectives on female empowerment place great faith in the
transformative capacity of women’s income generation as a source of
enhanced female bargaining power within households headed by men. None-
theless, women across the three Malawian villages covered by the qualitative
data all report that they are expected to disclose cash incomes generated both
through the sale of agricultural products as well as non-farm activities to their
husbands. Two women stated that they were required to do so but chose to
defy this norm to preserve some financial independence from their husbands.
While husbands in general also claimed to adhere to similar expectations from
their wives, this was disputed by many of the female respondents. Moreover,
even if cash income was used for family needs, in general one of the husband’s
prerogatives is to decide on the use of generated income, although this varies
among villages under patrilineal and matrilineal tenure, with stronger female
involvement in expenditure decisions in the latter (Andersson Djurfeldt et al.
2017 (resubmitted)).
Regional Perspectives on Livelihood Diversification and Gender
The data presented above have illustrated the contextual nature of agricultural
commercialization and sources of income even at the country level. The point
is often made, however, that gender relations as well as gendered patterns of
production and marketing are context-specific, distinguished by regional or
even village-level features. Indeed, the notion of women’s crops is increasingly
being questioned in the literature, and as shown in this chapter patterns of
commercialization vary across time and space even at the macro scale.
To what extent differences in gender-based cash incomes can be attributed
to regional production patterns andmarketing arrangements that depart from
and reinforce gender-based divisions of labour and commercialization pat-
terns is the subject to which I turn next.
In Table 4.8, the sample is divided by region as well as by sex of farm
manager, showing the concentration of gender-based income gaps docu-
mented at the country level in Table 4.5 to one region in Ghana and Zambia.
In the case of Kenya and Malawi, while there are statistically significant
differences for all regions, caution is warranted for those regions where statis-
tical significance is only possible to establish at the 10 per cent level.
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Moreover, differences in income are larger in one region in each country
(Nyeri in Kenya, and Shire Highlands in Malawi).
Statistical testing of gender-based differences of means for particular sources
of income is generally difficult, since small sample sizes result from dividing
income data further. To the extent that statistical significance can be estab-
lished, some interesting differences as well as similarities emerge: raising
income through the sale of agricultural labour is biased towards the house-
holds of female farmmanagers in three regions (Nyeri, Kenya, and Ntchisi and
Shire Highlands, both in Malawi)—but only in one of these is the difference
statistically significant at below 5 per cent. Both regions in Zambia have
higher incomes from staple sales among male-headed households, but only
in the case of Mkushi does this translate into higher cash incomes overall. In
the Eastern Region in Ghana, larger incomes raised from the sale of staple
crops also explains higher incomes in male-headed households. In the case of
the Eastern Region, incomes generated from themarketing of other food crops
are also important. The vibrant tomato trade noted during fieldwork in 2011
may be a possible explanation for the income discrepancies between the two
household groups (Andersson Djurfeldt et al. 2014). Depending on regional
characteristics, other food crops and animal produce also generate more
incomes for the households of male farm managers in some regions.
For NFI sources very few gender-based differences exist at the regional level.
To the extent that they do, incomes from remittances are biased towards the
households of female farm managers. Incomes raised from micro-business are
also larger for female-headed households in Mazabuka, Zambia, and the two
regions in Ghana. To some extent this compensates for lacking farm incomes.
Table 4.8. Income per adult equivalent by sex of farm manager and region, Afrint III, in
2010 PPP-adjusted USD
Male N Female N Diff. Sig.
Ghana Eastern 830 179 458 55 371 ***
Upper East 125 215 127 52
Kenya Kakamega 397 85 223 56 174 *
Nyeri 888 99 504 47 385 ***
Malawi Ntchisi 82 76 52 18 30 *
Thiwi Lifidzi 97 60 64 31 33 *
Bwanje Valley 62 66 28 24 34 ***
Shire Highlands 146 55 81 42 65 **
Tanzania Kilombero 327 152 278 36
Iringa 234 124 229 52
Zambia Mkushi 232 168 140 61 92 ***
Mazabuka 282 163 226 34
Mozambique North 90 119 84 30
Centre 356 76 365 80
South 142 15 84 36
Gender, Commercialization, and Diversification
109
Indeed, in the case ofMazabuka, Zambia, and the Upper East, Ghana, there are
no statistically significant differences in cash incomes between male- and
female-headed households. In the case of the Kenyan regions, by contrast,
gender gaps in total cash income are related to non-farm sources of income.
Salaried employment and pensions are skewed towards male-headed house-
holds in the case of Kakamega and Nyeri, respectively.
Although regional patterns of intra-household access to income within
households headed by male farm managers largely replicate the country
level, some interesting differences emerge between the regions. Three cases
of farm incomes are biased towards women: the sale of other food crops in
Mazabuka, Zambia, the leasing out of agricultural equipment in Kakamega,
Kenya, and the sale of farm labour inKakamega,KenyaandSouth,Mozambique.
Leasing out of equipment is a very rare source of income, however, and the
results should be treated with much caution.
Intra-household biases towards women are found with respect to micro-
business involvement in four regions, Shire Highlands (Malawi), Eastern and
Upper East (Ghana), andMazabuka (Zambia). In the case of Mazabuka and the
two regions in Ghana, this pattern mirrors the income gap based on sex of
head of household, suggesting a stronger involvement of women in general in
micro-business in these regions. Key informant interviews with the chief and
headmen from Nikantaka village in Mazabuka points to the emergence of
several non-farm opportunities connected to the Zambia Sugar processing
plant in Mazabuka. Moreover, a nickel mine was established in the village in
2006 by an Australian company, providing jobs as well as demand for services.
Although themining company had pulled out of the village by the time of the
interviews in 2012, female focus group discussions as well as interviews with
traders in the local trading centre confirmed the continued importance and
dynamism of small-scale trading and the engagement of women in this trade.
A similar pattern was reported in the qualitative data for both regions in
Ghana. In the Upper East there is a seasonal pattern to some of these activities,
with artisanal small-scale mining and alcohol production and sale being
carried out in the off-season. The villages in the Eastern Region are strategic-
ally located with respect to trade in vegetables as well as textiles with neigh-
bouring countries.
In the two regions in Ghana and Mazabuka in Zambia, the segmentation of
income opportunities by gender occurs both between male- and female-
headed households as well as within male-headed households, but this strati-
fication by gender appears to be complementary rather than competing. These
regions are in the minority, however. Rather, the same patterns of lower
female incomes characterize both the country and regional levels, pointing
to the limited possibilities for women to raise individual incomes withinmale-
headed household.
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Conclusions
This chapter set out with the empiricist aspiration to address the gendered
aspects of commercialization, diversification, and rural livelihoods. A number
of key findings can be reported: agricultural commercialization, if measured
throughmarket participation, is not generally segmented by gender, although
exceptions exist both nationally and regionally and with respect to particular
crops. The data do not suggest a discrimination against female farmers with
respect to prices received or the segmentation of particular marketing chan-
nels by gender, however. The exception here is tobacco in Malawi, where
institutional discrimination against women prevents female participation.
The results also contradict the common perception in the literature that
commercialization of food crops leads to male dominance of markets over
time; rather, the patterns are fluid, with bothmale and female farmers moving
in and out of markets as opportunities change. Nonetheless, particular coun-
tries stand out with respect to certain crops: for maize, a growing bias against
female farm managers can be noted with respect to all measurements of
commercialization in Zambia. Mozambique, Malawi, and to a lesser extent
Tanzania stand out in terms of non-grain food crops, where market participa-
tion by male farm managers had increased relative to female-headed house-
holds between Afrint II and III.
In the case of maize, poorer commercial possibilities for female farm
managers appear to be tied strongly to production factors, where lack of labour
and land prevent the generation of a marketable surplus. The combination of
domestic work with sole responsibility for farming in highly labour-intensive
production systems was repeatedly mentioned in the qualitative interviews as
the main difficulty facing female farmmanagers. While the gender-based gaps
in total household cash income were limited to Malawi and Zambia during
Afrint II, by the time of the third survey round, members of male-headed
households were on average also earning higher cash incomes in Kenya and
Ghana. The explanation for higher cash incomes within male-headed house-
holds can generally be found in higher farm-based incomes, with NFI sources
earned by the households of female farm managers not being able to com-
pensate for this relative shortfall. To the extent that agricultural commercial-
ization has increased since Afrint II—as has been the case particularly in
Zambia—it has benefited female farm managers but has also disproportion-
ately advantaged their male counterparts.
The sources of intra-household gaps in cash income largely replicate the
gaps found between male- and female-headed households, but intra-
household gaps are in fact generally larger than the gaps found at household
level. Male members generate the bulk of cash in households headed by male
farm managers, whether from within or outside farming.
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With respect to agricultural commercialization, the gendered patterns sug-
gest an important distinction between women who manage their own farms
and women who live in households headed by men. Whereas the constraints
for the former appear to lie in the lack of access to agrarian resources that can
be used to generate a marketable surplus, the disincentives to commercializa-
tion may be more forthcoming for the latter, as the outcomes from sales are
controlled by their husbands. What unites both groups of women are the
restrictions to commercialization imposed by lacking mobility, in turn related
to domestic responsibilities and cultural mores that impede physical move-
ment. Institutional segmentation of markets by gender, through male mem-
bership requirements in trading associations or contracting arrangements,
may also exclude women.
Analysing the data by region rather than country shows that at this level
income gaps are also explained by higher incomes from farm-based sources in
male-headed households. By contrast, in some regions without gender-based
income gaps, income generated from non-farm activities by female-headed
households to some extent explains the absence of such gaps. While intra-
household data at the regional level point to a handful of income sources
(both farm- and non-farm-based) that are biased towards women, in general
the data on cash incomes—whether at country, household, or individual
level—point to the very limited possibilities for women to raise any type of
cash income.
The mantra of ‘linking smallholders to markets’ has become something of
an article of faith in pro-poor growth perspectives—with the ‘business case’ for
addressing gender gaps in agriculture dovetailing with the ‘social justice case’
of enhancing women’s empowerment through earning individual cash
incomes. Theoretically female bargaining power can be improved through
generating incomes either from agriculture or non-farm sources. The data
suggest, however, that rural livelihoods are predominantly based on agrarian
sources of income which in turn are based on productive assets that are
unequally distributed by gender—whether among or within households.
The prospects for linking female farmers to markets, therefore, are dimmed
not by the institutional mechanisms of markets in themselves, but by the
structural inability of female farmers to produce a marketable surplus. In this
regard, non-farm sources of constraints on commercialization also need to
be recognized, for instance the labour-intensive drudgery characteristic of
women’s lives in many parts of sub-Saharan Africa. While agricultural tech-
nology may be relevant to raising yields among female farmers through
improved inputs for instance, non-agricultural interventions to ease con-
straints on women’s labour and mobility, such as addressing the ill-health of
young children and improving access to water for domestic use, may be
equally important.
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Agrarian Change and Structural
Transformation: Drivers and Distributional
Outcomes
Agnes Andersson Djurfeldt, Göran Djurfeldt, Ola Hall, and Maria Francisca
Archila Bustos
Introduction
The structural transformation (ST) of developing economies is a much-
studied process, but research is sparser on the topic of this chapter: the
impact of ST on the agrarian economy and its structure, including gender
segmentation. We identify three processes of agrarian change affected by
ST: (1) intensification of grain cultivation, i.e. increasing per area yields of grains;
(2) commercial diversification of cropping; and (3) increasing non-farm diversifica-
tion, sometimes referred to as pluriactivity or straddling of sectors. Here the former
term will be used when referring to livelihoods, which are pursued, hypothet-
ically, to a growing extent by farmer households (Haggblade 2007, Haggblade
et al. 2007). Two more processes—(4) increased use of agricultural labour and
(5) increased rates of exit from the agrarian sector and entry into the non-
agrarian one—are part of the ST but cannot be studied with the current dataset.
In a previous publication, two of the current authors studied the same
processes for the first panel period (2002 to 2008); here we refer to this study
as ‘the previous study’ (Andersson Djurfeldt and Djurfeldt 2013). In this
chapter we deal with the second panel period (2008–13/15), studying house-
holds that were surveyed in both Afrint II and Afrint III. We ask if the process
of ST-driven change is continuing and what its drivers and spatial and distri-
butional profiles are. Although we see the processes of agrarian change that we
study as driven by the ST, in the following we will be referring to the processes
studied as agrarian ST or occasionally as transformation of the agrarian sector.
Agrarian Change Driven by Structural Transformation
The ST of a developing economy is technically defined as a process in which
the non-agrarian share of the total GDP increases, which coincides with a
decreasing share of the total labour force employed in agriculture. According
to Lewis’ classical theory, when in the early stages of ST the agrarian labour
reserve has been emptied, ST depends upon an increasing productivity per
agricultural worker (Lewis 1954). A global and longitudinal study by Timmer
and Akkus shows that a global process of ST was going on from 1961 onwards,
with a yearly decline of about 1 per cent in the global agricultural labour force
(Timmer and Akkus 2008). Concurrently, global grain yields have increased
(Neumann et al. 2010), as have rates of crop and non-farm diversification.
From the colonial era onwards, with the emptying of land reserves, agricul-
tural development has been seen as a process of intensification propelled by
population growth. The consensus in social science seems to be that population
growth is not a driving force of intensification directly, except maybe indirectly
and in a longue durée perspective (Hayami and Ruttan 1971, Platteau et al. 1998).
Increasing demand for staples from the non-agrarian sectors is stimulating
commercialization of cropping and is an important, if not the most important
driver of intensification. However, commercialization encourages the comple-
mentary process of extensification as well. The latter term refers to a process
where total output is augmented by expanding areas under cultivation—with
more or less constant yields. The balance between extensification and intensi-
fication is related to access to land and the growth of the farming population
in a given area. The latter in turn is affected by the movement of labour from
the agricultural sector, either through non-farm diversification, or through a
complete exit from agriculture. Thus, both increasing demand for agricultural
products, as well as increasing labour scarcity, condition the balance between
extensification and intensification, and when the ST proceeds this is clearly in
favour of the latter.
Diversification of cropping likewise is powered by the ST: as non-agrarian as
well as agrarian GDP per capita increases, the demand for non-staple crops
tends to surge, stimulating the development of markets for such crops. Diver-
sification again may depend on new areas brought into cultivation (i.e. ex-
tensification), as well as on increased productivity (in economic terms) on
already cultivated land (intensification). In sub-Saharan Africa at present, crop
diversification often draws on micro-irrigation: in riverbeds, or in swampy or
marshy lands. Traditionally such tough-to-till lands were not attractive to
farmers, but with increasing demand they tend to be increasingly drawn
upon (for an argument similar to ours see Adams and Carter 1987).
After this introductory section, we proceed with an overview of previous
research before describing the data used and how they were produced. Then
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follows a discussion of hierarchical or multi-level models before expounding
on the three models used. A descriptive analysis of the variables involved and
the hypotheses associated with these is then made before coming to the
results of modelling the process of intensification, commercial crop diversifica-
tion, and non-farm diversification. A conclusion regarding the main hypotheses
ends the chapter.
Previous Research
There are few studies focusing on agrarian ST, especially in sub-Saharan Africa.
Most research is either on entire economies and their ST, or targeting the
transformation of the industrial or service sectors. Among the valuable excep-
tions belongs the review of research and policy issues by Binswanger-Mkhize
et al. (2010) and Fuglie (2011, see also Poulton draft 2017). They show how the
agrarian ST in sub-Saharan African was more or less stagnant from the 1970s
onwards, but suggest an increasing trend since around the turn of the millen-
nium. With the global food price crisis from 2008 onwards, market incentives
for producers improved. The consequences for smallholders of the long agri-
cultural recession which effectively ended with the millennium was reflected
in our previous study (Andersson Djurfeldt and Djurfeldt 2013).
In the earlier article, we discussed the trends of intensification for two
periods—from the year of household formation to Afrint I and for the first
panel period respectively. For the first period, we used retrospective binary
data on whether the household increased production and cultivated area
respectively since the year of household formation, which allows us to assess
intensification patterns. On this basis, we estimate that during the period
between the year of household formation until 2002, the intensification rate
in grains among the farmers sampled in Afrint I was 1.3 per cent per year, but
that it increased to 4.4 per cent annually during the first panel period. If the
models of agrarian growth in the works cited above prove correct, we would
expect even higher rates in the second panel period.
By contrast, our previous study of commercial crop diversification, meas-
ured by the sale of non-staple food crops, shows that this type of diversifica-
tion declined somewhat between Afrint I and Afrint II compared to the period
leading up to the first round of data collection. This might have been a
reflection of push-driven diversification pre-2002 and improved possibilities
for grain production after that year. If the macro-analyses quoted above hold
water, we would expect agricultural diversification prompted by distress to be
replaced by pull-driven processes, stimulated by increasing demand for non-
staple crops, in its turn induced by improved purchasing power by local as well
as urban-based consumers.
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Another surprising finding from our previous study is that non-farm
diversification or sector-straddling decreased during the first panel period
compared to the period before that,1 which may have been a result of push-
driven factors. During the long agricultural recession during the 1980s and
1990s, many smallholders were pushed into the non-farm sector, but with the
shift in the early years of the 2000s, and especially after 2008, the odds turned
so that farming became more attractive. The question remains whether accu-
mulation motives have replaced distress as the primary basis for non-farm
diversification. If so, we would expect a faster rate of non-farm diversification
for the second panel period.
A related question concerns the distributional outcomes of agrarian change
prompted by the ST. Is it a pro-poor or a pro-rich process? Since the issues
started to be studied around the turn of the nineteenth into the twentieth
century, many scholars have claimed that the development of markets for
farm produce necessarily leads to increasing polarization.2 We discuss the
distributional aspects of the three processes, including a specific focus on
gender—a perspective that has been given limited attention in analyses of
agrarian transformation.
Data Description
The Afrint surveys and panels are described in detail in Chapter 1. In this
chapter we are drawing mainly on data from the second Panel 2, covering
the survey rounds of Afrint II and Afrint III. Throughout we are comparing
with Panel 1, data from which were used in the previous study (Andersson
Djurfeldt and Djurfeldt 2013). Round 3 consists of 3,375 farm household
cases, of which 2,138 are included in the panel. In the models presented
here, 68 per cent of these are included and the rest are missing cases. Further
details of the trends in the cross-sectional data can be found in Chapter 2.
It can be argued that attrition itself reflects the agrarian changes brought by
the ST of the economy, for example in prompting people to migrate or leave
farming. We have not attempted to model this, as Dzanku et al. have done for
the Afrint Panel 1 (Dzanku et al. 2015).
1 Here we cannot make an exact comparison with the pre-2002 period because comparable data
were not collected.
2 The development in Russia is a classic example where Lenin (1899, 1960) claimed that the
development of capitalism led to expropriation of the peasants and the bifurcation of the peasantry
into an agrarian bourgeoisie and a landless proletariat or poor peasantry, while famously Chayanov
(1966; 1977) claimed the reverse, that the resilience of the peasantry was high, and that with the
formation of a strong cooperative movement it could survive in a surrounding capitalist economy.
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Hierarchical Modelling and Multi-Level Panel Survey Data
Strangely, the conventional way of analysing village survey data like ours
often omit taking account of the complex sample structure, with units sam-
pled in stages, from country, over region to village, and finally households or
individuals. Given the complexity of calculating sampling errors in such
designs (Kish 1965, Kish 1987, Cochran 2007) this is not surprising, although
software for the purpose is extant and included, for example, in the ‘complex
sample module’ in a package like IBM-SPSS. A convenient way of avoiding
these complexities is to use hierarchical models, the design of which, at least
in our case, mimics the design of a multistage sample. Specialized software has
been developed for the purpose, for example MLWin, which is used here
(Rasbash et al. 2010).3
A major advantage in using multi-level models is to avoid false positives,
which are likely to arise, for example, in using village or country dummies in a
multistage household sample such as ours. When doing so, every household
gets a 0 or 1 value for the dummy, falsely implying that there are as many
villages as households. When calculating the sample error, the result is an
underestimation stemming from dividing by the root of the first-stage sample
size, i.e. the number of households, instead of the root of the second-stage
sample size, which equals the number of villages. One dare not guess how
many false positives this has led to in development research where multistage
household surveys are often used.
Modelling Techniques
Our response variables are all binary: (1) whether a farm household increased
their yields of grain during the panel period, i.e. when we compare their yields
during the 2006–8 period compared to their recent yields (2011–13); (2)
whether they entered (or left) the market or increased their sales of non-
staple food crops during the same period; and (3) whether they became non-
farm diversified or ceased to be so during the panel period.
In the models for commercial diversification of cropping and for non-farm
diversification we use the status at the end of the period (diversification and
non-farm diversification dummy, respectively, for 2013) and then insert the
same status at the start of the period (2008) as an autoregressive component.
The core of the models then is the following:
3 For a good introduction to these statistical techniques see Snijders and Bosker (1999).
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yt1 ¼ β0x0 þ β1yt0 þ ei ð5:1Þ
As formulated here the model is not yet multi-level: it shows how the
dependent variable at the end of the period (yt1) is regressed on the same
variable at the start of the period (yt0) and how (β1) expresses the association
between the two. Making the model autoregressive thus takes account of the
fact that the status at (t1) is dependent on that at (t0). The extent of that
dependence is caught in the regression coefficient (β1) for the autoregressive
variable (yt0).
We define variables as multi-level with the subscripts (i), (j), and (k) referring
to household (i), village (j), and region (k) respectively. Introducing this
notation and two matrices of independent variables at household (i,j,k) and
village level (j,k) yields the following type of model:
yt1ijk ¼ β0x0jk þ β1yt0ijk þ β2X1ijk þ β3X2jk ð5:2Þ
The variance at household level is set to 1, while the village and region
variance is modelled as:
β0x0jk ¼ β0 þ v0k þ u0jk ð5:3Þ
where v0k and u0jk is the region and village-level variance respectively, so that
the sum of the regression coefficient of the constant (β0) and the two variance
components make up the total residual (designated as (ei in equation 5.1).
Both variance components (u and v) in turn are defined as normally distrib-
uted with their means = 0 and their variances estimated by the sample
variances.4
The intensification model needs a qualifying comment since the dependent
variable is not a genuine dummy as are the ones for crop and non-farm
diversification: you are either diversified in terms of cropping or income, or
you are not. By contrast, the intensification process cannot be a priori defined
as autoregressive: if a household intensifying during a period is not dependent
on whether it did so during the preceding period. The variable refers to the
process between t0 and t1, during which you either intensified or not. Thus we
cannot use an autoregressive model for intensification as straightforwardly as
we do for the other two processes. We chose instead to use the level of
intensification of the village at t0 as a pseudo-regressive variable, which proved
to work fine.
The three models have been estimated, in a first stage by Iterative General-
ised Least Squares (IGLS) and subsequently by Markov Chain Monte Carlo
estimation using the IGLS parameter estimates as Bayesian priors. The list of
independent variables refers to hypotheses about the drivers of the three
4 More precisely as v0k
e
Nð0;ΩvÞ : Ωv ¼ Ω2v0 and analogously for the region level variance (u0jk).
Agriculture, Diversification, and Gender in Rural Africa
118
processes. While the exemplification above only covers three levels, in the
application below we add country as the fourth level. Before considering
the results of the modelling, we will look at the binary associations between
the dependent variables and the vectors of independent ones. In connection
with this we formulate the exact hypotheses to be tested in the models.
Descriptive Data and Hypotheses
As can be expected from a period of increasing pace of ST, all three processes
studied seem to have accelerated for the households that were part of Panel 2
(cf. Table 5.1). The rate of intensification increased from 47 per cent in the first
panel to 59 per cent in the second one. As can be inferred from the small
standard errors, the difference between the periods is highly statistically sig-
nificant. To be exactly comparable the mean estimates should be divided by
the length of the panel in terms of years: we then get 6.71 per cent per year for
the first period and 9.83 per cent for the later one.
For crop and non-farm diversification we compare the rates for the respect-
ive survey rounds: for Afrint I the rate of commercial crop diversification was
45 per cent; it had barely increased for Afrint II to 46 per cent. However, it took
a leap between 2008 and 2013, jumping from 46 to 66 per cent. Percentage
Table 5.1. Rates of intensification and crop and non-farm diversification by panel period
a) Panel period
Afrint I to Afrint II Afrint II to Afrint III
Rate of intensification p SE n p SE n
per panel 0.47 0.006 1,601 0.59 0.007 1,321
Mean % per year 6.71 9.83
b) Survey round
Afrint I Afrint II Afrint III
Rate of diversification
of cropping
p SE n p SE n p SE n
per panel 0.45 0.008 1,056 0.46 0.005 2,474 0.66 0.004 2,548
Mean % per year 0.14 3.33
Non-farm
diversification
per panel 0.61 0.007 1,056 0.50 0.005 2,472 0.55 0.005 2,541
% 1.57 0.83
Note: a. p = proportion, SE = standard error, and n = number of cases.
Source: own panel data
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wise we get a 0.14 per cent increase per year for the first panel, compared to
3.33 per cent for the most recent period. The acceleration would be expected
during a process of high economic growth spurring the process of agrarian ST.
In Afrint I, 61 per cent of households had income from non-farm sources;
this percentage dropped to 50 per cent by Afrint II (or a mean decrease of
1.57 per cent per year) and then rose to 55 per cent five years later (an
increase of 0.83 per cent per year). A possible interpretation is that in the
earlier period there was considerable push-driven diversification out of agri-
culture, a dynamic which diminished in the second period. The acceleration
after that year could be evidence of pull- rather than push-driven non-farm
diversification.
There is no doubt that the recent period of high growth for sub-Saharan
Africa, stimulated by a period of high prices for rawmaterials in world markets
(Fuglie 2011), impelled a growing pace of ST in the sample countries. This
means an acceleration compared to the 2002–8 period, when the process of ST
ran on a somewhat lower gear (compare the results in our previous study,
Andersson Djurfeldt and Djurfeldt 2013). The current results should thus not
be a surprise. The questions to be answered in the following relate to the
drivers of these processes, and to the spatial and distributional consequences.
Detailed descriptive statistics can be found in Table 5.2.
Independent Variable Selection and Formulation of Hypotheses
As we have already outlined, model design is based on matrices of independ-
ent variables at both household and village level, related to specific hypoth-
eses about the drivers as well as consequences of the three processes. To
counteract panel mortality we have replaced deceased respondents by sam-
pling one of their descendants. Against a background of many studies show-
ing that big changes in farming tend to occur as a consequence of the
generational shift, we tested this hypothesis and the effect of increasing age
in all three models. Including the latter variable also allows us to distinguish
between the effects of ageing and time-bound effects more generally.
Wewill be looking specifically at FMFs. As can be seen from Table 5.3, 22 per
cent of all sample farms were female-managed in 2013. We want to see if,
when controlling for other factors, the odds are against FMFs when it comes to
intensification and crop and non-farm diversification.
It is worth noting that, on the mean, household labour resources (measured
as total number of family workers in agriculture) increased by 14 per cent5
during the period, or on the average by 2.33 per cent per year. This is in line
5 This is the antilog of the logged change reported in the table, 0.131.
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with the opening of a demographic window of opportunity in sub-Saharan
Africa, as shown by Masters (2011): the labour force is increasing in size and
proportion both of the total as well as of the rural population. Increasing
labour resources should, according to our hypothesis, favour intensification
and diversification and cropping, and possibly also non-farm diversification.
Interestingly the average cultivated area per farm has increased by 63 per
cent, or a mean of 9 per cent per year during the second panel. Much of this
increase in cultivated area draws on fallows, according to our hypothesis,
driven by increasing demand, both for grains and for other food crops.
Expanded area is a condition for, as well as a consequence of, extensification,
i.e. the increase in production by means of area expansion, rather than by
higher yields. Fifty-seven per cent of the sample farmers have expanded their
cultivated area since Afrint II, or an average of 9.5 per cent year. Our
Table 5.2. Descriptive statistics
Variable Cross-section Panel Mean SE
Autoregressive componentsa
Village mean rate of grain intensification Afrint II 0.310 0.025
Afrint II–III 0.349 0.024
Other food crops sold Afrint II 0.584 0.004
Afrint III 0.662 0.009
Non-farm diversified household Afrint II 0.575 0.010
Afrint III 0.633 0.010
Age of head household, logged Afrint III 3.883 0.006
Descendant household, dummy Afrint III 0.050 0.004
Female-managed farm, dummy Afrint III 0.220 0.008
Household labour resources logged, change in Afrint II–III 0.131 0.016
Change in cultivated area Afrint II–III 1.633 0.034
Extensifed grain production, dummy Afrint II–III 0.572 0.011
Entered market or increased grain sales, dummy Afrint II–III 0.380 0.011
No. of meals eaten in lean season Afrint II 2.313 0.014
Access to household credit, dummy Afrint II 0.110 0.006
Distance to nearest town with 50,000+ population,
travel time
2000 2.680 0.042
Always used or started to use animal manure,
dummy
Afrint II–III 0.872 0.009
Used improved seed since 2008, dummy Afrint II 0.379 0.013
Belonged to 10% largest landholders in village,
dummy
Afrint II 0.116 0.009
Land titling scheme present in village, dummy Afrint II 0.500 0.069
Farm partly irrigated, dummy Afrint II 0.386 0.049
Gini coefficient of land distribution in village Afrint II 0.375 0.158
Diversified cropping since 2008 Afrint II–III 0.501 0.013
Became pluriactive since 2008 Afrint II–III 0.228 0.011
Intensified grain cultivation, 2008–13 Afrint II–III 0.301 0.012
Notes: a. Intensification is not a genuine binary outcome since the process of intensification can continue over time. The
autoregressive component is replaced by a derived village-level mean (the share of farms in the village that intensified
during the first panel period) in the intensification model.
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Table 5.3. Models of three processes of agrarian structural transformation
Fixed effects Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Intensified grain cultivation
since 2008
Sold other crops 2013 Non-farm diversified
household 2013
β SE Sig. β SE Sig. β SE Sig.
Constant 3.33 0.77 *** 1.46 1.07 2.17 0.93 **
Autoregressive componentb 1.56 0.59 *** 0.99 0.15 *** 0.75 0.14 ***
Control variables
Age of head household 2013, logged 0.23 0.20 0.09 0.20 0.71 0.19 ***
Head of household descendant of 2008 respondent 0.29 0.31 0.20 0.31 0.13 0.31
Household characteristics
Change in labour resources, 2008–13, logged 0.10 0.10 0.35 0.10 *** 0.06 0.09
No. of meals eaten in lean season, 2008 0.31 0.11 *** 0.17 0.12 0.01 0.11
Belonged to 10% largest landholders in village, 2008 0.24 0.21 0.28 0.24 0.55 0.20 ***
Farm characteristics
Femalemanaged farm 0.13 0.17 0.78 0.16 *** 0.15 0.15
Change in cultivated area, 2008–13 0.05 0.05 0.41 0.07 *** 0.14 0.05 ***
Extensifed grain production, 2008–13 1.13 0.16 *** 0.35 0.16 ** 0.19 0.14
Entered market or increased grain sales, 2008–13 1.59 0.16 *** 0.22 0.15 0.50 0.13 ***
Always used or started to use animal manure, 2008–13 0.10 0.25 0.13 0.21 0.22 0.19
Used improved seed, 2008 0.04 0.19 0.35 0.22 0.08 0.18
Farm partly irrigated, 2013 0.06 0.14 0.78 0.17 *** 0.25 0.14 *
Access to agricultural credit, 2008 0.02 0.22 0.65 0.29 ** 0.12 0.21
Village-level variables
Distance to nearest town with 50,000+ population, travel time, 2000 0.03 0.14 0.61 0.15 0.24 0.14 *
Square of the above 0.00 0.01 0.11 0.02 *** 0.02 0.01
Land titling scheme present in village, 2008 0.61 0.27 ** 0.69 0.28 ** 0.34 0.25
Gini coefficient of land distribution in village, 2008 0.23 0.86 4.34 0.78 *** 1.34 0.59 **
Intercorrelation between dependent variables in Models 1 to 3
Intensified grain cultivation since 2008 – – – 0.09 0.17 0.30 0.16 *
Diversified cropping since 2008 0.09 0.15 – – – 0.02 0.15
Became non-farm diversified since 2008 0.01 0.16 0.34 0.16 **   
Intensified grain cultivation, 2008–13    0.09 0.17 0.17 0.30 0.16 *
Random effectsc
Country 0.13 0.34 0.13 0.39 0.45 0.31
Region 1.20 0.62 1.48 0.80 * 0.82 0.25 **
Number of cases 1,447 1,447 1,447
Missing (%) 32.32 32.32 32.32
2*loglikelihood, null model 2,005.31 1,673.53 1,853.86
Ditto, full model 1,506.30 1,262.59 1,775.28
Chi2 499.0089 0.000 *** 410.94 0.000 *** 78.58 0.000 ***
Degrees of freedom 25 25 25
Notes: a. All regression coefficients have been tested. Significance levels are denoted as *, **, and *** for 10, 5, and 1 per cent respectively.
b. Intensification is not a genuine binary outcome since the process of intensification can continue over time. The autoregressive component is replaced by a derived villageylevel mean (the share
of farms in the village that intensified during the first panel period) in the intensification model.
c. In a binary logistic model, the lowest-level variance (between villages) is set to 1. The level-specific variances are calculated as proportions of the former.
d. SE = standard error.
hypothesis is that although extensification is still very much a reality, com-
pared to intensification it would be less important than it was for Panel 1.
Concurrently panel households have increased their herds of livestock by
0.48 tropical livestock units since Afrint II, or 8.0 per cent per year.6 We would
have preferred to use this variable to test a hypothesis that (so far) intensifi-
cation is mainly dependent on sources of nutrients endogenous to the local
economy and that exogenous sources, i.e. mainly inorganic fertilizer, are less
important. Since livestock data on Mozambique are missing, using livestock
ownership in the models implies that we lose one country and a large number
of cases. However, data on the use of manure are available for all countries,
and therefore we resort to these data in modelling.
The share of households that used manure rose from 60 to 87 per cent
between Afrint I and II. However, usage fell again to 65 per cent by the final
round of data collection. Our hypothesis is that, notwithstanding this recent
decrease, intensification is mainly driven by endogenous sources of nutrients.
Data on application of inorganic fertilizer are noisy, so use of manure is best
compared with the usage of improved or hybrid seed, which was more or less
constant for the first panel period (54 per cent compared to 52 per cent
according to Jirström et al. 2011: 94). The percentage did not differ much for
Afrint III, when it was 50 per cent (as reported in Chapter 2). In terms of crop
technology then, we do not see much in terms of dynamism, so hypothetic-
ally crop technology exogenous to the village plays a minor role as a driver of
grain intensification, as well as crop diversification. Given the recently
boosted investments in diffusion of improved crop technologies and input
subsidies across a range of country settings, this is a remarkable finding, which
we return to later in the chapter.
More dynamism can be seen in the statistics on irrigation:While 32 per cent
of the panel households had access tominor irrigation for the second round of
data collection, the figure rose to 43 per cent by Afrint III, a yearly increase of
1.83 per cent. Note that this refers not to major irrigation systems, but to
minor ones, constructed and managed either by communities or by individ-
uals or groups of farmers. Diversification of cropping could be expected
both to stimulate expansion of irrigation and to be stimulated by it; and
intensification similarly, but less so since, of the grain crops studied, only
paddy cultivation involves irrigation and moreover, most of the rice grown
is rain-fed.
Afrint farmers face long travel times, on average two hours and forty min-
utes, to market outlets in bigger cities (more than 50,000 inhabitants). Travel
6 Tropical livestock units (TLUs) are defined by a weighted sum of big as well as smaller livestock.
Conversion factors are: cattle = 0.7, sheep = 0.1, goats = 0.1, pigs = 0.2, chicken = 0.01 (Harvest
Choice 2011).
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time and destination were estimated based on population figures for 2000
(Nelson 2008), so that presumably this is an overestimate compared to current
conditions, which implies some noise in the data. Unfortunately, the dataset
does not allow choosing a later period or smaller urban destinations, so these
data serve as our indicator of market accessibility.7
Curve estimation exercises have been made for our three outcome variables
(intensification and crop and non-farm diversification) regressed on travel
time, with equations including the square of time. These show that there is
a negative correlation between travel time and intensification, as well as with
non-farm diversification; on the other hand we see a positive association with
commercial crop diversification. The former correlations are expected: the
farther to the major market, the lower the propensity for farmers to intensify
or diversify into NFIs. In the multivariate setup that follows we use statistical
controls to explore further the association between travel time to market and
the three processes under investigation.
Note that the positive association between commercial crop diversification
and travel timedefies the expectation that thepropensity for a farmer todiversify
would decrease with increasing distance to the market. However, non-staple
food crops are often sensitive to transport over long distances, especially under
African conditions, therefore production of such crops is typically directed
towards local markets, rather than regional, national, or international ones.8
This could explain the positive correlation between distance to markets and
commercial diversification within agriculture, and implies a modification of
the overall hypothesis on the importance of distance tomarkets.9
There are many prerequisites for a deeper smallholder market integration of
smallholders. Infrastructure is obviously important, but so is institutional
development (Platteau et al. 1998). We use two indicators of such develop-
ment: availability of agricultural credit and land titling. While for Afrint II, 12
per cent of the panel households had access to credit, the percentage had
substantially increased by the third round of data collection when it reached
19 per cent, a difference which is statistically significant. We have no updated
figures when it comes to changes in land tenure, but already for Afrint II, 47
per cent of the panel households were living in villages, which had land titling
schemes. The question is to what extent these institutional changes are
contributing to the agrarian change induced by the ST. According to our
7 It should be pointed out that we have several survey indicators of distance, travel time, and
cost of transport to market, but all these seem inferior to the one used here.
8 Only one of the sample villages is involved in production directly for the international market.
9 In all three cases the square term is statistically significant but of such a low magnitude that it
hardly affects the estimate of the dependent variables (propensities to intensify, diversify, or go
pluriactive).
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hypothesis they will assume an increasing importance, especially for intensi-
fication and diversification of cropping.
Our models also deal with the distributional patterns of the agrarian ST,
especially in terms of poverty and distribution of assets. The most reliable
poverty indicator in our case seems to be the number of meals eaten in the
lean season, which on the mean were 2.3 in Afrint II. One of the hypotheses
that we test is whether intensification is a pro-poor process, and if this holds
for non-farm diversification as well. Commercial crop diversification, on the
other hand, could arguably be a strategy for farmers who are relatively food
secure and possess the resources in terms of various forms of capital to venture
into the more risky strategy of commercial diversification. The latter strategy
then is not expected to be pro-poor, while the two first-mentioned ones could
very well be.
We study only one indicator of wealth, namely landownership, and more
specifically its distribution proxied by the Gini index. Varying between 0 and
1 the Gini is the most frequently used inequality measure; it was 0.38 for
Afrint II. Our expectation is that agrarian ST, while not necessarily pro-poor,
should not be anti-poor.
Another indicator of unequal distribution of benefits is if a household
belonged to the 10 per cent of largest landowners in a village at the start of
the period. Based on previous research on the Afrint data, we expect that the
three processes we are studying do not advantage village elites. Thus, we
expect a zero or negative correlation between the dependent variables and
the elite indicator.
Comparing the results for the three variables mentioned, i.e. the poverty
indicator, the Gini index, and the elite dummy, will enable us to assess
whether the processes are more attractive to middling farmers compared to
either the poor or the rich elite.
The final question is whether the three processes are interrelated. To test for
this we include the change during the second panel for the respective response
variables as independent variables in the other equations. Note, however, that
even if at the household level the processes may be uncorrelated, this need not
imply that they are so at the village level.
A final hypothesis deals with the autoregressive effect in all models, which
we expect to be stronger than in the corresponding models in the preceding
study (Andersson Djurfeldt and Djurfeldt 2013). The consequence of the
accelerating ST process should be reflected in the coefficients for the autore-
gressive components,which shouldnotonlybepositive, buthigher than in the
previouspanel period.However, as alreadypointedout, only twoof themodels,
i.e. those for crop and non-farm diversification, are genuinely autoregressive.
The intensification model is different, with a ‘pseudo-autoregressive’ compo-
nent, i.e. the village mean rate of intensification for the first panel period.
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On the whole, using panel data considerably simplifies causal attribution:
when working with cross-sectional data this is a perennial problem which
statisticians and economists have shown considerable ingenuity in address-
ing. With panel data we always have the possibility of using lagged variables,
or factors measured at t0 rather than t1. Since causality is not retroactive, the
lagged variable may be a cause of the independent ones, but not the other way
around. However, in this case it is not always possible to use the lagged
variable strategy; in some cases, we use variables referring to changes in the
panel period as a whole (t0 to t1) rather than to a state at t0. Since the
dependent variables refer to the same period, this makes causal attribution
less straightforward. In most cases, however, we are interested in the associ-
ation between the two variables; or differently put: what is the correlation
between the variables, given that we control for other variables, as we do in
multiple regressions? The cases where the dependent and independent vari-
ables refer to the same time period are discussed in detail in what follows.
Modelling Results
Table 5.3 presents the three models of (1) intensification, (2) commercial
diversification of cropping, and (3) non-farm diversification.
All three models are highly statistically significant, with Chi2 tests signifi-
cant below the 0.1 per cent level. Regression coefficients are significant when
marked with asterisks. For the crop diversification model, however, the con-
stant is not statistically different from zero.
Model 1: Intensification
In the model of intensification, four regression coefficients are strongly stat-
istically significant while one is significant at the 5 per cent level. First, the
village rate of intensification for the first panel period is negatively related to
the odds for a household in that village to have intensified its grain cultivation
during the second panel. We interpret this as a saturation effect: in villages
with high rates of intensification during the first panel period, the odds for an
individual household to have intensified in the second period would be much
lower than elsewhere. This is undeniably a positive distributional conse-
quence of the process of ST as it is currently evolving since more villages,
previously less intensified and presumably farther from the market, are appar-
ently being drawn into the process.10
10 This could have the effect of weakening the association between the odds for intensification
and distance to market.
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The indicator of the twin process to intensification, i.e. extensification, is
also highly statistically significant, but negative ðβ ¼  1:13Þ; while it was
positive and highly significant in the earlier period ðβ ¼ 0:98Þ. Here, both
the dependent and the independent variables refer to the same time period,
namely the second panel. However, in this case we are interested in the
association between them, rather than seeing one factor as the cause of the
other. Thus we can assert that, from having been complementary options,
intensification and extensification are becoming mutually exclusive strat-
egies. For many farmers the option of increasing area, rather than yields, has
been a relevant option: theymay have done so, either at the relative expense of
other crops, or absolutely by drawing on fallows or virgin land. In other words,
the increase in grain production stimulated by increasing demand continues to
take two, mutually exclusive forms: extensification or intensification.
The commercialization indicator strengthens this interpretation: farmers
who have entered the grain market, or increased their volume of sales in that
market, are almost five times ðExpð1:59Þ ¼ 4:89Þ as likely to have increased
their yields compared to those who decreased their sales or left the market
during the period. Causal attribution is not self-evident in this case, since both
the test variable and the dependent variable refer to the same time period. In
principle, causation can be either from intensification to commercialization,
the other way around, or possibly even circular. Whatever the case, there is no
doubt about the strong association between the two variables. In the previous
study the corresponding regression coefficient for the first panel period was of
a similar order, but lower or ðβ ¼ 1:29Þ. If anything then, commercialization
increased in importance in the later period. This reinforces the conclusion
drawn in our earlier study and supports the hypothesis about an accelerating
ST. Commercialization driven by increasing demand is not only the strongest
factor associated with grain intensification (Andersson Djurfeldt and Djurfeldt
2013) but moreover a quickening one.
The spatial dimension of intensification should be possible to gauge by the
distance indicator. On the binary level, as we have seen, intensification is
negatively related to the travel time to the nearest majormarket. However, in a
multivariate setup the regression coefficient is not statistically significant. This
is a setback for our hypothesis, which however is likely to be an effect of other
variables, collinear with distance, for example the commercialization indica-
tor or the indicators of crop and non-farm diversification, respectively. More-
over, as already pointed out, the pseudo-autoregressive component, the
village-level rate of intensification, could have a similar effect.11
11 In a model stripped of a number of variables which are not significant in the one above, and
with the use of manure replaced by the number of tropical livestock units, we get the expected
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Since the turn of the century, African governments have given increasing
attention to food production and security, with yield-increasing programmes
receiving more funding from governments and donors.12 Against this back-
ground it may be disappointing that the use of improved seed cannot be
shown to have had any influence on the intensification process.
Increased yields might instead be conditioned by access to manure.13 As is
clear from Table 5.3, however, the proxy for the use of manure is not statis-
tically significant. In a stripped model (see footnote 11) the use of manure
is replaced by a less noisy variable: the number of tropical livestock units
owned (details withheld).14 The elasticity of intensification to a unit increase
in livestock ownership in this model is ð β ¼ 0:32; 5 per cent significant),
implying that adding a unit of livestock increases the odds for having inten-
sified by 37 per cent. As far as can be judged from our data, intensification thus
depends on local, organic sources of nutrients, which may limit attainable
yields over time.
Credit and land titling may stimulate intensification according to our
hypothesis: studying the influence we find that credit shows zero effect on
intensification. As discussed later, this may suggest that insofar as intensifica-
tion implies investment it may be financed through means other than credit,
for example NFI. Land titling, on the other hand, proves negatively related to
intensification but—as we will see—is positively related to commercial crop
diversification. This will be further discussed in what follows.
Looking at other distributional consequences of intensification, we note
that, like in the earlier period, elite membership, as proxied by belonging to
the 10 per cent of largest landowners in a village at the start of the period, does
not increase the odds of having intensified. The process does not appear to be
pro-poor either, since the association with the poverty indicator15 is negative
and statistically significant: a household that had had one meal less
than the mean number of meals taken during the lean season in 2008 had
27 per cent lower than average odds of having intensified its grain production
since then ðExpð0:31Þ ¼ 0:73Þ. A quite significant conclusion is thus that
significance for travel time ðβ ¼ 0:16Þ, significant at the 5 per cent level. This adds to the evidence
that the odds for intensification increase with decreasing travel time to markets.
12 Refer to the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme under New
Partnership for Africa’s Development, which has meant increasing funding for agricultural
development, both from governments and from donors (Kolavalli et al. 2010).
13 Here both the dependent and the independent variable refer to the same time period,
2008–13. Again, the issue is not one of causal attribution but rather of association between the
variables.
14 Livestock ownership is measured in tropical livestock units, according to standards
established by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (Harvest Choice 2011).
This information was not collected in Mozambique. For this reason, we do not include this
country in the stripped model.
15 The number of meals eaten in the lean season, 2008.
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intensification (neither elite or pro-poor) seems to be a process attracting
middling smallholders.
Regarding gender finally, intensification cannot be shown to discriminate
against or privilege FMFs. Thus intensification is not obviously gendered.
The country- and regional-level variances are not statistically significant.
This would strengthen the conclusion drawn in the earlier study, that there
are no great differences in the intensification processes as they play out in
different countries and regions. We seem to be witnessing a generic process.
Model 2: Commercial Crop Diversification
The autoregressive component in the diversification model (if the household
was commercially diversified at the start of the period or had increased its
market engagement) is strongly significant and with a regression coefficient
ðβ ¼ 0:99Þ, as seen in Table 5.3. This implies that the odds for the household to
be diversified during the second period are considerably higher than if the
household had not been diversified in the previous period ðExpðβÞ ¼ 2:69Þ.
Thus, once diversified, households are not disposed to withdraw from non-
staple food crop markets, another sign of their being drawn into an ongoing
process of ST.
Diversification is lower among female farm managers: the odds for such a
household to have diversified is ðβ ¼ 0:78;ExpðβÞ ¼ 0:46Þ, which is around 50
per cent less than for male farm managers. This implies that, in contrast to
intensification, diversification seems to be a gendered process, tilted against
female farm managers. This interpretation is supported also by the cross-
sectional trends presented in Chapter 4 of this volume, which suggest a mas-
culinization of markets for certain non-staple food crops during the second
panel period for Mozambique, Malawi, and Tanzania.
Like extensification in grains, diversificationof cropping to some extent draws
on added landed resources: the relevant regression coefficient implies that the
elasticity of diversification to an increase in cultivated area is ðβ ¼ 0:41;
ExpðβÞ ¼ 1:51Þ. This is more than double the figure noted for the first period,
again an indicator of progressing ST and in line with our hypothesis.
Commercial diversification of cropping is highly responsive to an increase
in labour resources. T regression coefficient is ðβ ¼ 0:35;ExpðβÞ ¼ 1:42Þ, mean-
ing that the elasticity of commercial diversification to a 1 per cent increase in
labour resources is 0.42 per cent. This once again underscores the importance
of market incentives to smallholder commercialization.
Interestingly, in agreement with another of our hypotheses, diversification
seems to be driven by access to credit, with a regression coefficient of
ðβ ¼ 0:65;ExpðβÞ ¼ 1:92Þ, indicating that a household with credit access had
almost double the odds of crop diversification for the second panel period,
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compared to households without such access. In the previous period we found
no indication of diversification facilitated by credit (Andersson Djurfeldt and
Djurfeldt 2013). Furthermore, if land titling was present in a village at the
beginning of the period, the odds for diversification are considerably higher.
None of these indicators were significant in the previous period, pointing to
changing conditions and contexts for the agrarian transformation process.
Another sign of institutional development in other words.
Besides the further development of markets for staples and non-staples, this
points to an institutional development, itself a part of ST, creating conditions
for further agrarian transformation. Despite much criticism against land tit-
ling superimposed on customary land tenure systems, this result seems to
suggest that land titling may fulfil its professed function of facilitating com-
mercialization and reducing risks. However, it obviously says nothing about
the possible social costs of such policies and gender aspects in particular. In
this context, it can be noted that several authors note that formalization of
customary tenure systems leads to weaker access and user rights among mar-
ginalized groups such as women and migrants (Walker 2003, Meinzen-Dick
and Mwangi 2009, Razavi 2009, Alden Wily 2011).
Longer distance to markets would be expected to mean lower odds for
diversification, but apparently this does not hold and is against expectations.
The regression coefficient for travel time to major urban markets is not statis-
tically significant, while its square is positive and significant. This points to a
U-shaped distribution and indicates that when controlling for other factors,
the odds for crop diversification first decrease and then increase with increas-
ing distance. This partly contradicts the binary relation reported earlier, which
was positive but not U-shaped. Furthermore, remembering the non-significant
association between travel time and the odds for intensification in Model 1, it
seems that multicollinearity may be a problem here too. A stripped model (see
footnote 11) gives a positive regression coefficient, which corroborates the
suspicion that multicollinearity is disguising what is probably a positive asso-
ciation. Thus we retain the interpretation that commercial crop diversification
is often directed to local rather than regional markets.
Like for intensification, commercial diversification of cropping does not
appear to be favouring local elites, while the regression coefficient for the
poverty indicator likewise is not significant. Our model thus indicates that
diversification of cropping is neither pro-elite, nor pro-poor, albeit slanted
against women.
Investment of family labour and capital in irrigation is often a prerequisite
for diversification. The process draws on thirsty crops like vegetables,moreover
often grown in the off-season. The regression coefficient for access to (mainly
minor) irrigation is 0.78, meaning that farms with access to irrigation have
more than double the odds of being diversified compared to those without.
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Furthermore, there is a strong association between inequality of landowner-
ship in the village, as measured by the village Gini index for land distribution
ðβ ¼ 4:34;ExpðβÞ ¼ 0:01Þ and the odds for diversification of cropping. Thus
the higher the inequality in landownership in a village, the lower the odds for
crop diversification. To elaborate the conclusion already reached: crop diver-
sification is neither pro-rich nor pro-poor, but seems more likely in village
with many middling farmers.
While there is no intercorrelation between the odds for crop diversification
and intensification, the process is negatively associated with non-farm diver-
sification. At the household level the processes thus seem to some extent
opposing, such that households tend to go either for one or the other.
As for the variance decomposition, there are some outliers at village and
regional level but no clear ones at country level, reflected in a statistically
significant region-level variance, but a non-significant one at country level.
Diversification thus seems to be a uniform process, perhaps uneven in pace
and space but with the same drivers.
Model 3: Non-Farm Diversification
In the study of the first panel period we had difficulties in designing amodel of
non-farm diversification that was at all statistically significant and thus had
trouble in attaining statistical significance for the independent variables
(Andersson Djurfeldt and Djurfeldt 2013). We did not realize that this was
probably due to over-fitting and the large number of non-significant inde-
pendent variables included in the model. Although it contains a fair number
of independent variables the current model (cf. Table 5.3) is much more
sturdy. The good fit probably depends on better data quality as well.
Age and gender give comparable results for both periods and in line with the
hypothesis. The former variable is negatively correlated with non-farm diver-
sification both for the first panel and for the second panel. The regression
coefficient is considerably higher in the latter period though, with regression
coefficients of β ¼  0:20 for the first period and 0.71 for the second period.
If non-farm diversification were a push- rather than pull-driven process in the
late twentieth and early twenty-first century, and if the ST implies that it is
becoming less so, this would explain, at least ad hoc, the lower negative
correlation between age logged and the odds for non-farm diversification.
Increased food and livelihood security in the more recent period would, in
this interpretation, be pushing fewer old people into low-return micro-
business, like peddling vegetables to passers-by along the roadside.
The overall increase in labour resources that we have already noted is not
associated with non-farm diversification while, recalling results for both
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Models 1 and 2, it is positively associated with crop diversification and not at
all with intensification. This may imply that, while all three strategies would
be facilitated by increasing labour resources, crop diversification as a vent for
‘surplus labour’ is a more feasible option than the other two.
For the second panel, in contrast to the first one, we get a non-significant
regression coefficient for the gender of farm manager. Unlike crop diversifica-
tion where FMFs are less likely to be involved, non-farm diversification, like
intensification, seems to have included both types of households. Thus the
gender dynamics of the processes are mixed, at least at household level.
We get a weak statistical significance for the association between the odds
for non-farm diversification and the distance indicator, but would have
expected a stronger one. Recalling that the binary correlation was negative,
we suspect another problem in this model compared to the previous ones. The
outcome variable is heterogeneous, containing small-scale as well as large-
scale businesses, casual employment as well as salaried work, alongside
pensions and remittances. When we run a model regressing household
involvement in micro-business on a stripped number of independent vari-
ables (cf. footnote 11), we do get the expected strong association with
distance: the longer the travel time to markets, the lower the odds for being
involved inmicro-business. This suggests that the ST brings with it tighter and
more frequent relations between urban and rural areas, manifested in
increased non-farm diversification around the urban centres.
Model 3 reveals some other features of non-farm diversification, which
deserve to be commented on. The autoregressive component is high and
statistically significant ðβ ¼ 0:75;ExpðβÞ ¼ 2:12Þ, which is expected and
implies that once diversified into non-farm sources of income, households
are highly likely to remain so. This contradicts data from our earlier study,
which suggest mobility into and out of the non-farm sector in response to
challenges as well as opportunities in the farm sector. In its turn, this contrast
may point to the consolidation of non-farm diversification during the second
period in response to broader structural change of the macro-level economy.
‘Straddling’ the farm and non-farm sectors, as it has also been called, should
not be regarded as a temporary response to crisis, but as an enduring liveli-
hood strategy, involving an increasing number of smallholders globally
(Djurfeldt and Sircar 2016).
Furthermore, non-farm diversification is negatively related to an increased
cultivated area, indicating that for many households this strategy may be an
alternative to a more vigorous engagement in farming. The strongly negative
association with grain market entry points in the same direction, again sug-
gesting more permanent livelihood strategies focused on the non-farm sector.
Non-farm diversification is not significantly associated with the poverty
indicator, but negatively so with elite membership, signalling that the strategy
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is widespread among other sections of smallholders. Not unexpectedly it is
unrelated to credit access, as well as to the usage of manure or improved seed.
Non-farm diversification is moreover negatively related to access to irrigation,
but not associated with presence of land titling schemes in the village. Finally,
the strategy is much more common in villages with unequal distributions of
landownership. Rather than remain in agriculture or work as agricultural
labour for neighbours with larger plots of land, it seems many smallholders
have diversified into non-farm sources of income.
All this points to non-farm diversification to some extent being an alterna-
tive to commercial crop diversification, but not to intensification with which
it is positively related ðβ ¼ 0:30;ExpðβÞ ¼ 1:35Þ. Households engaged in non-
farm diversification are thus more likely to intensify their cultivation than
others. This piece of evidence obviously points to non-farm diversification
being an alternative to credit for financing intensification. Note also that the
strategy is unrelated to extensification, which may mean that non-farm diver-
sification may lessen the pressure on land in a region.
Variance decomposition gives results similar to the previous models, with
few deviant villages, but like in Model 2 with some regions significantly
differing from the overall trends. Countries differ little and what we observe
may therefore be a general trend.
Conclusions
On a speculative note, it is tempting to see the three periods covered in this
chapter and in the previous work as pointing to three modalities in the
relation between African smallholder agriculture and the non-agrarian econ-
omy, exemplified by: (1) a period with slow growth in the non-agrarian
economy, creating sluggish demand for farm products and for what Arthur
Lewis would have called surplus labour; (2) another period withmore vigorous
growth in the non-farm sector boosting the demand for staples as well as non-
staples; and (3) yet another period with sustained non-agricultural growth and
strengthened demand for farm products.
The first of these periods is easily recognized as the long recession in African
agriculture from the 1980s until the early years of the twenty-first century
(Fuglie 2011). The concurrent agrarian stagnation was reinforced by low world
market prices, maintained by the dumping of farm surpluses by the OECD
countries, tempting African governments to feed their urban populations by
cheap imports rather than by domestic production.
Tables turned with the period of growth from around the time of the first
survey, which was founded on high raw material prices stimulating the Afri-
can non-farm sector, foreign direct investment, and GDP growth. During
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similar previous periods, growth occurred in spurts and collapsed with a fall in
raw material prices, but from 2008 it was reinforced by the global food prices
crisis, which brought about a period of higher world market food prices, and
indirectly increased demand for domestically produced staples. This situation
still prevailed when writing this in early 2017.
The models we have developed in this and our previous work illustrate the
response of African smallholders to these different economic circumstances.
By modelling household strategies from the year of household formation
(c.1980) to the time of the second round of data collection (Afrint II) in the
previous work (Andersson Djurfeldt and Djurfeldt 2013), we saw the effects of
sluggish growth on staples, as well as non-staple production. Combined with
population growth and increasing land scarcity, smallholder households
were pushed into low-return off-farm activities, like micro-business and low-
wage labour, on as well as off the farm. In the 2013 work mentioned above,
we witnessed the turnaround from a low-growth scenario pre-2002, fed by
sluggish demand for farm products, to one of higher growth and demand. As a
reaction to this, smallholders withdrew from low-return non-farm activities
and from less remunerative non-food cash crops. Stimulated by improved
prices, they tended to intensify first of all in staple crop production, possibly
with a view to their own food security. This tendency was further boosted
during the second panel period when members of smallholder households
increased their diversification, on as well as off the farm. This time it appears
they were pulled into the non-farm sector by better prospects rather than
pushed out of the farm sector.
In line with the above, the three indicators of ST that we are using here
indicate an increasing pace of transformation (cf. Table 5.1). During the pro-
cess of ST, one would also expect an increasing demand for labour, leading to
improved wage levels for farm workers. This issue has not been researched
here, but hypothetically sub-Saharan African agriculture, outside some pock-
ets, has not yet come to that stage. Similarly, the present inquiry has not dealt
with the welfare consequences of the agrarian ST, but mainly with its drivers
and distributional consequences, among them its gender dimensions.
On an overall level, two of the three processes studied here do not seem to
be gender biased. Most importantly, female farm managers are not excluded
from grain intensification processes. Hopefully this implies that insofar as
intensification has positive effects on farmer food security (directly through
self-provisioning, or indirectly through increased farm incomes), women as
well as men and their children would benefit from the process.16
16 In a recent study, Ritzema et al. (2016) found moderate but positive effects of production
intensification on smallholder food security.
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Unlike the other two processes, in the most recent period commercial crop
diversification is not gender neutral. Our model shows a clear discrimination
in favour of MMFs. This gender bias could be connected to biases in some of
the other drivers, since diversification is more likely to benefit farmers with
access to land reserves, security of tenure, irrigation, and credit,17 all factors
with a positive influence on the odds for diversification.
Non-farm diversification does not seem to be a gendered process, at least at
the household level: male- and female-headed households were as a likely to
become pluriactive during the second period, although female-headed house-
holds had lower odds of non-farm diversification in the first period.
Since the elite is less non-farm diversified than the majority of smallholders,
sector-straddling has become more of an option for the majority; it would be
wrong to say that it is pro-poor but neither is it pro-rich. Interestingly, NFI to
some extent seems to be invested in grain intensification, suggesting high
returns in grain markets and possible food security improvements.
17 Although binary statistics do not evidence discrimination of women in the access to
agricultural credit.
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Agricultural Intensification Response to
Agricultural Input Subsidies in Tanzania:
A Spatial-Temporal and Gender Perspective,
2002–15
Elibariki E. Msuya, Aida Cuthbert Isinika, and Fred Mawunyo Dzanku
Introduction
Attaining food security through self-sufficiency from local production has been
a longstanding goal of the Tanzanian government (Isinika et al. 2005), and
agricultural intensification has been the key strategy to achieve this goal in the
main staple crops. Towards this end,many programmes implemented or coord-
inated by the government with support from numerous donors have come and
gone, and have had varying levels of achievement as well as setbacks. The
introduction of inorganic fertilizer and improved seed under the National
Maize Project (1974–84) in the southern highlands of Tanzania has been cited
as a successful example of agricultural intensification in Tanzania (Isinika et al.
2005) and even deemed a mini-green revolution by some (Eriksson 1993).
However, setbacks towards agricultural intensification have also been
numerous. For instance, the mini-green revolution cited above could neither
be replicated countrywide nor could it be sustained after market liberalization
in 1986 due to high subsidy costs. All subsidies were subsequently withdrawn
(World Bank 1994, Delgado and Minot 2000). Hence, low input use and
correspondingly low agricultural productivity remains prevalent throughout
the country. Consequently, poverty—particularly rural poverty—has per-
sisted despite numerous anti-poverty development programmes and projects.
The government has made various efforts to address these problems. Under
the Agricultural Sector Development Programme (ASDP II), which contributes
towards MKUKUTA,1 targets had been set to increase the agricultural sector
growth rate from 2.7 per cent in 2009 to 6.0 per cent per annum by 2015;
reduce income poverty from 33.3 per cent in 2011/12 to 24.0 per cent by
2025; and and reduce food poverty from 11.3 per cent in 2011/12 to 5 per cent
by 2015 (United Republic of Tanzania 2015).
This chapter assesses the trend of agricultural intensification in Tanzania,
focusing on the performance of maize and rice2 production from 2002 to
2015. Using panel data from the Afrint study (Tanzania), the chapter exam-
ines how maize and rice yields have changed in the Iringa and Morogoro
regions during the study period, which coincides with the second phase of the
agricultural subsidy scheme. It was envisaged by policymakers that providing
an input subsidy would improve agricultural productivity and contribute
towards the national goal for food security and poverty reduction (United
Republic of Tanzania Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs 2010). The
main objective of this chapter is to assess whether the subsidy programme had
an impact on reducing poverty as envisaged by the government, also compar-
ing the yield outcomes and livelihood impacts across the gender, age, and
wealth stratum. Specifically, the analysis addresses three questions: (1) What
has been the effect of input subsidy programmes on agricultural technology
adoption? (2) How has the adoption of technologies targeted by the subsidy
programme impacted on maize and rice yields? (3) What has been the rela-
tionship between intensification (increased yield), output, and livelihood
outcomes?
Data for the study were collected from two regions involving about 400
households in ten villages. All five villages from the Morogoro region belong
to Kilombero district. The five villages in the Iringa regions are spread in three
districts; Iringa rural, Kilolo, and Mufindi. Data were collected in three waves
(2002, 2008, and 2015), as described in Chapter 1. In Afrint II and III, some of
the original respondents who had passed away or had become too old were
replaced by their married offspring, who had formed new households. By the
final round of data collection, 186 of the original respondents remained. Out
of these, 150 had complete data for all the relevant variables, thus constituting
the panel data used in this study of temporal, spatial, and gender differences in
use of inorganic fertilizer and improved maize and rice seed as productivity-
enhancing technologies.
1 MKUKUTA stands for Mpango wa Kukuza Uchumi na Kuondoa Umaskini Tanzania, in
Kiswahili (the national language of Tanzania). MKUKUTA is the equivalent of the National
Strategy for Growth and Poverty Reduction (United Republic of Tanzania, Ministry of Finance
and Economic Affairs, 2010). It is an instrument for implementing the National Vision 2025 to
guide economic transformation to attain middle income status by 2025.
2 In this chapter rice is used interchangeably with paddy (un-milled rice).
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Background
Agricultural Policy in Tanzania
Tanzania, like many other developing countries, aspires to attain economic
development. Food security and poverty reduction are key indicators used to
gauge success in meeting the national goal to attain mid-level economic
development status by the year 2025, as stated in the National Vision
(United Republic of Tanzania Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs
2010). Indicators for achieving this goal are defined in the National Strategy
for Growth and Poverty Reduction, more commonly known by its Kiswahili
acronym—MKUKUTA. It has been argued by some authors that as long as the
majority of the world’s poor continue to derive their livelihoods from agricul-
ture, any poverty reduction strategy must focus on improving agricultural
performance because agricultural growth promotes poverty reduction (Ajani
and Igbokwe 2013, Andersson Djurfeldt 2013). However, others have argued
that agriculture is not a reliable sector on which to base rising prosperity since
it has failed to deliver in the past. For instance, Ellis (2009: 59) argues that ‘the
notion that poverty reduction is best addressed in the very sector where
poverty is most acute is seriously flawed and fails to focus adequately on
supporting growth processes where they actually occur in the economy.’
In Tanzania, poverty has been defined as predominantly rural, and it is
skewed against women and youths (United Republic of Tanzania 2015).
More than 70 per cent of the rural population still depends on agriculture
for their livelihoods, but increasingly also draws on non-farm income
(NFI) sources (Katega and Lifuliro 2014, Ombakah 2014). At the macro
level, the share of agriculture in GDP declined from 50 per cent in the year
2000 to less than 24.7 per cent in 2014 (United Republic of Tanzania 2008,
Bank of Tanzania 2013/14), partly due to revision in the national account
estimates during 2006 to accommodate structural changes in patterns of
production, consumption, and investment. The revision also accounted for
changes in relative prices and incorporated new data, which reflected new
economic activities in the services, industry, and construction sectors
(United Republic of Tanzania, National Bureau of Statistics 2006, Isinika
et al. 2011).
At the farm level, such diversification is reflected by the rising share of non-
farm economic activities, hence NFI (Da Corta and Price 2009). Nonetheless,
farming remains the livelihood anchor for the majority of rural households in
Tanzania for the foreseeable future. The Afrint III data show that nearly two-
thirds of household income came from farming. Since the mid-1970s the
government has used subsidies as the main instrument for promoting agricul-
tural intensification in order to achieve food security and poverty reduction
goals (Isinika and Msuya 2016). We therefore examine whether these targets
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have been met by recent subsidy programmes, and if they have been gender
inclusive as intended.
Agricultural Subsidy Programme Since 2000
In Tanzania, we identify three phases of agricultural inputs subsidy provision.
During the first round (1975–84) the inputs subsidy involved providing fertil-
izer, improved seed, and pesticides to farmers in Iringa, Mbeya, Rukwa, and
Ruvuma, nicknamed ‘the big four’ (Isinika et al. 2005). This subsidy was
phased out in 1984 due to high cost and realignment of policies to conform
to a market economy (Delgado and Minot 2000). By 1994, all subsidies (direct
and indirect) had been withdrawn. The second phase involved a partial trans-
port subsidy that was introduced in 2003, lasting until 2007. This subsidy was
introduced to address the problem of declining yield and output of maize in
particular (Delgado and Minot 2000, Isinika et al. 2005). The subsidy was
improved to accommodate seed for other crops (maize and sorghum in
2004) as well as other inputs (pesticide and herbicides in 2006), which were
added to improve the subsidy’s impact (Isinika and Msuya 2016). During the
financial year 2007/8 the input subsidy programme was redesigned to form
the National Agricultural Input Voucher Scheme (NAIVS), with improved
administrative efficiency, constituting the third phase (2008–13). This study
focuses on the second- and third-phase subsidy programmes.
The NAIVS scheme was developed as a pro-poor scheme to enhance small-
holder contribution to increased production ofmaize and rice (United Republic
of Tanzania 2015). The scheme intended to reach 2.5 million farmers by 2011,
providing a 50 per cent subsidy for the purchase of chemical fertilizer as well
as improved seed to increase food crop productivity and output, particularly
for maize and rice in the big four high-potential regions, plus Kigoma and
Morogoro, which were added (Patel 2011). In 2011 the subsidy coverage was
expanded to cover sixteen regions, also extending it for another two years until
2013. According to the NAIVS project document, it was expected that by 2015
the scheme would have stimulated significant demand for inputs such that
farmers’ needs would continue to be met through the market. Nonetheless, by
2015, when data for Afrint III data were being collected, NAIVS had ended, but
subsidized inputs were supplied to villages as new administrative arrangements
were being organized to minimize corruption tendencies and inefficiency.
Methodology
Conceptual Framework
It has been argued that successful agricultural intensification should improve
the productivity of land and labour (Larsson 2001), which improves food
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security at the household level and economic development community-wide,
up to the district, regional, and national levels. Productivity from intensifica-
tion also induces agricultural commercialization as farmers increase their
share of marketed surplus over time (Jayne et al. 2011, Andersson Djurfeldt
2013). This, in turn, enables farmers to accumulate farm and non-farm assets,
which contribute further towards improving farm productivity, while accu-
mulated non-farm assets (houses, radios, and transport facilities) move the
farmers to a higher wealth status. According to Ellis andMdoe (2003), poverty-
reducing accumulation involves trading up assets, for instance, from having a
chicken to acquiring goats and later buying cattle and land. Another pathway
may involve moving from owning chickens, which leads to having cash
income, to financing non-farm activities. Similar indicators for assessing live-
lihood improvement are used in this chapter.
The pathway or trajectory from intensification to improved livelihoods,
however, is not guaranteed, and it may vary from one farmer to another,
based on choices farmers make or limitations they face in accessing such
technologies. This means there will be farmers who use improved seed and
inorganic fertilizer from subsidy sources and from the market. The group of
non-users include those who did not access subsidy inputs because they could
not afford to, and others who may have opted not to use the inputs due to
other reasons. Close to one-third of the respondents (28 per cent) in the Afrint
study could not afford to buy fertilizer (Msuya and Isinika 2016). The working
hypothesis in this study is that users of improved inputs will have higher
yields and better livelihood indicators compared to non-users.
Analytical Approach
TheAfrint survey instrumentwas used to collect data on fertilizer and improved
seed adoption. During each cross-section (wave) farmers were asked to report
whether they used these inputs in the current period and for the two prior
periods.3 Mean values were then computed for the use of fertilizer and maize
and rice seed. Data were also collected formaize and rice yield, representing the
outcome of technology adoption. Information on asset ownership was used to
compute an asset index to represent a household’s welfare. These data are used
for descriptive and regression analysis.
The analysis is done in two stages. Descriptive data are presented in
Tables 6.1 to 6.5, comparing the mean percentage of farmers who chose
3 During each cross-section, yield data were collected for the current year and two previous
seasons. For example, a respondent who was interviewed in 2002 reported onmaize yield for 2002,
2001, and 2000. The average of the three reported values is used throughout the analysis in this
chapter.
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different options on technology adoption and the corresponding mean yield
for each cross-section or wave (Afrint I, Afrint II, and Afrint III). Descriptive
analysis is done using pooled data, or waves comparisons being made by
gender, region, and wealth quartile for maize. The analysis for rice basically
applies to Morogoro since only a few farmers grew rice in Iringa. Figure 6.1
presents the relationship between yield and the farmers’ welfare status repre-
sented by a wealth index, which was constructed using principle components
analysis (Finan et al. 2005) based on ownership of various assets, including:
phone, stove, television sets, radio, tape recorders, roofing material, and type
of wall for houses.
The second level of analysis employed a fixed effects regression model to
determine factors that influence the variation in yield of maize and rice in the
Iringa andMorogoro regions. The analytical model is derived in the section on
regression analysis. Findings from both analyses provide the basis to inform
policymakers about the yield outcomes and livelihood impacts of agricultural
subsidy programmes since their introduction in 2003. These findings can




TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION YIELD RESPONSE AND THE SPATIAL GAP
Table 6.1 presents pooled data for the mean difference of adopting inorganic
fertilizer and improved maize seed and corresponding mean yield values
for Iringa and Morogoro. In the Morogoro region, only 7 per cent and
Table 6.1. Mean difference in maize yields and agricultural technology adoption by region
Indicator Morogoro Iringa Diff.
Yield (Kg/ha) 1,172 1,262 90 kg/ha
Seed (% of households using improved seed) 7 28 22***
Fertilizer (% of households using inorganic fertilizer) 4 43 39***
No fertilizer (% of households using no fertilizer) 89 46 –43***
Seed only (% of households using seed only) 6 11 5**
Fertilizer only (% of households using fertilizer only) 4 26 21***




Notes: a. Unless otherwise stated, the definitions used for indicators used in Table 6.1 are also used elsewhere in this
chapter.
b. Diff. in column four stands for difference.
c. ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 5 per cent and 1 per cent levels respectively.
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Figure 6.1 Welfare and agricultural intensification.
Notes: a. To make the graph more readable, each point represents thirty-five observations for the
upper panel and twenty observations for the lower panel.
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4 per cent of the respondents adopted improved seed and fertilizer respectively.
Corresponding levels for Iringa were higher, being 28 per cent for seed and
43 per cent for fertilizer. The regional difference in adoption rates was much
higher for fertilizer (39 per cent) compared to 22 per cent for seed; both
differences were, however, significantly different from zero (hereafter simply
stated as ‘significant’). The level of technology adoption is much lower in
Morogoro, where nearly 89 per cent of the respondents did not use fertilizer
compared to 46 per cent in Iringa, a 43 per cent gap between the two regions.
The low level of fertilizer use in Morogoro may be explained by three
factors. First, technologies for rice production in Tanzania are less developed
and accessible relative to maize (Isinika et al. 2004). Second, low levels of
improved seed adoption attract fewer farmers to adopt fertilizer application
(Msuya and Isinika 2016). Third, rice production in the study area takes place
in Kilombero valley, where soil fertility is relatively higher due to alluvial
soils from annual flooding. During the third Afrint survey (2015) about
64 per cent of the respondents did not use inorganic fertilizer, the highest
non-use being in Morogoro (83 per cent) where 53 per cent of the respond-
ents felt their soil was fertile enough, compared to only 14 per cent in Iringa
(Msuya and Isinika 2016).
Out of farmers who adopted any improved technology, in Morogoro
6 per cent adopted only seed, 4 per cent adopted only fertilizer, and very few
farmers (approximately 0 per cent) adopted both seed and fertilizer. As stated
earlier, farmers in Iringa had higher adoption rates: 11 per cent adopting only
seed, 26 per cent only fertilizer, and 17 per cent adopting both seed and
fertilizer. Mean yield levels were, as expected, higher in Iringa by 90 kg/ha,
but the difference was not significant. This analysis shows clearly that for
maize production there were spatial differences in technology adoption
between the two regions, which may be attributed to higher soil fertility in
Kilombero valley, but also due to the fact that the Morogoro region joined the
subsidy programme later; rice seed was added in 2006 and fertilizer subsidy for
rice production in Morogoro became available in 2008 (Patel 2011).
In Table 6.2 technology adoption and yield levels are compared for pooled
data and for each region across all three waves. The difference between time
periods is also presented. According to pooled data for maize, between Afrint
I and Afrint II there was no significant difference in technology adoption but
yield increased by 277 kg/ha, which was significant. The proportion of house-
holds adopting improved seed and fertilizer increased slightly, by 6 per cent
and 3 per cent respectively. A slight increase was also observed for farmers who
adopted seed only (1 per cent) as well as seed and fertilizer (4 per cent). But the
proportion of farmers who did not use fertilizer declined by 4 per cent.
During the next interval (Afrint II to Afrint III), the proportion of farmers
who adopted improved seed declined significantly by 8 per cent (p 0.05) and
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Table 6.2. Mean difference in yields and agricultural technology adoption over time
Indicator Maize Rice{
Afrint I Afrint II Afrint III Afrint I–II Afrint II–III Afrint I Afrint II Afrint III Afrint I-II Afrint II–III
All regions
Yield 1,002 1,279 1,390 277*** 111 1,512 2,039 2,164 527*** 125
Seed 17% 23% 16% 6% 8%** 19% 21% 14% 2% 7%
Fertilizer 20% 23% 35% 3% 12%*** 12% 33% 28% 22%*** 5%
No fertilizer 69% 65% 60% 4% 5% 76% 54% 63% 23%*** 9%
Seed only 11% 12% 4% 1% 8%*** 12% 13% 9% 1% 4%
Fertilizer only 14% 12% 24% 2% 12%*** 5% 25% 24% 21%*** 1%
Seed and fertilizer 7% 11% 12% 4% 0% 7% 8% 5% 1% 3%
N 232 232 232 102 102 102
Morogoro
Yield 1,020 1,260 1,236 240** 24
Seed 4% 10% 6% 6%* 4%
Fertilizer 1% 1% 11% 0% 10%***
N 100 100 100
Iringa
Yield 989 1,293 1,504 304*** 212*
Seed 28% 34% 23% 6% 11%*
Fertilizer 35% 40% 54% 5% 14%**
No fertilizer 49% 46% 43% 3% 3%
Seed only 16% 14% 3% 2% 11%***
Fertilizer only 23% 20% 34% 3% 14%**
Seed and fertilizer 12% 20% 20% 8%* 1%
N 133 133 133
Notes: a. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 per cent, 5 per cent, and 1 per cent levels respectively.
b. This applies to the Morogoro region only.
so did the percentage which adopted seed only (8 per cent; p  0.01), both
changes being significant. However, there was a significant increase in the
proportion of farmers adopting fertilizer (12 per cent), but no change in those
who adopted fertilizer and seed. Maize yield increased by 111 kg/ha (from
1,279 kg/ha to 1,390 kg/ha), but the change was not significant. During this
interval (Afrint II to Afrint III) the proportion of fertilizer users in Morogoro
region increased significantly by 10 per cent (from 1 per cent to 11 per cent),
but the use of improved maize seed declined by 4 per cent contributing to a
yield decline by 24 kg/ha, but the decline was not significant.
A similar pattern of changes is observed in the Iringa region in terms of
technology adoption, but in this case significant improvements in yield are
observed both for Afrint II and Afrint III, being stronger in the former period.
In the Morogoro region, significant improvement in yield is observed during
the first interval (Afrint I to Afrint II), attributed to increase in improved seed
adoption, where 6 per cent more households used the technology but no
significant change was observed in relation to fertilizer use. In the case of
rice, significant improvement is observed in yield during the first interval
when yield increased by 527 kg/ha, equivalent to 35 per cent. This is largely
accounted for by the increase in households that used fertilizer (22 per cent).
Households that used seed only or fertilizer and seed increased by only
1 per cent. During the second interval (Afrint II to Afrint III) the adoption of
improved seed and fertilizer declined by 7 per cent and 9 per cent respectively,
and the share of households that did not use fertilizer rose by 9 per cent.
Nonetheless, paddy yield increased by 125 kg/ha.
The trend of technology adoption shows improvement during the first
interval but a decline during the second interval; this can be explained by
improvement of the subsidy programme whereby rice seed and the Morogoro
region were added by 2008. The decline for Afrint III may be explained by
the fact that the NAIVS scheme ended in 2014. During 2015, when the third
wave of Afrint data was collected, the government was still deliberating about
the future of agricultural inputs subsidy provision in terms of magnitude and
institutional framework. Some subsidized inputs were distributed, from stocks
of the expired NAIVS.
The NAIVS was designed to stimulate demand for improved seed and fertil-
izer, after which farmers would continue to get supplies from themarket (Patel
2011). However, the programme evaluation report (United Republic of
Tanzania 2015) shows that only 37 per cent of the farmers continued to
use fertilizer beyond the three-year period. But, 50 per cent continued to use
improved seed, indicating a higher preference to adopt improved seed than
fertilizer. This last conclusion contradicts findings from the analysis in this
study which show a higher proportion of farmers adopted fertilizer than
improved seed.
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THE GENDER GAP
Eligibility for the voucher programme was to be based on two hard criteria:
(1) The household was cultivating no more than 1 ha (approximately 2.5
acres) of maize or paddy; and (2) the household could afford the top-up 50
per cent payment for the input package (approximately TZS4 55,000). In cases
where the number of eligible households was larger than the number of
vouchers, priority was to be given to female-headed households and farmers
who had not been using improved inputs five years prior to NAIVS (Patel
2011). Table 6.3 presents the gender gap in technology adoption and yields for
maize and rice. In the case of maize, the pooled data (covering all three waves)
show that significantly more male-managed farms (MMFs) (10 per cent) used
improved seed, but the proportion of female-managed farms (FMFs) using
fertilizer was higher (by 5 per cent), but the difference was not significant.
When the data are disaggregated by cross-section (wave) the dominance of
MMFs using fertilize rises to 16 per cent during the first phase, but declines to
9 per cent and 5 per cent during the second and third phases respectively. The
difference during the first phase is significant.
Despite this, MMFs consistently have significantly higher yields, as demon-
strated by the significant difference between them for the pooled data as well
as for each cross-section. The gender yield gap (269 kg/ha) is highly significant
when pooled data are used. The mean yield of FMFs is only 79 per cent5 of the
mean for MMFs, thus a 31 per cent6 gender gap. However, the mean yield of
FMFs has caught up—as shown in the cross-sectional data. On average female
farm managers attained 77 per cent of the yield of their male counterparts in
Afrint II—a share that rose to 82 per cent for Afrint III. Between Afrint
I and Afrint II, the yield of both MMFs and FMFs declined by 18 per cent
and 20 per cent respectively. During this period the transport subsidy did not
specifically target female farmers (de facto, de jure, or those within MMFs). The
yield decline has been attributed to drought during the 2007/8 season. The
rebound after 2008 was stronger for women (20 per cent) compared to men
(7 per cent), which probably reflects the effect of NAIVS to specifically target
FMFs (Patel 2011). Pooled data for rice show that significantly more MMFs
applied fertilizer, a 13 per cent difference. However, the difference was not
significant for improved seed (5 per cent) and yield (236 kg/ha); the mean
yield of FMFs was equal to 88 per cent that ofMMFs, clearly demonstrating the
gender gap.
4 TZS = Tanzania Shillings—the local currency for Tanzania.
5 Computed using the mean yield of FMFs as a percentage of MMFs.
6 Computed as the difference between the mean yield of MMFs minus the mean of FMFs over
the mean of MMFs times 100.
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THE WEALTH RANK GAP
The national input subsidy scheme was designed to stimulate production,
targeting poor farmers who cultivate 1 ha or less and women (Patel 2011).
We argue that successful targeting of poor farmers should, over time, narrow
the gap between the poor and the rich when it comes to the adoption of
improved technologies targeted by the policy, all else being equal. We test this
hypothesis using descriptive analytical tools where we compare fertilizer and
improved seed adoption rates across wealth quartiles. We use an asset index as
our measure of wealth.
Based on the χ2 test for the pooled data, results in Table 6.4 show that there
was a significant difference between the four wealth ranks and so was the gap
between the richest and the poorest quartiles; being highest for fertilizer use
on rice (37 per cent) and lowest for use of improved rice seed (10 per cent).
The technology adoption gap for maize was also wider for fertilizer used
(17 per cent) than for seed (13 per cent). This could be explained by the fact
that even though the price of improved seed is relatively higher compared to
local varieties, seed normally requires smaller quantities per unit area, such
that it is possible for farmers to buy the small quantities they can afford and
plant on a small portion of their farm. Meanwhile, farmers have to apply
relatively larger quantities of fertilizer per unit area for the impact to be felt.
Table 6.3. Mean difference in technology adoption and yields by sex of farm manager
Maize Rice
Yield Seed Fertilizer N Yield Seed Fertilizer N
Pooled
Male 1,281 21% 25% 548 1,945 19% 27% 254
Female 1,013 11% 30% 150 1,710 13% 13% 52
Diff. 269*** 10%** 4% 236 5% 13%**
Afrint I
Male 1,048 21% 20% 186 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Female 815 4% 22% 46 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Diff. 233** 16%*** 2% n.a. n.a. n.a.
Afrint II
Male 1,354 25% 22% 184 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Female 992 16% 27% 48 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Diff. 362** 9% 4% n.a. n.a. n.a.
Afrint III
Male 1,452 17% 34% 176 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Female 1,193 12% 39% 56 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Diff. 260* 5% 4% n.a. n.a. n.a.
Notes: a. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 per cent, 5 per cent, and 1 per cent levels respectively.
b. n.a. = not available; values for these cells were less than 1 per cent, hence they are not displayed.
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The difference in technology for improved maize seed was significant
through all three waves of data collection but with increasing intensity,
being 12 per cent in 2002 (p  0.1), 16 per cent in 2008 (p  0.05), and
25 per cent in 2015 (p  0.01). The gap between all wealth ranks and between
the poorest and richest households for fertilizer is significant for the pooled
data but weaker for each cross-section. The proportion of households that
used fertilizer increased only slightly (from 8 per cent to 9 per cent) between
2002 and 2008, but the overall difference between the wealth ranks was
Table 6.4. Agricultural technology adoption and yields by wealth quartiles
Maize Rice
Seed Fertilizer Yield Seed Fertilizer Yield
Pooled
Poorest 15% 20% 904 14% 5% 1,280
2nd 14% 22% 1,114 16% 18% 1,864
3rd 18% 27% 1,260 16% 34% 2,136
Richest 28% 36% 1,631 24% 42% 2,368
Overall statistical
significance: χ2(3)
12.42*** 12.03*** 19.71*** 3.65 22.02*** 15.79***
Gap between poorest
and richest
13%*** 17%*** 727*** 10% 37%*** 1,087***
Afrint I
Poorest 9% 13% 830 7% 3% 1,122
2nd 24% 22% 1,088 14% 5% 1,830
3rd 18% 27% 1,147 26% 16% 1,750
Richest 21% 21% 1,354 30% 25% 2,078
Overall statistical
significance: χ2(3)
5.57 3.70 5.07*** 5.58 6.29* 9.21***
Gap between richest
and poorest
12%* 8% 524*** 23%** 22%** 956***
Afrint II
Poorest 18% 25% 1,068 21% 7% 1,562
2nd 14% 12% 1,090 18% 36% 1,875
3rd 29% 22% 1,339 15% 41% 2,338
Richest 34% 34% 1,723 29% 54% 2,562
Overall statistical
significance: χ2(3)
8.38** 7.76* 4.71*** 1.65 13.46*** 2.78**
Gap between richest
and poorest
16%* 9% 655*** 8% 47%*** 999***
Afrint III
Poorest 6% 29% 703 10% 7% 1,055
2nd 5% 30% 1,175 7% 30% 1,886
3rd 23% 38% 1,265 17% 28% 2,223
Richest 31% 47% 1,640 24% 52% 2,360
Overall statistical
significance: χ2(3)
17.98*** 4.52 17.10*** 3.67 12.47*** 11.81***
Gap between richest
and poorest
25%*** 18%* 937*** 14% 45%*** 1,305***
Note: a. *, **, and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10 per cent, 5 per cent, and 1 per cent levels respectively.
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significant (p  10 per cent) in 2008, while the gap between the poorest and
richest stratum was significant in 2015. In the case of rice, the difference in
adopting improved seed was strong only for the first wave (23 per cent). But
the difference in adoption was stronger for using inorganic fertilizer on rice,
which was significantly different for the pooled data (p  5 per cent), and the
intensity increased over time, being 22 per cent in 2003, 47 per cent in 2007
(p  0.05), and 45 per cent in 2015 (p  0.01). These findings imply that
differences in technology adoption for maize are more strongly attributed to
maize seed technology, while in the case of rice the push comes from fertilizer
adoption.
Consistent with the technology adoption gap, there is a significant differ-
ence in the yield levels across wealth ranks both for pooled data (maize and
rice) and for each wave of data collection (χ2 > 2:78 19:71; p  0:05 0:01).
The yield gap for pooled maize was 727 kg/ha, the poorest quartile obtaining
only 55 per cent of the yield realized by the richest quartile. The correspond-
ing ratio for rice is 54 per cent. The gap for maize increased from 524 kg/ha for
the first round of data collection to 937 kg/ha by the third survey, rising by
413 kg/ha (79 per cent). Similarly, the gap for rice increased from 956 in Afrint
I to 1,305 kg/ha by the time of Afrint III, which means the gap between the
mean yield of the richest and the poorest quartiles increased by 349 kg/ha
equivalent to 59 per cent. The widening gap, such that the richer quartile
obtain higher yields implies that the richer quartiles were in a better position
to utilize inputs supplied by the voucher system. Often, those now cultivate
less than 1 ha, and farmers who had not engaged using inputs prior to 2003
cannot afford to pay 50 per cent of the price as required by NAIVS. For these
reasons, criteria for accessing subsidized inputs had to be revised in some
regions because very few farmers exceeded the proposed lower limit of 1 ha
(Patel 2011).
AGRICULTURAL INTENSIFICATION AND LIVELIHOOD
IMPROVEMENT
Everything else being equal, we expect increased agricultural intensification to
lead to livelihood improvements. We examine this hypothesis by analysing
the association between maize and rice yields and livelihood improvements
using the asset index and a binary food insecurity status indicator (Table 6.5).
A household is defined as food insecure if the number of meals eaten during
the lean season is less than that eaten during the rest of the year. The food
insecurity variable is available in this dataset for the second and third waves
only. We begin by showing the correlation between intensification and wel-
fare in Figure 6.1. The analysis clearly shows that the welfare of a household
increases with rising yield level, but at a declining rate above 2 t/ha for maize
and 3 t/ha for rice. Both yield levels fall short of recommended optimum levels
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(4 t/ha for maize and 6–8 t/ha for rice) (Isinika et al. 2004), which means there
is still potential to improve yield further.
Table 6.5 compares the proportion of farmers in a particular wealth rank and
the corresponding share of food insecure households. For pooled data among
farmers who grewmaize, the lower ranks accommodate a higher proportion of
food insecure households. While two of the lowest quartiles account for 44.6
per cent of the households producingmaize, they constitute 58 per cent of the
food insecure. Similar proportions apply for rice, where 45.7 per cent of the
lowest quartiles account for 60 per cent of the food insecure.











Lowest 20.0 36% 17.9 26%
2nd 24.6 22% 27.8 34%
3rd 30.7 26% 35.3 27%
Highest 37.2 24% 39.5 33%
Overall significance:
F-stat(3) and χ2(3)b
24.03*** 5.75 15.85*** 1.24
Gap between highest lowest 17.2*** 12% 21.6*** 7%
Afrint I
Lowest 11.3 n.a. 6.3 n.a.
2nd 16.7 n.a. 16.8 n.a.
3rd 18.5 n.a. 30.5 n.a.




Gap between highest lowest 13.4*** n.a. 22.2*** n.a.
Afrint II
Lowest 22.2 14% 21.2 0%
2nd 23.9 9% 23.5 12%
3rd 28.4 9% 28.2 15%
Highest 32.8 7% 33.9 24%
Test for overall significance:
F-stat(3) and χ2(3)b
4.95*** 1.61 2.30* 1.30
Gap between highest lowest 10.6*** 7% 12.6** 24%**
Afrint III
Lowest 31.1 59% 33.1 73%
2nd 35.9 35% 45.0 36%
3rd 44.2 44% 45.0 42%
Highest 47.7 37% 49.4 40%
Overall significance: F-stat(3)
and χ2(3)b
11.51*** 8.51** 2.96*** 8.71**
Gap between highest and
lowest
16.6*** 22%** 16.2*** 33%**
Notes: a.*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 per cent, 5 per cent, and 1 per cent levels respectively.
b. The F-stat (3) is for the test related to the asset index while the χ2(3) is of the binary food insecurity indicator.
c. n.a. = values are too small (less than 1 per cent).
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The overall variation in welfare as well as food insecurity among wealth
ranks is significant. This difference persisted through all three waves but the
difference in food security is only significant during the third wave. The trend
for rice production follows a similar pattern.
Regression Analysis
MODEL
The regression equations to be estimated are concerned mainly with assessing
the difference in maize and rice yields between households using improved
farm technology and those that are not. Because our interest is in government-
subsidized inputs we focus mainly on inorganic fertilizers and improved seed
adoption as the main explanatory variables, while controlling for other stand-
ard factors that typically enter an agricultural production function. Let Ykjit
represent output per unit area for crop k cultivated in region j by household
i in time t, Zkjit is the corresponding vector of production inputs (including
inorganic fertilizers and improved seeds). SupposeXkjit is the vector of all other
covariates observed by the researcher that are assumed to influence crop
output. Given the above assumption we can specific the yield function as:
Ykjit ¼ δ0Zkjit þ β0Xkjit þ ui þ eit ; k; j ¼ 1;2; i ¼ 1;2; :::;N; and t ¼ 1;2;3
ð6:1Þ
where ui represents an unobserved household-specific factor assumed to be
time invariant, and eit is the random error that captures exogenous shocks like
weather variability.
Since the level of output obtained depends on farm household i’s choice of
whether or not to use production inputs, and what level to use (based on
observed and unobserved characteristics of the household and farm), Z is
correlated with ui ex ante. This means that to estimate δ
0
consistently we
need an estimator that allows such correlation. The fixed effects (FE) estimator





in equation (6.1) because it allows both Z and X to be correlated with ui.
Arguably, the downside is that we are unable to identify time-invariant cov-
ariates that may influence yields (e.g. sex of farm manager). In the present
application, however, the sex of farmmanager contains appreciable variability
over the approximately thirteen-year span of the panel (2002–15).
In order to allow us to test the differential impacts of technology use as a
package, and given that ourmain variables of interest are captured in the binary
form, we construct a discrete choice variable, S, which takes on the value 1 if a
household neither used improved seeds nor applied inorganic fertilizers, 2 if
a household used improved seeds but not inorganic fertilizers, 3 if a household
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used inorganic fertilizers but not improved seeds, and 4 if a household used both
improved seeds and inorganic fertilizers.7 Our hypothesis is that the yields
obtained by farmers using a combination of the two inputs is over and above
the yields of both those using only one of these inputs and those using none at
all. Also, households using at least one of these inputs are expected to have
higher average yields than those not using any of the two inputs at all.With this
modification we can rewrite equation (6.1) as:
Ykjit ¼ δ2S2kjit þ δ3S3kjit þ δ4S4kjit þ γ0Zkjit þ β0Xkjit þ ui þ eit ð6:2Þ
where δ2; δ3, and δ4 are the coefficients on the discrete choice input variable of
interest described above, meaning that δ1, the coefficient on S1 (i.e. not using
any of the two inputs) is the reference category. Based on our hypothesis, we
expect δ2; δ3; and δ4 to be positive and statistically different from zero. The
vector γ
0
represents the coefficients of other inputs such as cultivated area,
labour, machinery, and other soil amendments.
In the case of maize, equation (6.2) is estimated on the full sample and also
separately for the two regions (i.e. Morogoro and Iringa). Rice is predomin-
antly produced inMorogoro and therefore the rice equation estimates apply to
that region only.
RESULTS OF REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Results of regressing the mean yield against the mean values of variables
discussed in the previous section are presented in Tables 6.6 and 6.7 for maize
and rice respectively. In the case ofmaize, Table 6.6 presents results of analysing
the full sample data aswell as the two regions separately. Eachof themodelswas
tested for overidentification using the Sagan Hansen statistics, and all χ2 values
were found to be highly significantly greater than zero, implying that thefixed-
effect model was suitable for statistical inference. All three models had F values
that were highly significant for each of the three waves. The adjusted R2
increased from 14.4 per cent to 18 per cent and 20.6 per cent during the three
waves of data collection, implying that the combined effect of explanatory
variables to account for variation in the meanmaize yield increased over time.
The intercept was positive and highly significant for all three waves. Most of
the coefficients are positive, except for the natural log of cultivated area,
which is negative and highly significant (p  0.01), confirming the longstand-
ing inverse relationship between farm size and productivity (Muyanga and
Jayne 2014). This is consistent with the argument that in Tanzania, after the
year 2000, crop production response has more often come from area expan-
sion rather than productivity improvement (Delgado and Minot 2000).
7 Here, we suppress the subscripts k, j, i, t.
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Table 6.6. Fixed-effect estimates of the determinants of maize yields with improved seed and fertilizer adoption effect
Variables Overall Morogoro region Iringa region
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Improved seed and fertilizer (ref. = neither)
Seed only 0.048 0.044 0.023 0.073 0.064 0.013
0.093 0.093 0.095 0.115 0.118 0.123
Fertilizer only 0.178* 0.144 0.112 0.168 0.126 0.080
0.097 0.089 0.090 0.111 0.097 0.099
Seed and fertilizer 0.260* 0.210 0.163 0.252* 0.198 0.160
0.133 0.128 0.127 0.140 0.133 0.129
Improved seed 0.025 0.034 0.005
0.153 0.147 0.140
Fertilizer 0.229 0.185 0.173
0.205 0.211 0.199
Log area cultivated 0.332*** 0.359*** 0.333*** 0.434*** 0.416*** 0.406*** 0.282*** 0.325*** 0.283***
0.076 0.079 0.075 0.147 0.151 0.135 0.085 0.089 0.089
Log labour use 0.098 0.072 0.059 0.018 0.009 0.021 0.160** 0.123* 0.118*
0.060 0.059 0.059 0.121 0.120 0.115 0.068 0.067 0.067
Soil amendments 0.059*** 0.059*** 0.060*** 0.065* 0.067* 0.072* 0.058** 0.057** 0.057**
0.022 0.022 0.022 0.037 0.036 0.036 0.028 0.027 0.028
Agricultural extension 0.107* 0.081 0.073 0.135 0.109 0.055 0.098 0.073 0.079
0.060 0.060 0.059 0.088 0.083 0.080 0.083 0.084 0.081
Mechanization 0.114** 0.091 0.039 0.103 0.085 0.085 0.107 0.084 0.046
0.056 0.058 0.060 0.073 0.079 0.086 0.086 0.090 0.089
Female manager 0.119 0.156 0.103 0.097 0.160 0.206**
0.096 0.095 0.186 0.194 0.105 0.100
Age of manager 0.004 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.006* 0.001
0.002 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004
Educated manager 0.326*** 0.220** 0.261* 0.199 0.346*** 0.213
0.094 0.098 0.140 0.138 0.120 0.129
Non-farm participation 0.019 0.015 0.019 0.001 0.032 0.037
0.053 0.052 0.094 0.087 0.065 0.065
Time effect (ref. = 2002)
2008 0.146*** 0.264*** 0.052
0.050 0.070 0.070
2015 0.212*** 0.176* 0.216***
0.055 0.090 0.069
Constant 6.490*** 6.210*** 6.429*** 6.488*** 6.331*** 6.384*** 6.526*** 6.170*** 6.422***
0.068 0.158 0.171 0.121 0.242 0.233 0.089 0.204 0.225
Observations 696 695 695 297 296 296 399 399 399
Adjusted R2 0.144 0.180 0.206 0.138 0.163 0.220 0.155 0.206 0.229
F-stat. 9.005 7.555 7.971 4.704 3.310 4.522 5.400 4.833 6.057
p-value of F-test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
sigma_u 0.569 0.554 0.555 0.600 0.587 0.585 0.536 0.513 0.524
sigma_e 0.516 0.508 0.501 0.498 0.497 0.483 0.534 0.522 0.516
rho 0.549 0.543 0.551 0.591 0.582 0.595 0.502 0.492 0.507
Test of overidentifying restrictions: fixed vs random effects with cluster robust standard errors
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Sargan-Hansen statistic 50.391 χ(8) 48.005 χ (12) 49.293 χ(13) 24.842 χ(7) 27.872 χ(11) 29.894 χ(12) 59.073 χ(8) 55.591 χ(12) 61.277 χ(14)
[p-values] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0008] [0.0034] [0.0029] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000]
Notes: a. Cluster robust standard errors are reported under coefficients.
b. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent, and 10 per cent levels respectively.
c. sigma_u is the estimate of the within-household standard deviation.
d. sigma_e is the estimate of the between-household standard deviation.
e. rho is the estimate of the intra-class correlation or the proportion of the total variance due to heterogeneity across households.
Table 6.7. Fixed-effect estimates of the determinants of rice yields in Morogoro with
improved seed and fertilizer adoption effect
Variables (1) (2) (3)
Improved seed and fertilizer (ref. = neither)
Seed only 0.016 0.017 0.053
0.122 0.130 0.122
Fertilizer only 0.345** 0.306** 0.111
0.137 0.138 0.143
Seed and fertilizer 0.459*** 0.439*** 0.326**
0.137 0.140 0.134
Log area cultivated 0.392*** 0.419*** 0.378***
0.123 0.126 0.124
Log labour use 0.089 0.108 0.100
0.106 0.107 0.104
Agricultural extension 0.227** 0.200** 0.149*
0.089 0.088 0.084
Mechanization 0.349*** 0.331*** 0.266***
0.056 0.064 0.070
Female manager 0.113 0.129
0.221 0.223
Age of manager 0.003 0.001
0.004 0.004
Educated manager 0.235* 0.166
0.130 0.138
Non-farm participation 0.073 0.057
0.082 0.082





Constant 7.071*** 6.856*** 7.046***
0.092 0.214 0.233
Observations 306 305 305
Number of households 102 102 102
Adjusted R2 0.229 0.255 0.302
F-stat. 9.921 7.161 6.797
p-value of F-test 0.000 0.000 0.000
sigma_u 0.506 0.505 0.491
sigma_e 0.475 0.470 0.458
rho 0.532 0.536 0.536
Test of overidentifying restrictions: fixed vs random effects with cluster robust standard errors
(1) (2) (3)
Sargan-Hansen statistic 34.712 χ(7) 47.481 χ (11) 42.780 χ(12)
[p-values] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000]
Notes: a. Cluster robust standard errors are reported under coefficients.
b. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent, and 10 per cent levels respectively.
c. sigma_u is the estimate of the within-household standard deviation.
d. sigma_e is the estimate of the between-household standard deviation.
e. rho is the estimate of the intra-class correlation or the proportion of the total variance due to heterogeneity across
households.
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Adopting only improved seed also has a negative sign through all three
waves, indicating that for good performance improved maize seed requires
fertilizer as a complementary input. This means that when farmers adopt
technologies, they need to consider their complementary effects; otherwise,
technology adoption may have a negative influence on yields. Adopting
fertilizer only and combining seed and fertilizer both had a significant effect
on yield, and while the influence declined during subsequent waves it
remained positive. The findings also show that female managers recorded
lower yields, consistent with the finding that FMFs use less yield-enhancing
technologies, as reported earlier. The negative coefficient on non-farm partici-
pation reflects competition for resources, especially labour and capital.
Variables that had a significant positive effect on yield (p  0.1 – p  0.01)
included: soil amendments, mechanization, labour use in the Iringa region,
agricultural extension, education of farm manager, and time; these were
stronger for the full sample and Iringa region than Morogoro. Soil amend-
ments were similarly stronger in Iringa than Morogoro. The model for rice
exhibits similar characteristics, having highly significant F values with an R2
value that increased from 22.9 per cent in 2002 to 30.2 per cent in 2015.
All the signs are similar to the maize model except for the negative sign on
labour use, reflecting competition for this input among enterprises.
Conclusion and Policy Recommendations
The analysis presented in this chapter clearly shows that maize farmers in
Iringa and Morogoro were highly responsive to the fertilizer and seed compo-
nents of the input subsidy programme, and their response was sensitive to the
magnitude of the subsidy. The partial transport subsidy, which was intro-
duced in 2003, did not stimulate a strong yield response from farmers. After
2008, yields improved significantly, especially for rice but also for maize,
which coincided with the introduction of the national subsidy scheme that
was designed to stimulate production targeting poor farmers. In the absence of
the subsidy, use of improved inputs for rice production in Morogoro had been
low, especially among FMFs and households in the lowest production quartile.
These categories should therefore be supported to improve productivity so
that they can also make substantial productivity improvements and liveli-
hood gains from government programmes. The wide gender gap in yield
and livelihood indicators also needs to be addressed as stated in government
policy documents.
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Intensification, Crop Diversification, and
Gender Relations in Malawi
Peter Mvula and Wapulumuka Mulwafu
Introduction
Agricultural intensification is currently being promoted in Malawi as one of
the strategies for achieving food security while at the same time improving
rural livelihoods. Continual cases of food shortages, vulnerability, and poverty
lend credence to the narrative of ‘low maize productivity trap’ which has
characterized Malawi’s agriculture since the 1980s (Devereux 2002, Chirwa
and Dorward 2013). In view of the declining levels of productivity and chal-
lenges of land shortages, agricultural intensification and crop diversification
are some of the ways in which rural livelihoods can be improved. This chapter
builds on the idea of intensification by analysing the dynamics of agricultural
production in the rural setting of Malawi. It focuses on two key issues: the
gendered patterns of intensification and the diversification of crop produc-
tion. The study sought to answer the following research questions: What
factors are driving agricultural intensification in the Afrint study areas in
Malawi? How is agricultural intensification affecting both male and female
farm managers in the Afrint study areas? What is the relationship between
agricultural intensification and crop diversification in the study areas?
Data for the writing of this chapter were drawn from the three rounds of the
study. The research was conducted in four regions, namely: Ntchisi, Thiwi
Lifidzi, Shire Highlands, and Bwanje Valley. For this chapter, we used both
the quantitative dataset and qualitative data. Qualitative data are only from
the period of the third round of data collection and were only collected from
three villages in two regions based on changes in the dataset between Afrint
I and Afrint II. The three villages (here anonymized) are Chikwanje and
Nkhwangwa in Ntchisi and Khasu in Thiwi Lifidzi. A detailed description of
the approach, sample design, and data collection methods and analysis has
been provided in Chapter 1.
In this chapter, we analyse differences between households with male farm
managers and those with female farm managers. We use the gender of farm
managers because they are often the ones who make decisions regarding
what to grow, how to grow it, and what to sell. In our sample, the proportion
of male farm managers did not differ very much from the proportion of
households that were headed by men, and the same goes for female-headed
households. Among female-headed households, 99.2 per cent had female
farm managers and only 0.8 per cent had male farm managers. The opposite
is true among male-headed households, where 97.5 per cent had male farm
managers and only 2.5 per cent had female farm managers. This implies that
more often than not, household heads were also farm managers.
The first part of the chapter provides an overview of the general agricultural
policies pursued by the Malawi government since independence. Special
attention is placed on demonstrating the aspects of intensification and diver-
sification with regard to gender relations. The next section presents findings
from the study and shows ways in which gender relations resonate with policy
and practices when promoting intensification and crop diversification.
Background
The role of agriculture in Malawi’s national development endeavours cannot
be overemphasized. The sector contributes significantly to food security and
rural livelihoods, employment, income, and exports. For instance, agriculture
accounts for nearly 80 per cent of Malawi’s export earnings, contributes a
share of 36 per cent of its GDP, and occupies 80 per cent of the workforce
(Mwase et al. 2014). Despite the centrality of this sector, efforts towards
intensification and diversification have had no effects on rural livelihoods
(Chirwa et al. 2008). Indeed, although Malawi has followed the spirit of the
Maputo declaration to the letter by consistently allocating more than 10 per
cent of the national budget to the agricultural sector, the problem of food
shortages has not disappeared. The recent postcolonial history of Malawi has
been characterized by frequent famines and food shortages. Many questions
have been asked as to why the country continues to experience such disasters
when the Ministry of Agriculture has traditionally received a significant
amount of budgetary allocation compared to other sectors. Indeed, a lot of
investment has been made in food production, raising incomes for farmers,
soil fertility improvement programmes, and technology transfers. However,
the impact has been adversely affected by persistently poor harvests and
increasing impoverishment since the 1980s. In part, this is due to the
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country’s overreliance on rain-fed agriculture as well as low technology uptake
by smallholder farmers (Chirwa et al. 2008). This is manifested in the recur-
rent food shortages, the dwindling export base, and the flood of agricultural
imports which have severely depressed local production (Harrigan 2003,
Peters 2004b).
Chirwa and Dorward (2013) have suggested three phases in understanding
the development of Malawi’s postcolonial agricultural policies. The first
phase, spanning the period from 1964 through 1980, is described as pre-
reform and was marked by state regulation of the agricultural industry. The
state intervened in areas of production, extension, technology development,
and marketing of agricultural produce. Alongside donor support, government
made significant investments through the integrated rural development pro-
gramme. Input subsidies were also made while a state parastatal dominated in
the marketing of peasant-produced crops. Both men and women participated
in different agricultural activities and in some cases they were organized in
farmers’ groups in order to access inputs.
The second phase was ushered in by the adoption of Bretton Woods struc-
tural adjustment programme conditionalities in the early 1980s. The agricul-
tural sector underwent somemajor reforms including the removal of subsidies
and liberalization of trade. The real turning point occurred in the 1990s when,
as a result of liberalization of trade and the withdrawal of subsidies, the
agricultural sector virtually collapsed. The Agricultural Development andMar-
keting Corporation’s (ADMARC) functions of cushioning and moderating
input and producer prices to the advantage of smallholder farmers were
withdrawn from the agricultural sector, and this served as a deterrent to
production. In addition, the private sector began to play a role even though
its performance has not been very satisfactory, and cases of abusing the
smallholder farmers have been reported (Chirwa 1998). Moreover, the market
information system was inadequate to address farmers’ needs. Finally, the
prices of farm inputs were too high for the smallholder farmers. By 1994,
however, agricultural productivity remained relatively low as poverty and
vulnerability were exposed by the food shortages of 1987 and 1992–4. The
poor members of society, including women, suffered most under the effects of
these reforms. But the reforms also revealed structural weaknesses in the
economy, including the slow growth in exports, the lack of diversification,
and overreliance on tobacco exports (Chirwa et al. 2008).
The third phase is the post-reform, covering the period after 1994 to the
present. Agricultural policies developed during this period reflect the political
climate of competitive politics where increasing agricultural productivity is
necessary for both achieving food security and for enhancing political
patronage. It is a phase sometimes marked by inconsistencies in policy
formulation and implementation. One issue that has attracted a considerable
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amount of debate is that of the input subsidy programme. Before liberaliza-
tion in the 1990s, the government used to run an input subsidy programme,
particularly for fertilizer and seed. Although the programme was meant to
stimulate smallholder maize production, it benefited the estate sector as well.
For instance, large-scale commercial farmers could buy fertilizer at the same
price as the smallholder farmers. The unfortunate part is that smallholder
farmers were not allowed to grow high-income crops and remained with
maize production. There was little diversification in terms of the crops
grown. The greatest beneficiaries of the subsidy were therefore producers of
high-income crops such as tobacco. However, in the 1994/5 growing season,
Malawi liberalized the fertilizer market by introducing competition into the
domestic smallholder market and reducing the monopoly of the Small
Farmer Fertilisers’ Revolving Fund of Malawi and ADMARC. The result was
that fertilizer prices went up so high that not many farmers could afford to
buy them. Consequently, production reduced drastically and Malawi began
to experience food shortages in the mid-1990s, and the country began to
import maize in order to meet the national food requirements (Chirwa and
Dorward 2013).
In order to mitigate the effects of food shortages, the government inter-
vened by introducing the Starter Pack Programme in the 1994/5 farming
season which was later substituted by a Targeted Input Programme (TIP) in
the 1996/7 farming season, whereby small quantities of packaged seed and
fertilizer were distributed to needy farmers. Women, the elderly, and persons
living with HIV/AIDS were particularly earmarked for this scheme. However,
the subsidy was too little to have any meaningful impact on the country’s
food security. In addition, emphasis was largely on maize production. The
food shortage situation was never completely addressed, as evidenced in the
hunger crisis of 2002 (Devereux 2002, Dorward et al. 2004). The Agricultural
Productivity Investment Programme (APIP) was another intervention in the
1990s aimed at increasing maize productivity. Funded by the European
Union, this programme provided subsidized credit scheme facilities to small-
holder farmers to increase maize productivity. However, by the early 2000s it
was established that smallholder production of maize was inadequate to
enable farmers to repay the loan on the basis of maize alone. Hence, diversi-
fication strategies were introduced to encourage the production of legumes
(Government of Malawi 2007, Chirwa et al. 2008).
Literature on land tenure and the role of women in agricultural production
and the differential access to resources is abundant (Kishindo 2004, Kerr 2005,
Peters and Kambewa 2007, Peters 2010). As is the case in many parts of Africa,
women perform most of the production tasks ranging from planting to har-
vesting of crops. At the same time, they attend to the various household
chores like cooking, fetching water, and caring for children. While land in
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the study areas is traditionally owned by women, decisions on the use and
management of produce is controlled by men. Women face further con-
straints to production including labour and technology, as both men and
women depend on farming for their livelihoods but men tend to have greater
opportunities of participating in wage employment and non-farm income
activities.
Intensification Policies and Gender Dimensions
The state has remained an important actor in efforts to increase agricultural
productivity and to achieve food security. For instance, in 2006, the govern-
ment came up with the Agricultural Development Programme whose aim is to
harmonize the investment and support programmes in agriculture which
have the highest potential for contributing to food security and agricultural
growth in the next five years. It is a prioritized, results-based framework for
implementing agricultural components of the Malawi Growth and Develop-
ment Strategy (MGDS). It has identified key constraints of the agricultural
sector and the required investments within the context of national and
regional contexts. It is essentially an operational tool of the MGDS in the
area of agriculture, food security, irrigation, and disaster risk reduction. On
agriculture, the idea is to increase the contribution of the sector to economic
growth through production of food crops and value added for domestic and
export markets (Government of Malawi 2007).
Intensification has been promoted as one of the strategies for addressing the
challenge of low agricultural productivity. The introduction of input subsidy
programmes, although in a modified form from previous initiatives, was
aimed at increasing productivity of principally the maize crop. In the 2004/5
farming season, government introduced the farm input subsidy whereby
farmers were provided with coupons to buy hybrid seed and fertilizer at
subsidized prices. Although heavily criticized by some donors, the programme
registered an increase in production to the point of temporarily making
Malawi a self-sufficient nation. As in previous subsidy programmes, women
and other vulnerable groups were the main targeted beneficiaries (Levy and
Barahona 2002, Chinsinga and O’Brien 2008, Chirwa and Dorward 2013,
Mwase et al. 2014).
Malawi’s agricultural development has been driven by several factors
including the promotion of irrigated agriculture, the subsidy programme,
and the opening up of rural markets. One of the interesting aspects of liberal-
ization has been the emergence of elite private groups trading in agricultural
commodities. While the participation of the private sector has in some cases
been instrumental in providing market opportunities in the rural and often
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hard-to-reach areas (Sitko and Jayne 2014a), the situation in Malawi shows
that private traders have generally been exploitative. Civil servants and
businessmen have taken advantage to establish small-scale companies, some-
times ‘briefcase’ companies for the purpose of participating in the market
opportunities opened up with liberalization. The problem is that they have
squeezed out the small farmers since they have knowledge of the markets
(Chirwa et al. 2008).
Private traders have been quite active in the marketing of produce. Again,
the most accessible areas have benefited from private sector participation. For
input supply it is mainly fertilizer, and this again has been controversial. There
have been complaints of delays and selectivity in the areas private traders
target. Sometimes this has been attributed to political influence and not
market principles of demand. Chirwa (1998) has argued that although the
gains and losses are not clear-cut, the major losers of these policy reforms are
smallholder farmers who buymaize at high and volatile prices. These net food
buyers are generally low-income or wage earners in urban and semi-urban
areas and smallholder farmers in remote areas. These groups have suffered as a
result of increased consumer prices and seasonal price instability for major
food crops. Chirwa (1998: 91) further argues that ‘remote areas which cannot
be accessed by private traders are losers because most of the markets in such
areas were also closed by the state marketing agency. The closure of markets
meant that net food buyers did not have access to surplus maize while net
food sellers had difficulties in selling the surplus maize to private traders at
better prices.’
More recently, government implemented the Irrigation, Rural Liveli-
hoods and Agricultural Development (IRLAD) project which promoted
some aspects of intensification. Funded by the International Development
Agency, the US$65 million project sought to raise agricultural productivity
of rural households by providing an integrated package of support cover-
ing irrigation, production advisory services, and marketing between 2006
and 2012. With more than 40 per cent of the beneficiary households being
female-headed, IRLAD intensified production of maize and rice as a way of
achieving food security. At the end of the implementation period, the
project contributed towards increasing farm income and building of insti-
tutional capacity for irrigation development in several districts of the
country (Government of Malawi 2012, Government of Malawi 2015).
The results of this project run contrary to the findings of Ricker-Gilbert
et.al (2014), who argue that while areas of higher population density are
associated with smaller farm sizes, there is no evidence of intensification.
They show that households have not experienced any increase in maize
yields per hectare, but instead tend to rely more on off-farm income to
earn a living.
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Diversification Strategies and Gender Dimensions
Although the debate on agricultural diversification in Malawi has been going
on for decades, the structure of the country’s economy has remained relatively
the same (Orr and Mwale 2001, Simtowe 2010, Chibwana et al. 2012, Asfaw
et al. 2015). Concern for the country’s overreliance on tobacco and maize has
been expressed by a diverse group of stakeholders including government,
donors, and partners. At the national level, initiatives have been introduced
with qualified success. The European Union supported government with €23
million (approximately MK4.6 billion1) for the Farm Income Diversification
Programme (FIDP) from 2009 to 2015 (Zant 2012). The recently ended phase
one aimed at increasing food security and income levels of rural households,
while at the same time ensuring sustainable use of soil and water resources by
encouraging agribusiness development and improved marketing of agricul-
tural products. It focused on the areas of soil conservation and water man-
agement, organization of rural communities, promotion of agribusiness
initiatives, and improvement of capacities of rural communities to access
and develop post-harvest agricultural activities and provision of timely and
relevant training in horticulture. The second phase of the programme aims
at improving the livelihoods and nutritional status of rural households
through increased and diversified production, and better market access.
Having learnt lessons from phase one, FIDP II uses an integrated approach
and seeks to address the need: to diversify and increase agricultural produc-
tion; to promote income generation through agri-business initiatives with
the involvement of the private sector; to improve FIDP farmer group man-
agement capacities; to improve FIDP farmer group social dynamics; to halt
and reverse the decline of the natural resource base; and to capacitate
farmers and district level staff on nutrition issues (Zant 2012).
The declining natural resource base and climate variability have been
viewed as some of the factors influencing farmers’ adoption of crop diversifi-
cation. The report by Asfaw et al. written for the FAO (2015) shows that
climate variability is one of the main drivers of diversification in developing
countries. In the context of Malawi, the study showed that climate variability
determined the likelihood of diversification in terms of labour, cropland, and
income. In terms of gender, women were less likely to diversify their labour
than men. This means that as a risk-management and shock-coping strategy,
diversification would afford male farmers more opportunities to increase
income security than women farmers.
1 MK stands for Malawi kwacha, the local currency.
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At the national level, Malawi has several alternative crops to replace or
supplement the traditional ones like maize, tobacco, sugar, and tea, but
whose market outlook looks poor, partly due to high transportation costs.
Yet the need to diversify production has become necessary in order to
optimize returns to the land and labour. The major constraint to intensifi-
cation and diversification in Malawi include high transportation costs and
market infrastructure. In the 1990s, paprika was unsuccessfully promoted as
one of the cash crops to diversify Malawi’s economy. In more recent years,
the food crops being earmarked for diversification include cassava, sweet
potatoes, Irish potatoes, pigeon peas, and bananas, while cash crops include
groundnuts, soya beans, macadamia, and paprika (Zant 2012, Asfaw et al.
2015, CISANET Nd).
Studies on diversification in Malawi reveal structural challenges for its large-
scale uptake. In his study of the determinants of livelihood diversification in
Malawi, Simtowe (2010) argued that female-headed households were more
likely to combine agriculture with casual labour than merely relying on agri-
culture. In addition, access to credit was another factor that determined the
process of diversification as households with easy access were unlikely to
diversify away from agriculture. Female-headed households which generally
earned less income from agricultural production had limited opportunities to
supplement income apart from engaging in casual labour. Another study by
Chibwana et.al (2012) demonstrates that while there is a positive correlation
between participation in the input subsidy programme and the amount of
land used for planting maize and tobacco, empirical findings showed less
diversification. This is due to the fact that farmers allocated more land to
maize and tobacco and less land to crops such as groundnuts and soya beans.
Recent agricultural policy developments in post-independence Malawi
demonstrate that while so many policies with good intentions have been
formulated and implemented, the challenge of achieving food security has
remained elusive. The country continues to experience frequent food short-
ages which are largely due to anthropogenic factors. The failure of intensifi-
cation programmes to increase food production and food security remains as
critical now as it was twenty years ago.
Discussion of Findings
This section presents key findings from the study by looking at issues of
intensification and gender, crop diversification, and gender dynamics at
household level. It shows how these ideas relate to specific aspects of the
empirical data from the study.
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Intensification and Gender
Agriculture remains themain livelihood activity for farmers in the four regions.
Farmers have been using the same fields for a long period and growing the same
kind of crops, dominated by maize. There are relatively few new areas where
farmers could get additional farming land if they wanted to expand. Instead,
further fragmentation is taking place where the same units of land are being
shared amongmembers of households. It was common for a household to have
more than one plot at different locations. Some of the farmers who had slightly
larger plots in Afrint II were found to have reduced plot sizes by the time of
Afrint III. When asked to explain, the majority indicated that they had given
out part of the land to their grown-up children. This was also confirmed by key
informants both in the villages and among agricultural extension staff.
The farming land is still owned and inherited through the maternal side of
the family, but in the case of married couples the farms are usually managed
bymen. In the quantitative study sample for Afrint III, 68.7 per cent weremale
farm managers while 31.3 per cent were female farm managers. Each house-
hold cultivates the family gardens and the produce is almost wholly used for
home consumption or for sale if there is some surplus.
Most farmers depend on rain-fed agriculture although in some areas dimba
(stream-bank gardens and low-lying areas using residual moisture during the
dry season) fields are increasingly being utilized. The rainy season, which
usually starts around November and ends in March or April of the following
year, is the busiest and most active period for farming communities. Dimba
fields have become important means of supplementing food requirements for
households but also as sources of income. Empirical studies by Chinsinga
(2007), Peters and Kambewa (2007), and Peters (2004a) also underscored the
importance of dimba cultivation to household food security. Commonly
grown crops during the winter season include maize, beans, tomatoes, and
cabbages. Farmers who cultivate more than once a year have reported an
increase in income levels as well as a general improvement in their livelihoods.
Estimated mean landholding that was put to the production of maize was,
across the three rounds of surveys, less than 1 ha (Table 7.1). Holdings culti-
vated by households with female farm managers are slightly smaller than
holdings cultivated by households with male farm managers and the differ-
ences are not statistically different. The household average yield of maize in
the first round was no more than 4,668 kg/ha. This average has, over the years
of the study, decreased to 1,092 kg/ha during round II and increased slightly in
Afrint II to 1,248 kg/ha.2 These findings are consistent with results from others
2 This figure differs slightly from the figures presented in Chapter 2 (Table 2.5). The reason for
this is that this chapter uses data only for the year of the survey, whereas the data in Chapter 2 are
based on three-year annual averages.
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studies where the average yield in 2003/4 was 4,823 kg/ha, while between
1997/8 and 2002/3 it ranged between 1,274 and 1,309 kg/ha (RATES 2003:
10). Just as with average landholding sizes devoted to the growing of maize,
the mean maize yield among households with female farm managers were in
all rounds significantly less than the averages among households with male
farm managers. Across the three seasons, the mean difference in production
between households with female managers and those with male managers
were not statistically significant across the three periods, but yield was slightly
in favour of households with male farm managers.
Information and Technology
Apart from the amount of land that is devoted to a crop, the variety of seeds
that a farmer uses matters as well. Our findings reveal that in the four districts
under study, about 50 per cent of the households used traditional maize seed
in the farming and this is consistent across the three rounds of the study. The
other half used hybrid seed, and very few used open pollinated varieties or
composite seeds. There are no significant differences between households
with male farm managers and those with female farm managers. The wide-
spread use of traditional seed varieties could be because of lack of resources to
acquire these, but it could also be a result of limited knowledge regarding the
value of planting improved seed varieties due to lack of extension services. Our
study revealed that more than 50 per cent of the respondents had never
received extension advice in the three rounds of the survey, and the percent-
age is as high as over 90 per cent in round III. Slightly more respondents from
households with female farm managers had never had any extension advice
than respondents from households that had male farm managers.
Another factor is the availability of fertilizer, particularly through the agri-
cultural input subsidy programme, which has in some ways improved prod-
uctivity. In principle, it is meant for needy members in the villages and
Table 7.1. Mean area under maize cultivation (ha) and maize yield (kg/ha) by sex of farm
manager
Afrint I Afrint II Afrint III




0.15 167 0.13 136 0.88 222 0.61 171 0.87 275 0.65 125
Maize yield 4,882 163 4,406 133 1,096 222 1,087 171 1,257 197 1,235 140
Note: a. N equals the number of respondents who answered the questions in that category.
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especially the elderly, widows, and female-headed households. All such needy
people are registered and they are supposed to get inputs. But there have been
many operational challenges with the implementation of this programme.
Sometimes village heads decide to distribute inputs to all residents in the
village disregarding their socio-economic status. In other cases, the coupons
are not enough, so that the needy people get only a pail and the rest may not
get anything at all. The local criteria, however, means that all fertilizer is
shared widely so that it is used by more people. This subsidy programme
also encouraged the splitting of villages partly to increase chances of benefit-
ting from the inputs but also to avoid conflicts in the village. But the criteria
for registering beneficiaries have been changing every year depending on the
amount of resources available at national level. At village level, generally, the
typical amount of fertilizer available and the number of beneficiaries have
been declining over time. This could be responsible for the decline in yields as
seen earlier, and this is regardless of the gender of the farm manager since
levels of poverty in the villages tend to be the same.
Crop Diversification
As alluded to earlier, over the years maize was the main crop that every
household was supposed to grow to ensure that the household was food
secure. In the face of climate change, dwindling land sizes, and reduction in
the productivity of maize there has been a push from both the state and non-
state actors for households to diversify the crops that they grow. Results of this
study show that people have slowly taken to the idea asmost households grow
several crops and not just maize. When presented with demand, farmers tend
to respond positively as is the case with increased production of groundnuts,
soya, and the hybrid varieties of potatoes and maize. Although most of these
crops were being grown in some areas in the past, respondents interviewed
during the qualitative fieldwork indicated that production was generally low
(women’s focus group discussion in Chikwanje, 24 November 2012 andmen’s
focus group discussion in Nkhwangwa, 26 November 2012). They further
pointed out that low prices and absence of markets in the area were some of
the reasons for low production. The interest in diversifying crop production
may be attributed to farmers’ sensitivity to market opportunities as well as a
strategy for coping with climate variability. Table 7.2 demonstrates that more
than 50 per cent of the sample over the three rounds grew more than four
different types of crops.
Analysis of the number of crops that people grew by gender of the farm
manager shows little difference in households where farmmanagers weremen
and where farm managers were women. Only in round III were differences
significant at the 10 per cent level, with female-managed farms (FMFs) on
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average being slightly less diversified. This means that all households regard-
less of the gender of the farm manager are diversifying probably because they
are all subjected to the same kinds of environmental and economic condi-
tions. There are slightly fewer females diversifying probably because of the
need to produce food for their households.
In this study, we classified maize, rice, and sorghum as the major crops that
people grew.Whenwe consider a combination of the three, most households
in that respect grow one of the three crops (Table 7.3). This is true of the data
from rounds I, II, and III. In all rounds, more households that had female
farm managers than those with male farm managers grew one major crop.
Thus, in terms of major crops grown there was little diversification, especially
among households with female farm managers in the last two rounds of the
study. This implies that when it comes to issues of diversification, the gender
of the farm manager does not matter. Since what we classified as major
crops are largely subsistence crops, there is one crop that is dominant and
that is maize. Messages of diversifying into other food crops may thus not
be working.
The predominant crop grown by most people was maize. More than 95 per
cent of the households interviewed across the three rounds grew maize. Less
than 25 per cent grew rice and less than 2 per cent grew sorghum. Sorghum is
one of the crops that is being slowly left out and replaced by other crops, both
for food and non-food purposes. Differences between households with female
farm managers and those with male farm managers were significant at the 5
per cent level for rounds I and II, but the differences were very small for both
years and therefore need to be interpreted with caution.
Table 7.2. Share of households that grew a certain number of crops by sex of farm
manager, Afrint I to Afrint III
Number of
crops
Afrint I Afrint II Afrint III
Male N Female N Male N Female N Male N Female N
1 1.8 165 3.1 130 7.1 177 7.0 141 5.8 276 5.7 124
2 9.7 10.0 22.1 20.3 9.8 6.3
3 13.3 13.1 16.8 18.0 7.6 11.1
4 15.6 21.5 22.6 23.3 9.1 16.7
5 19.0 20.0 14.6 12.8 12.0 15.1
6 16.3 10.0 7.1 8.7 11.6 13.5
7 7.9 13.1 8.4 7.0 13.4 11.1
8 6.7 5.4 0.9 2.9 13.8 12.7
9 5.5 2.3 0.4 0.0 9.4 1.6
10 1.8 1.5 0.0 0.0 4.0 3.2
11 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.4 2.4
12 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.2 0.8
Note: a. N equals the number of respondents who answered the questions in that category.
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Other Crops
Apart from what are regarded as staple food crops, households in the study
sample also grew other food crops, including vegetables, beans, sweet
potatoes, groundnuts, peas, plantains, cassava, Irish potatoes, and millet
(Table 7.4). Except for beans, peas, and cassava, a higher proportion of
farms with male managers grew these crops than those with female man-
agers. These are crops that are usually sold for cash. This may suggest a gender
dimension that male farm managers grow crops that are usually sold while
crops that are predominantly grown for consumption are the responsibility of
women. In most cases, more than a third of households that grew other
food crops, including vegetables, sold them. This was the case regardless of
whether the household was headed by a man or a woman. The differences
between the households were rather small. In round one though, the differ-
ences in the share of female- and male-headed households that grew several
of the crops were statistically significant. Likewise, in Afrint II differences
were statistically significant for several of the crops. In the final data collec-
tion round, however, it was only households that grew sweet potatoes and
those that grewmillet that recorded significant differences between male and
female farm managers.
Further investigations into crops that people grew showed that very few
households grew non-food cash crops and these were mainly cotton, sugar
cane, and tobacco, which were dominated by households that had male farm
managers (Table 7.5). Thus, when it comes to growing high-value crops,
households with female farm managers are in a minority. In round I, the
only statistically significant difference between proportions male and female
farm managers were those growing tobacco. In round II it was those growing
tobacco and those growing sugar cane. In round III, significant differences
were recorded for all the three crops.
Table 7.3. Number of major crops grown by sex of farm manager
Number
of crops
Afrint I Afrint II Afrint III
Male N Female N Diff. Sig Male N Female N Diff. Sig Male N Female N
1 or
none
76.2 168 76.5 136 0.003 ** 76.1 226 80.2 172 0.041 ** 76.1 276 80.2 126
More
than 1
23.8 23.5 23.9 19.8 23.9 19.8
Note: a. N equals the number of respondents who answered the questions in that category.
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Table 7.4. Share of households that produced other food crops, by sex of farm manager, Afrint I, II, and III
Afrint I Afrint II Afrint III
Male N Female N Diff. Sig. Male N Female N Diff. Sig. Male N Female N Diff. Sig.
Vegetables 71.4 168 60.4 134 11.0 ** 40.5 195 40.1 152 0.4 68.1 276 69.8 126 1.7
Beans 60.1 168 58.5 135 1.6 68.6 194 71.4 154 2.8 55.1 276 60.3 126 5.2
Sweet potatoes 61.9 168 57.0 135 4.9 46.7 195 47.1 153 0.4 58.0 276 49.2 126 8.8 *
Groundnuts 42.9 168 33.3 135 9.6 * 47.2 195 28.8 153 18.4 *** 50.0 276 43.7 126 6.3
Peas 20.2 168 32.6 135 12.4 ** 18.6 194 35.7 154 17.1 *** 36.6 276 38.1 126 1.5
Plantains/
bananas
35.7 168 44.4 135 8.7 * 23.6 195 31.2 154 7.6 * 38.4 276 32.5 126 5.9
Cassava 12.4 226 25.0 172 12.6 *** 18.1 226 29.1 172 11.0 *** 27.2 276 31.0 126 3.8
Irish potatoes 27.4 168 12.6 135 14.8 *** 24.9 193 14.4 153 10.5 ** 20.7 276 15.9 126 4.8
Millet 11.3 168 11.9 135 0.6 14.0 193 13.0 154 1.0 13.8 276 21.4 126 7.6 **
Note: a. N equals the number of respondents who answered the questions in that category.
Table 7.5. Proportion of households growing non-food cash crops by sex of farm manager
Afrint I Afrint II Afrint III
Male N Female N Diff. Sig. Male N Female N Diff. Sig. Male N Female N Diff. Sig.
Cotton 1.2 168 0.0 136 1.2 3.6 136 2.9 170 0.7 9.1 276 4.0 126 5.1 *
Sugar cane 14.9 168 15.4 136 0.5 7.6 136 2.4 169 5.2 ** 14.9 276 5.6 126 9.3 ***
Tobacco 20.8 168 4.4 136 16.4 *** 14.7 136 1.8 170 12.9 *** 14.1 276 2.4 126 11.7 ***
Note: a. N equals the number of respondents who answered the questions in that category.
Crop Diversification Initiatives and Livelihood Changes
Commercialization of non-staple food crops was introduced by either NGOs
or special production andmarketing programmes. In Ntchisi, several organiza-
tions have been actively supporting commercial production of groundnuts,
soya, and maize. These include World Vision and the National Association of
Smallholder Farmers in Malawi, which provide groundnut seed. Farmers
are expected to pay back at the end of theharvesting season double the amount
of seed they received. In Thiwi Lifidzi, the Foundation for International Com-
munity Assistance, a micro-finance organization, has been organizing farmers
to establish credit groups. Women in particular have benefited a lot from the
Credit Union ofMalawi Organisation, another NGOproviding credit facilities,
which facilitated the opening of a bank account from which farmers get
loans to buy inputs. They have also been quite instrumental in securing
markets for produce. Concern Universal used to support farmers through
implementation of the APIP. A few donors also supported projects such
as the Rural Economic Enhancement Project, which linked potato and
groundnut farmers to markets like Universal Industries Limited. Similarly, the
International Potato Centre project has been supporting farmers to increase
production and marketing of potatoes in the two districts (key informant inter-
view with District Agricultural Development Officer, Ntchisi, 23 November
2012; and District Agricultural Development Officer, Dedza District, Thiwi
Lifidzi, 20November 2012). Although the NGOs andmicro-finance institutions
provide an important service to the rural farming communities, the challenge
is that they tend to operate in localized areas. Hence the results may be difficult
to replicate or even scale up beyond the designated areas of intervention.
In addition, regardless of the success of the projects, most donor-supported
initiatives tend to fall off when such support phases out (Shivji 2006).
Some noticeable improvements in the livelihoods since the previous rounds
of the survey were mentioned in the qualitative interviews. In many of the
villages, and particularly in Khasu, there are more houses with iron sheets, the
number of people keeping cattle has gone up, and in general more people can
send their children to school. These changes can be attributed to increased
income from the sale of crops. Farm-gate prices have also increased; for
instance, a 200 kg bag of potatoes was selling at MK12,000—13,000 if sold
to a vendor in the village—but the price went up to MK15,000 if sold at
Chimbiya market. Farmers considered this to be a reasonably high increase
from what they used to get in 2007/8 and this encouraged them to growmore
potatoes (key informant interview with lead farmer at Khasu village, 21
November 2012).
One of the greatest challenges for farmers remains the issue of marketing.
For example, while a market point exists at Chimbiya which is situated some
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twenty kilometres away from Khasu, few farmers can afford to transport their
commodities and be assured of getting reasonable prices in good time. In the
villages of Chikwanje and Nkhwangwa, Ntchisi boma (town), situated at a
distance of between twenty and thirty kilometres, is the main market outlet
for farmers produce. This situation has created space for the entry of middle-
men, commonly known as vendors. Since the economic liberalization of the
1990s, middlemen from urban areas have penetratedmany rural farming areas
where they offer highly variable prices. In some cases they offer competitive
prices, and in other cases they exploit farmers with rates that are below
production cost. Farmers complained that vendors exploit them in many
ways, such as through tying up of weighing scales, bargaining, or mixing up
the figures.
Contribution of Farming to Household Income
Farming appears to be the backbone of rural livelihoods in Malawi, as most
income was drawn from farming-related activities. Analysis of variance in
round I shows that differences between households with male farm managers
and thosewith female farmmanagers in terms of incomes from sale of non-food
cash crops, non-farm salaried employment, and remittances were statistically
significant, but remittances were skewed towards female farm managers. In
round II the significant differences had increased and were now found in all
farm-based sources of income that involved the sale of produce (staple crops,
other food crops, non-food cash crops, and animal products). With the excep-
tion of the sale of animal produce, these differences remained in round
III. Diversifying into these types of crops therefore seems to pay dividends, but
has also led to widening gender gaps in commercialization.
Gender Dynamics at Household Level
The two rounds of this study revealed that maize and vegetables are the most
predominant crops that people grew. Earlier studies in Malawi (Dorward et al.
2008) demonstrate that the ratio of maize growers in the country’s four
regions varied between 93 per cent and 99 per cent. This is consistent with
the findings of this study as 98.7 per cent and 98.8 per cent of households with
male and female managers, respectively, grew the crop in round II. The cor-
responding proportions in round III were 99.6 per cent and 99.2 per cent,
respectively. Rice, on the other hand, was only grown in one of the regions
covered by the study and sorghum was hardly grown at all. Patterns of
production and growth are really based on the geographical location of the
households. Rice could only be grown in one region because that is where
conditions were ideal for production of this crop. What is striking about other
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food crops though is that these are grown everywhere and, in all the Rural
Development Programmes, more households with female farm managers
grew crops that were used as relish or used with relish as condiments while
households with male farm managers grew crops that could be sold. This
indicates that for households with female farm managers, consumption was
given more priority than cash generation.
Most households grew maize over one season but intercropped with other
crops basically to fully utilize the small land holdings and to take advantage of
some of the extensionmessages. Most people grew either hybrid or local maize
and very few grew the improved varieties. Data from qualitative research indi-
cated that this was the case because improved varieties are labour and input
demanding and difficult to store after harvest (men’s focus group discussion,
Nkhwangwa, 26 November 2012). Production has generally increased over the
years but somehouseholds are still food insecure. This is not very different from
the situation in other countries in the Southern African region (Sitko and Jayne
2014a). As Chirwa et.al. (2008) show, maize production had, over the past four
decades, been growing in real terms but this growth has failed to keep pace with
thepopulation growth, a fact thathas led to some commentators advocating for
the idea of feeding the African population through increased imports of maize.
Households with female farm managers in our sample are thus worse off, and
over the years they consistently produced about half of their male farm man-
ager counterparts. Holden and Lunduka (2013), in a study of who benefited
from Malawi’s targeted input subsidy programme, also noted that households
with female farmmanagers were more likely to be net buyers as they produced
significantly smaller amounts of maize than households with male farm man-
agers. Whiteside (2000) points out that a disproportionate number of house-
holds with female farm managers in Malawi can be described as poor or very
poor. He also argues that micro-level studies have shown that households with
female farm managers are particularly labour constrained, a fact that makes it
difficult for them to take advantage of off-farm employment.
Some of the maize that is grown is sold, most of it to traders from the village
and briefcase traders (vendors) from outside the village. Results show that the
price of maize over the years had got better (in particular, 14.3 per cent of the
respondents in round III indicated that prices had got worse, while 78.6 per
cent indicated that prices had improved), but only 40 per cent of the sample
indicated that the volume of maize that they sold had increased. This is
probably because the volume produced had also diminished because of the
decrease in land sizes.
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Conclusion
This chapter started by raising three research questions regarding gender
dynamics in agricultural intensification in the Afrint research areas of Malawi.
It has been established that the desire to achieve food security has largely been
responsible for propelling Malawi to adopt and implement agricultural
intensification. But such intensification has not been systematic as policy
changes have generally not been well coordinated. Many of the policy inter-
ventions were designed to benefit women and other vulnerable groups
through an increase in farm income and food security. It has also been
demonstrated that the declining land sizes and the provision of market
opportunities have encouraged the process of crop diversification. Although
government has in most cases formulated policies on diversification, imple-
mentation has until recently not been aggressively promoted. It is mostly
NGOs and some donor-supported projects that have taken the lead, as con-
firmed by empirical evidence from our research sites. These organizations are
actively organizing women to form groups so that they can access credit and
inputs for effective production andmarketing of their crops. NGOs are usually
concentrated in small areas, but the initiatives would be ofmore benefit if they
were replicated and up-scaled across the country.
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Policies or Prices? A Gendered Analysis of
Drivers of Maize Production in Malawi and
Zambia, 2002–13
Martin Prowse and Ellen Hillbom
Introduction
Ever since its introduction some 500 years ago, maize has played an important
role in processes of long-term economic, political, and social change in Africa.
It has to a large extent supplanted the continent’s own historical grain crops
such as sorghum and millet, and has supported increasing populations
(McCann 2005). White maize dominates food consumption in Eastern and
Southern Africa and accounts for more than half the calories people consume.
Although many rural households in Malawi and Zambia are net food pur-
chasers, almost all of them produce maize for consumption. While demand
for maize is expected to stay high in the foreseeable future (Byerlee et al. 2006,
Jayne et al. 2010), the deepening of agricultural markets (due to changing food
preferences, urbanization, and population growth) as well as better local,
national, and regional labour markets, provide contemporary smallholders
with a growing range of opportunities for diversification of agricultural pro-
duction and livelihood strategies. Under such circumstances it is pertinent
to ask to what extent and how smallholders are motivated to improve
productivity.
In this chapter, we pursue this line of questioning by using Afrint data from
Malawi and Zambia during the period 2002 to 2013. The comparison is
instructive as both neighbours are landlocked and share some linguistic,
matrilineal, and colonial similarities. However, they also differ in terms of
population densities, landholding sizes, industrial structure, and policies
encouraging smallholder production. The chapter applies an explicit gender
lens to examine if we can detect differences in maize farming by comparing
farms managed by men and women. We locate the study within each coun-
try’s historical context of post-independence government agricultural policies
with a particular focus on price stabilization and subsidy schemes. As the
Afrint I, II, and III rounds of data correspond with the most recent rise and
fall in global price on maize, we also explicitly investigate the extent to which
the global commodity boom of the early 2000s influenced smallholder pro-
duction. Further, we utilize qualitative data collected inMalawi and Zambia in
2012 and 2016 in the form of semi-structured interviews with key informants
and household respondents as well as focus group discussions to elaborate on
the results obtained from the Afrint panel data.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. In the next sectionwe examine the
basic trends inmaize production and productivity inMalawi and Zambia from
Afrint I to III. We then contextualize long-term government agricultural
strategies. Following this, we discuss the expected relationship between
hikes in global maize prices and national producer prices. We then turn to
the Afrint data presenting changes inmaize production during 2002–13 across
farms managed by men and women. Next, we conduct a production function
to assess the relative contribution of household-level factors to productivity
increases. Thereafter we turn to the qualitative data and the last section
concludes.
Trends in Maize Production and Productivity in Malawi
and Zambia, 2000–14
Figure 8.1 details recent country-level trends in maize production in Malawi
and Zambia based on FAO data.1 The data cover all farm sizes and all types of
maize, although both Malawi and Zambia produce almost exclusively white
maize. Production increased from 2.5 to 3.92 million metric tons (r2 = 0.711)
and from 1.04 to 3.35 million metric tons (r2 = 0.813) in Malawi and Zambia,
respectively. This trend is significant in both countries at the 1 per cent level
using a one-sample t-test and corresponds to an annual growth rate of around
7 per cent and 11 per cent respectively. When we conduct a linear regression
trend analysis for both countries it shows significance at the 1 per cent level
(although the Zambian data do show signs of serial autocorrelation as meas-
ured by the Durbin–Watson test). In per capita terms, though, this absolute
increase in maize production corresponds to stagnation in Malawi from 220
kg to 226 kg per capita compared to a rapid increase in Zambia from 103 kg to
1 We recognize that these FAO data may be noisier than comparable Ministry of Agriculture
data
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220 kg per capita.2 Figure 8.1 also shows that yields, i.e. land productivity,
have increased in both countries. In Malawi we see an increase from 1.74 to
2.31 tons per hectare (r2 = 0.51) while the Zambian data show an increase from
1.77 to 2.78 tons per hectare (r2 = 0.85). This corresponds to growth rates of 6
per cent and 5 per cent respectively. Both one-sample t-tests and linear regres-
sion trend analysis show significance at the 1 per cent level.
While capturing changes in production and productivity, these numbers do
not, however, disclose which segments of maize producers are driving
national trends: large- or small-scale farmers. Later in the chapter we return
to this issue as we investigate to what extent and through which mechanisms
smallholders in Afrint villages are part of the national trends.
State Intervention for Agricultural Development
Agricultural policies in Malawi after independence in 1964 initially focused on







































































Figure 8.1 Trends in maize production (million tons) and yields (metric tons per
hectare) in Malawi and Zambia, 2000–14.
Source: FAOSTAT, April 2016.
2 Population estimates from the World Development Indicators and World Population Review
for 2000 and 2014, respectively.
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and Trust 1999). Part of this strategy was the reform of the agricultural extension
and marketing services provided by the Farmers’ Marketing Board. The state’s
increased control over every aspect of agricultural production and marketing
during the 1960s, and the harsh penalties levied if these regulations were contra-
vened, prevented both settlers and African intermediaries from competing
with the Farmers’ Marketing Board in the marketing of food and cash crops
(Ng’ong’ola 1986). Due partly to a limited supply response from smallholder
agriculture, and facing a balance of payments crisis (Baker 1962, Thomas 1975),
the early 1970s saw a switch in government policy away from the smallholder
sector towards estates as a source of agricultural growth (McCracken 1984). The
smallholder sub-sector was now viewed as a source of labour, as well as playing a
role in the construction of the nation throughprovidingmaize for both rural and
urban populations. This was achieved through the parastatal Agricultural Devel-
opment and Marketing Corporation (ADMARC) offering fertilizer subsidies and
high pan-territorial and pan-seasonal producer prices for maize. Meanwhile,
consumer prices for maize were also subsidized. This state-led model worked
relatively well until the end of the 1970s when decline in terms of trade,
increases in international interest rates, drought, and the disruption of export
routes exposed the frailties of the dualistic agricultural development strategy
(Ng’ong’ola 1986, Harrigan 2001, Van Donge 2002).
In response to the economic crisis, the government opened negotiations
with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and structural
adjustment programmes were introduced. During the 1980s, subsidies for
maize seeds and fertilizers were phased out, and the producer price of maize
was reduced relative to export crops (Lele 1990, Kherallah and Govindan
1999, Harrigan 2001). Harrigan (2001) argues that the consequence of increas-
ing producer prices for export crops, while holding ADMARC maize prices
stable, was production switching from maize to fire-cured tobacco, ground-
nuts, and cotton. This reduction in maize hectarage was exacerbated by the
removal of the fertilizer subsidy programme which reduced the profitability of
maize, especially high-yielding varieties. These factors, along with the finan-
cial collapse of ADMARC, reduced maize production and precipitated a
national food crisis in 1987, causing government to reintroduce fertilizer
subsidies and increase maize producer prices (Harrigan 2005).
In the late 1990s there was a ‘policy vacuum’ regarding food production in
Malawi. Government and donors implemented a piecemeal reactive series of
measures (Harrigan 2003). The 1996/7 and 1997/8 agricultural seasons saw a
dramatic decline in maize production. From the 1998/9 agricultural season a
Starter Pack scheme reversed this trend, contributing to bumper maize har-
vests in 1998/9 and 1999/2000. In subsequent years, Starter Pack was accused
of crowding out the private sector, fostering smallholder dependency on hand
outs, and being overly bureaucratic (Harrigan 2005, Levy 2005), and it evolved
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into a ‘targeted’ social safety net in the form of the Targeted Input Programme
(TIP). Two events which shook policymakers into action were the regional
food security crises of 2001/2 and 2005/6. Policymakers responded by imple-
menting input subsidies to boost maize production and productivity. The
creation of Malawi’s Farm Input Subsidy Programme in the 2005/6 season
more than doubled maize production from 1.2 million to 2.6 million metric
tons. Between the 2006/7 and 2013/14 seasons, production only dropped
below 3 million metric tons in 2007/8 (Chirwa and Dorward 2013, Arndt
et al. 2016).
Meanwhile, in Zambia the colonial era saw the establishment of the mining
sector as the main export earner, and the rural areas as providers of labour and
food. Preferential policies were developed with the purpose of creating a
smaller group of commercialized maize farmers, initially settlers but later
including Africans (Gann 1969). After independence in 1964, the government
chose to subsidize agricultural inputs to continue stimulating maize produc-
tion by the commercial sector to feed its (relatively, in African terms) large
share of urban population, but also to encourage smallholder production.
While large-scale farmers demonstrated significant progress based on mech-
anization, subsidies, new hybrid varieties, and farming on marginal lands, the
smallholder sector also improved. Overall, from the early 1960s to the late
1980s, Zambian farmers increased their maize production by 400 per cent
(McCann 2005: 162). However, the economic crisis in the 1980s and early
1990s resulted in structural adjustment reforms which required a significant
reduction of subsidies. The lack of extension and credit for hybrid maize
production as well as market prices for fertilizer caused many smallholders
to revert to indigenous crops such as sorghum, millet, beans, and groundnuts
(Jayne and Jones 1997: 166, Govereh and Jayne 2003, McCann 2005).
In 1995 the Food Reserve Agency (FRA) was established as a parastatal
strategic food reserve/marketing board with a mission to buy maize at a pan-
territorial price exceeding wholesale prices in major maize-producing areas.
The FRA’s price policies included, for example, offering farmers above-market
prices, subsidizing prices to select large-scale millers, and exporting regionally
(even at prices below the FRA purchasing price). FRA activities have bothmade
maize prices more stable and raised them above average market prices, by as
much as 17–19 per cent for the 2003–8 period. Between the 2004/5 and 2010/
11 growing seasons the FRA purchased 30–86 per cent of maize marketed by
smallholders, costing the government roughly 25 per cent of the annual total
agricultural sector budget (Mason and Myers 2013). The FRA’s interventions
in output markets and price control represent active state policies that set
Zambia and Malawi apart. While in theory all smallholders can sell maize to
the FRA, unreliability and delays of payments by the parastatal entice those in
urgent need of cash to seek alternatives buyers of their produce, often selling
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well below the prices set by the government. Further, many cooperatives
profit from the opportunities represented by the price gap, turning into
maize-trading, rather than maize-producing, groups. Finally, the use of the
FRA’s pricing mechanisms to boost incomes of certain cooperatives and pri-
vate agents has contributed to the considerable growth of medium-scale and
large-scale commercially oriented farming, and increased the gap between them
and the small-scale subsistence farmers (Sitko and Jayne 2014b, Andersson
Djurfeldt and Hillbom 2016).
As a complement to the FRA, the Fertilizer Credit Program was created in
1997/8 with a small subsidy attached (Mason et al. 2012). In the 2002/3
season, large-scale fertilizer subsidies were reintroduced. During the three
years the programme ran, on average 29,000 metric tons of fertilizers were
distributed annually, particularly to the major maize-producing regions in the
Central, Eastern, and Southern provinces. However, repayment rates were
poor, and the next programme, the Fertilizer Support Program, was designed
as a cash-only input subsidy programme targeting selected beneficiary farm-
ers. Annual volumes were slightly more than double compared to the previous
programme, and beneficiaries were somewhat more evenly distributed over
the country. In 2009/10 the programme was renamed the Farmers Input
Support Program (FISP), and it was still running at the time of Afrint III. The
volume and number of recipients has been substantially increased from
48,000 metric tons of fertilizers and 120,000 farmers in 2002/3 to 180,000
metric tons and 900,000 farmers ten years later (Ricker-Gilbert et al. 2013).
FISP is open to households with more than 0.5 ha of land and it is delivered
through registered farmer groups such as cooperatives. These principles mean
that the programme excludes 15–20 per cent of the poorest rural households
in the country (Sitko and Jayne 2014b).
The fertilizer subsidy schemes in both Malawi and Zambia have been con-
tentious (see Chinsinga and O’Brien 2008, Chirwa and Dorward 2013, Sitko
and Jayne 2014b, Arndt et al. 2016, Ricker-Gilbert and Jayne 2017). The
challenges for implementation of fertilizer subsidies in both countries stems
from two forms of market failure. First, the slow process of rolling back the
state within agricultural input markets created an uncertain policy environ-
ment, which resulted in thin fertilizer markets in both countries characterized
by lack of authentic competition and penetration into all regions. In addition
to the overriding political imperative of assuring national-level food security
in the context of uncertain climatic conditions, imperfections within fertilizer
supply have exacerbated maize price volatility (including speculation by, e.g.,
maize-trading cooperatives in Zambia), placing pressure on the social contract
in both countries. The second form of market failure has been in credit
markets. Since the late 1990s, financial institutions have not been able to
offer credit to smallholders to intensify maize production on a sustainable
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basis due to them consistently prioritizing immediate consumption needs
over longer-term repayment considerations.
Reflecting the focus of this chapter, gender has increasingly been integrated
within national policy frameworks in both countries. Within Malawi, the
overarching Agricultural Sector-Wide Approach (ASWAp) aims to ensure that
half of participants in programmes, such as the FISP and the Green Belt initia-
tive on irrigation, are women. The ASWAp recognizes that women-headed
households have worse access to land, labour, and credit than male-headed
counterparts and, similar to the national gender policy, increase women’s
control over agricultural resources and technologies. In Zambia, gender within
agriculture is conspicuous by its absence: the Sixth National Development
Plan relegates gender to being ‘mainstreamed’ and delegates coordination to
the Ministry of Gender and Child Development. Gender also remains mar-
ginal within the National Agricultural Investment Plan (NAIP): it is seen as a
cross-cutting issue. Themain positive statement in the NAIP is the goal that 30
per cent of targeted beneficiaries are to be women.
Global and National Maize Prices, 2002–14
After around twenty-five years of decline, internationally traded food com-
modity prices started to increase sharply from January 2005 to June 2008
(Mitchell 2008, Piesse and Thirtle 2009). Being both a significant staple food
crop in much of the developing world and having multiple uses including
food, feed, and fuel, maize was at the core of the food commodity price boom,
with prices tripling (Rosegrant 2008, Piesse and Thirtle 2009). After their peak
in 2008, cereal prices declined by a quarter, only to increase rapidly again in
2011/12 before subsiding to below 2007 levels in early 2015 (World Bank
2015). Maize prices broadly reflect these general trends, showing a 20 per
cent decline up to the year ending May 2015 (World Bank 2015). Biofuels
were initially seen as a window of opportunity for African smallholders and a
route to pro-poor agricultural growth (Von Braun and Pachauri 2006, Peskett
et al. 2007). However, it became increasingly clear that the biofuel boom (itself
driven by high oil prices) was driving higher food prices as broader crops, e.g.
maize, were close substitutes in consumption and production (Mitchell 2008,
Rosegrant 2008).
The percolation of increasing prices on international markets to national
producer prices benefitting the commercialized smallholder population in
countries such as Malawi and Zambia should not be taken for granted. The
development challenge inherent in occupying a relatively remote geograph-
ical location lies in high transportation costs, making it difficult to realize
gains from trade. These challenges are particularly severe for countries
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with underdeveloped technology and infrastructure and a reliance on
passage through sovereign transit countries (Sachs and Warner 1997, Mitchell
2008: 5). Not surprisingly, there is strong evidence that a country’s level of
infrastructure development, i.e. transportation costs, is associated with its level
of agricultural productivity (Antle 1983, Gollin and Rogerson 2014). Further,
when ahigh import/export paritywedge andunderdevelopeddomesticmarkets
are combinedwithhighdomestic productionvariability, the impact of domestic
shocks such as droughts is increased. Consequently, domestic price instability
tends to be highest in landlocked African countries (Byerlee et al. 2006: 277).
Meanwhile, regional trade, in combinationwith good transportation infrastruc-
ture between countries, has the potential to expand the size of the market and
reduce price instability (Dorosh et al. 2009).
In Figure 8.2 we plot the development of national producer prices for white
maize in Malawi and Zambia for 2002–14. The data show that the basic trends
to a significant degree conform with the global hike in maize prices, though
there are variations. First, the sharp increase in prices is delayed and not
recorded until 2007. Second, while prices are high in 2008 the final peak is



















Figure 8.2 National white maize producer prices in USD/ton in Malawi and Zambia,
2002–14.
Source: FAOSTAT, April 2016.
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increase again somewhat in 2011. In sum, during our period of investigation,
2002–13, national producer prices for white maize are about the same at the
beginning and at the end of the period in both Malawi and Zambia, but in
between there is a price hike stretching from 2007 to 2009/10.
While the commodity boom left net developing-country consumers living
in poverty vulnerable to increasing food prices, it also created opportunities
for primary sector-based economies to profit by increasing their own produc-
tion (Helbling et al. 2008). In the rearticulation of smallholder-led agricultural
development around the turn of the millennium, it was argued that small-
holders broadly respond to market incentives, including price movements
(World Bank 2007). Hikes in food prices, including maize, could thereby be
seen as constituting a window of opportunity for producers. Scholars have
indeed found that higher profits from maize production caused African farm-
ers generally to shift to maize cultivation (Rosegrant 2008, Ghosh 2010, Jayne
et al. 2010), but we want to see to what extent the hike in national maize
prices influenced Afrint smallholders’ maize production in Malawi and Zam-
bia specifically.
Descriptive Statistics
We build on the three rounds of Afrint quantitative household data, described
in Chapter 1. As far as possible, we conduct consistent comparisons between
households with men and women as farm managers, referred to as male-
managed farms (MFMs) and female-managed farms (FMFs) respectively. The
three waves of data show considerable mobility between these household
categories. As we do not have a variable for sex of farm manager for Afrint I,
we are forced to use the household headship variable as a proxy. Within the
Malawian data we have 268 households in the panel covering both waves.
Afrint I shows 195 male-headed households (73 per cent) and seventy-three
women-headed households (27 per cent). In Afrint II, we see an increase in the
balance of women with 118 households (44 per cent) containing FMFs com-
pared to 150 MFMs (56 per cent). In Afrint III, we see a reduction again to
ninety-nine FMFs (37 per cent) vs 169 MFMs (63 per cent). To ensure we are
truly tracking the same households through time, we only use data from the
145 MFM households and ninety FMF households which display the same
household categorization throughout both waves (all three cross-sections) of
the dataset. In other words, we exclude the households which changed house-
hold status through the duration of the panel. The proportion of women
managing farms in the Zambian panel of 276 households showed similar
levels of mobility between categories, and again we only use the households
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which we are certain had the same gender of farm manager throughout the
period of investigation.
Table 8.1 presents selected descriptive statistics of relevance for our investi-
gation, i.e. trends in maize production, area under maize farming, yields, and
use of fertilizers. It is based on true panel households across both waves in
Malawi and Zambia, and shows results for all households as well as for male
and female farm managers separately. Significance is assessed through paired-
sample t-tests.
As expected, the application of fertilizer to maize has increased during
2002–13 for all farm categories. In both countries, men have increased the
application of fertilizer to a much greater extent than women: in Zambia by
210 kg more, in Malawi by around 47 kg more. Overall, maize production has
increased significantly during the period in question: by 22 per cent inMalawi
and by a staggering 239 per cent in Zambia. This means that trends in national
maize production that we noted earlier are not driven by large-scale farms
only, rather the increase in production in the smallholder sector is higher than
the national average, and significantly so in Zambia. While households in
Zambia were producing around double their Malawian counterparts in Afrint
I, by Afrint III this had grown to more than a factor of four. Increases in maize
production are coming from farmsmanaged bymen, not women. In statistical
terms, farms managed by women did not see any significant changes in maize
production between Afrint I and Afrint III. However, yields have increased
dramatically in both countries for farms managed by women. In Malawi,
women increased yields by 26 per cent compared to 47 per cent for men. In
Zambia, women increased yields by 51 per cent compared to men’s increase of
84 per cent.
At the same time as maize production is increasing, MMFs in Malawi have
reduced land allocated to maize from 0.95 to 0.88 ha, and FMFs in Malawi
have reduced the area under maize by 0.19 ha. Meanwhile, the story is the
opposite in Zambia, where men have increasing land under maize from 1.47
to 1.88 ha and women have increased land under maize, although to a slightly
lesser extent (and the result is not significant). For Malawi these results reson-
ate with the trends found at the national level and supports the conclusion
that increased maize production is a process characterized by intensification.
This is a land-scarce country, which is demonstrated by national numbers
reporting 183 people per square km (World Bank 2016). The qualitative Afrint
data show that the sampled sites in Malawi generally follow the national
trends reporting high levels of population density. In Zambia, while the
national trend pointed towards intensification, the Afrint data indicate that
for the smallholder population increased maize production is instead a story
of extensification. National population density levels are at low, at twenty-two
people per square km (World Bank 2016), but the Afrint sites inMazabuka and
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Table 8.1. Maize area, production, and yield for all households with male and female farm managers in Malawi and Zambia, Afrint I–III
Afrint Area under maize, 3-year average (ha) NPK application to maize (kg)
I III I III I III I III I III I III
All Male Female All Male Female
Malawi Mean 0.90 0.79 0.95 0.88 0.82 0.63 32.18 136.14 34.47 154.05 27.79 101.69
No. 232 232 143 143 89 89 152 152 100 100 52 52
S.D. 0.51 0.56 0.49 0.62 0.52 0.40 51.97 137.28 52.36 158.35 51.44 72.68
Sig. *** *** *** *** ***
Zambia Mean 1.40 1.76 1.47 1.88 0.97 1.04 214.27 526.51 227.68 575.77 149.11 287.21
No. 198 198 169 169 29 29 164 164 136 136 28 28
S.D. 1.05 1.42 1.07 1.48 0.81 0.67 398.45 595.67 428.94 618.06 182.13 400.55
Sig. *** *** *** *** ***
Afrint Maize production (kg) Yields (kg per hectare), based on pruned area data
I III I III I III I III I III I III
All Male Female All Male Female
Malawi Mean 745.43 906.38 801.72 1,098.25 652.95 591.17 879.35 1.225.69 903.08 1.326.77 840.95 1.062.02
No. 222 222 138 138 84 84 220 220 136 136 84 84
S.D. 645.31 1.034.23 600.81 1213.89 706.45 506.45 616.81 876.31 688.35 947.06 480.37 723.55
Sig. ** * *** *** ***
Zambia Mean 1.655.23 3.951.37 1.721.94 4.442.46 1.330.86 1.651.15 1143.97 1998.63 1158.75 2.125.41 1.072.64 1.618.68
No. 170 170 141 141 29 29 169 169 140 140 29 29
S.D. 2.219.82 5.247.31 2.322.05 5.606.03 1.627.97 1.554.33 716.42 1.196.95 717.90 1.238.32 717.43 873.70
Sig. *** *** *** *** ***
Mkushi show regional differences. While smallholders in Mkushi state that
much of their arable land is left idle, in Mazabuka this is not the case.
Nevertheless, it seems that Afrint smallholders have sufficient land to extend
rather than intensify their farming. Table 8.2 confirms the findings from
paired-sample t-tests and shows through independent sample t-tests that
men significantly increased fertilizer application and maize production to a
greater extent than women, but that changes in area and productivity
between MMFs and FMFs show no significance.
Production Function on Malawian and Zambian Data
To further explore changes in production and productivity we now turn to
assessing the relative importance of a number of household factors. We follow
the conventional specification of a production function as described in
Peterman et al. (2011), logging both sides of the equation. As our dependent
variable is normally distributed, we use a logged ordinary least squares regres-
sion model. To cover the full period of the project we use Panel I and Panel II
data. For each country, we pool data for households with male and female
farmmanagers and include gender of farmmanager as a dummy to see how it
influences productivity. Second, we run the same model stepwise with gender
of farm manager introduced in Block 2 to compare coefficients and how the
inclusion of gender of farm manager alters the model.
In previous sections we hypothesized that government policies generally
and fertilizer subsidies specifically, as well as national producer prices, could
be expected to influence smallholder maize yields (the dependent variable).
To capture government policies in the model we have included the use of NKP
Table 8.2. To what extent do the trends in maize cultivation differ between households













Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female
Malawi No. 143 89 100 52 138 84 136 84
Mean 0.18 0.07 119.58 73.90 296.52 61.77 423.70 221.07
S.D. 0.6 0.71 154.69 75.70 1263.51 822.66 1,078.32 779.41
Sig. ** **
Zambia No. 169 29 138 28 141 29 29 140
Mean 0.41 0.07 348.09 138.11 2,702.53 320.29 546.04 966.66
S.D. 1.51 1.01 638.99 393.72 5,486.70 2,182.36 1,115.69 1,407.92
Sig. * **
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(fertilizers) and improved seeds in both countries. In addition, as the qualita-
tive data for Zambia informed us that extension officers’ promotion of specific
conservation farming techniques, i.e. ripping, was deemed to have consider-
able positive effects on maize production, this variable was also included, but
only for Zambia. Maize prices are complimented with two spatial variables:
distance to market and village centre. Further, we look into smallholders’
access to the two basic factors of production—land and labour. For land we
include size of land used for maize production and for the quantity of labour
we have number of able workers and hiring of temporary farm hands, so-
called ganyu in Malawi. We also have more qualitative aspects of labour
captured by age and years of schooling of farm manager. Finally, we capture
the gender perspective as sex of farm manager.
We discussed earlier how the longitudinal study limited the sample size as
we use data from true panel households. The pruning of continuous variables
further reduces the number of cases available for the ordinary least squares
regression model. Despite these limitations, we obtain significant results.
Descriptive statistics for the Malawian model with relevant transformations
of variables are shown in Table 8.3. Missing values for some continuous
variables have been imputed using median or mean figures. Skewness and
Table 8.3. Descriptive statistics for Malawian production function
N Mean Std. deviation
statistic statistic statistic
Dependent
Yields—pruned at 3SDs, logged 138 7.86 0.32
Independent
Age of head of household, years—68, missing values
imputed with mean
138 6.36 0.95
Years of schooling of farm manager—2013 variable logged,
7 values imputed with median
138 1.29 0.75
Estimate of trend in able workers Afrint I to III, plus constant,
logged, 5 missing values imputed with median
138 1.64 0.36
Trend in maize area Afrint I to III—pruned at 3SDs, plus
constant, logged, 7 missing values imputed with median
138 1.02 0.19
Ganyu nominal trend Afrint II to III, plus constant, logged,
2 missing value imputed with median
138 4.24 0.50
NPK trend Afrint I to III— pruned at 3SDs, plus constant
logged
138 5.61 0.54
Started using improved seeds between Afrint I to III, dummy 138 0.39 0.49
Started hiring labour in between Afrint I to III, dummy 138 0.25 0.43
Distance to market, household level, logged, 2008 138 1.86 0.64
Distance to village centre, logged, 2013, missing values
imputed
138 1.07 1.23
Trend in maize prices in USD nominal from Afrint II to III,
no outliers, plus constant, logged
138 2.74 0.30
Dummy for sex of farm manager consistent across 2008 and
2013 with 2001 household head
138 0.64 0.48
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kurtosis are below accepted limits. Listwise, 138 units are available for the
production function. Table 8.4 shows coefficients for the model alongside
significance figures. Collinearity statistics are within limits with variance
inflation factors of variables below 1.2. The distribution of residuals is normal.
Overall, the model explains 39 per cent of the variance of change in maize
yields.
Table 8.4 shows that five independent variables are significant. The trend in
maize area shows a strong negative relationship (0.39) with maize yields at






B Std. error Beta
(constant) 7.448 0.433 ***
Age of head of household, years—68 missing
values imputed with mean
0.056 0.025 0.163 **
Years of schooling of farm manager—2013
variable logged, 7 values imputed with
median
0.009 0.030 0.020
Estimate of trend in able workers Afrint I to III,
plus constant, logged, 5 missing values
imputed with median
0.017 0.064 0.019
Trend in maize area Afrint I to III—pruned at
3SDs, plus constant, logged, 7 missing
values imputed with median
0.669 0.123 0.386 ***
Ganyu nominal trend Afrint II to III, plus
constant, logged, 2 missing value imputed
with median
0.006 0.045 0.009
NPK trend Afrint I to III— pruned at 3SDs, plus
constant logged
0.284 0.041 0.476 ***
Started using improved seeds between Afrint
I to III, dummy
0.030 0.047 0.046
Started hiring labour in between Afrint I to III,
dummy
0.038 0.051 0.050
Distance to market, household level, logged,
2008
0.100 0.035 0.198 ***
Distance to village centre, logged, 2013,
missing values imputed
0.049 0.018 0.186 ***
Trend in maize prices in USD nominal from
Afrint II to III, no outliers, plus constant,
logged
0.098 0.074 0.091
Dummy for sex of farm manager consistent




Model r r2 Adjusted r2 Std. error
of the
estimate
1 0.668a 0.447 0.394 0.25162
Notes: a. B is the symbol used for an unstandardized ordinary least squares regression coefficient.
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the 1 per cent level. Holding all else equal, the trend in fertilizer application
shows a strong positive relationship (0.48) with the trend in maize yields at
the 1 per cent level. Two spatial variables show weak positive and significant
relationships with the trend in maize yields: distance to market (0.20) and
distance to the village centre (0.19), both at the 1 per cent level. The direction
of these relationships is counter-intuitive: one would expect households
closer to density and markets to have higher levels of productivity. Finally,
age shows a negative relationship (0.16) at the 5 per cent level.
Table 8.4 also shows that counter to our initial assumptions regarding the
impact of price incentives, the logged trend in maize price variable does not
show any significance (although the construction of the indicator does not, at
present, allow for a lagged supply response). Finally, the variable for gender of
farm manager is insignificant. When the model is run stepwise with gender
of farm manager inserted in Block 2, very marginal changes are detected,
none of which alter significance levels of any variables. Thus, the data suggest
that, despite a slightly different strategy towards maize cultivation during
the period under question, households with female farm managers have
been sharing in the productivity increases enjoyed by households with male
farm managers, and are subject to the same broad influences in productivity.
Moving on, descriptive statistics for the Zambian model are shown in
Table 8.5. In a similar fashion to the Malawian model, missing values have





Yields—pruned at 3SDs, plus constant, logged 151 7.98 0.46
Independent
Age of head of household, years—square rooted, 9 missing values
imputed with mean
151 6.70 1.03
Years of schooling of farmmanager—2013 variable logged, 6 values
imputed with mean
151 1.92 0.63
Estimate of trend in able workers Afrint I to III, plus constant, logged 151 2.58 0.29
Trend in maize area Afrint I to III, pruned at 3SDs, plus constant,
logged, 7 missing values imputed with median
151 1.60 0.28
Ganyu nominal trend Afrint I to III, plus constant, logged 151 6.32 0.23
Started using conservation agriculture Afrint I to III, dummy 151 0.45 0.50
NPK trend Afrint I to III—pruned at 3SDs, plus constant, logged 151 7.44 0.22
Started using improved seeds between Afrint I and III, dummy 151 0.16 0.37
Started hiring in labour Afrint I to III, dummy 151 0.17 0.37
Distance to market, household level, logged, 2008 151 2.95 0.51
Distance to village centre, logged, 2013, missing values imputed 151 1.39 1.07
Trend in maize prices in USD nominal Afrint II to III, no outliers, plus
constant, logged
151 2.84 0.20
Sex of farmmanager consistent across Afrint II and III with Afrint I HH
head, dummy
151 0.80 0.36
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been imputed where appropriate, and skewness and kurtosis are below
accepted limits. In this model, 151 units are available for the production
function. Table 8.6 shows coefficients for themodel alongside relevant further
statistics. Collinearity statistics are within safe limits. The distribution of
residuals is normal. Overall, the model explains a lower degree of variance
than the Malawian model: only 22 per cent of the variance in maize yields.
Table 8.6 shows that similar to the Malawian model we find that fertilizer
(0.30), distance to market (0.20), and distance to the village centre (0.19)
show significance. However, and in contrast to Malawi, the coefficient signs
for both spatial variables are negative, suggesting proximity to density and
market channels is imparting a positive effect on yields. Moreover, we find









(Constant) 3.833 1.624 **
Age of head of household, years—square rooted,
9 missing values imputed with mean
0.014 0.035 0.032
Years of schooling of farmmanager—2013 variable
logged, 6 values imputed with mean
0.034 0.057 0.047
Estimate of trend in able workers Afrint I to III, plus
constant, logged
0.269 0.121 0.174 **
Trend in maize area Afrint I to III, pruned at 3SDs,
plus constant, logged, 7 missing values imputed
with median
0.040 0.133 0.024
Ganyu nominal trend Afrint I to III, plus constant,
logged
0.148 0.147 0.075
Started using conservation agriculture Afrint I to III,
dummy
0.129 0.073 0.141 *
NPK trend Afrint I to III—pruned at 3SDs, plus
constant, logged
0.618 0.168 0.303 ***
Started using improved seeds between Afrint I and
III, dummy
0.046 0.093 0.037
Started hiring in labour Afrint I to III, dummy 0.094 0.092 0.076
Distance to market, household level, logged, 2008 0.129 0.071 0.144 *
Distance to village centre, logged, 2013, missing
values imputed
0.075 0.034 0.177 **
Trend in maize prices in USD nominal Afrint II to III,
no outliers, plus constant, logged
0.077 0.170 0.034
Sex of farm manager consistent across Afrint II and
III with Afrint I household head, dummy
0.010 0.091 0.008
Model summary
Model r r2 Adjusted r2 Std. error of the
estimate
1 0.529a 0.280 0.211 0.40627
Notes: a. B is the symbol used for an unstandardized ordinary least squares regression coefficient.
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two further variables that are influencing yields in Zambia: the trend in able
workers (0.17) is significant at the 5 per cent level, and starting to use conser-
vation agriculture (0.14) is significant at the 10 per cent level. In the same
fashion as the Malawian model, the maize price variable and gender of farm
manager show no significance.
Discussion of Results
For our discussion of the panel data results we draw on qualitative data
collected in Malawi and Zambia in 2012 and again in Zambia in 2016. The
production functions identified three independent variables as having a sig-
nificant relationship with maize yields in both Malawi and Zambia: a positive
relationship between fertilizer application and yields, and a relationship
between distance to market/village centre and yields which is positive in
Malawi (households further away from density/markets have greater yields)
and negative in Zambia (households closest to density/markets have the
greatest yields).
Despite the criticism that fertilizer subsidies have fostered, our data show
that they have had an overall positive impact on maize yields, appearing to be
the least-worst option for governments to support food security during an era
of fluctuating global and national maize prices. In interviews, smallholders in
both countries repeatedly and incisively return to describing households’
fertilizer strategies. In Malawi poor soil fertility makes it imperative to apply
appropriate amounts to achieve decent harvests. Smallholders rely almost
exclusively on FISP, but when possible they buy additional unsubsidized
fertilizers. Existing critique that the programmes create dependency and
undercut the private market is confirmed. Village governments are in charge
of distribution and as a rule they compel eligible households to share their
bags of fertilizers, frequently causing respondents to complain that the
amounts received are not sufficient. While FISP in Malawi is targeted to cater
for the poorer households, the distribution principles for FISP in Zambia
discriminate against those with less than 0.5 ha. Andersson Djurfeldt and
Hillbom (2016) show how uneven access to subsidized fertilizers is part of an
ongoing polarization process among Afrint households in Zambia. Small-
holders depend on their memberships in cooperative unions for access; the
more unions you join themore fertilizers you can access. While some coopera-
tives are active andmembers share multiple activities, others only exist for the
distribution of FISP. The dependence on FISP and the programme’s reoccur-
ring late and unreliable distribution of fertilizers is a common complaint
from respondents.
Agriculture, Diversification, and Gender in Rural Africa
192
At first glance, the result from Malawi that households further away from
markets and village centres have greater maize yields may not make intuitive
sense. Taking into account the substantial subsistence production, variety of
marketing opportunities, and alternative high-value crops, the result can,
however, be explained. First, there are regional variations in the extent to
which smallholders engage in the marketing of maize, many only growing
maize for household consumption. Second, producers do not necessarily take
their maize to the market themselves—they often prefer to sell to vendors at
the farm gate thereby saving paying for transportation, costs that increase
with distance. Furthermore, closeness to urban areas allows smallholders in
densely populated Malawi to profit from the deepening of agricultural mar-
kets as they switch to high-value and more perishable crops such as veget-
ables, or provide for a growing ‘processing industry’, e.g. in the form of Irish
potatoes or soya beans. Turning to the Zambian data, a different dynamic
appears to be at work. While the FRA in many ways dominates the maize
market and provides buying stations throughout the country, the para-
statal’s inability to pay farmers on time entices many to switch to regionally
and locally established grain companies, cooperatives, and private buyers.
The closer smallholders are situated to markets the more likely they are to
profit from increasing competition as well as keeping transportation costs
down. Moreover, the much lower population density in Zambia means
thinner local markets and limited opportunities for smallholders to switch
into high-value food crops as is the case in Malawi.
Further, we have significant results that are country specific. The strong
negative relationship between maize production and size of maize area in
Malawi resonates with intensification and increasing land scarcity empha-
sized in key informant interviews. Age proved to have a significant negative
relationship with maize yields in Malawi. This is an interesting observation as
one often hears arguments about youth lacking interest in farming. Here we
see that it is the younger households with stronger labour who are increasing
productivity to a greater extent than their older peers. In Zambia we obtain a
different result in regard to access to labour resources. Here increasing maize
production is based on extensification processes, with more land being dedi-
cated to maize farming, but the production function shows that it is not only
land which plays a role in this growth process. Access to labour in the form of
more able workers, i.e. more family members able to participate in farm work,
also turns out to be important.
Furthermore, we have the positive relationship between practising conser-
vation farming and increasing maize yields in Zambia. This is corroborated in
the qualitative data where conservation farming, specifically ripping, is
claimed to provide multiple and substantial benefits. As one progressive
farmer near Mkushi explains, practising ripping, or deep tilling of only the
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row where the crop will be planted, means that he no longer needs to plough
and weed the whole field. Thereby he can farm a larger area compared to
before without adding labour resources. Further, he can now plan his farming
activities better, which reduces fluctuations in labour demand. Conservation
farming practices have also increased his yields significantly. These claims are
confirmed by the local agricultural extension officer.3
Before ending the discussion we need to comment on two insignificant
results—prices and gender. We set up this study partly in the context of the
recent commodity boom, and showed that national prices for white maize
have experienced a rise (and fall) during the period of investigation in both
countries. Subsequently, we hypothesized that rational smallholders would
react by increasing their maize production, but this turned out not to be the
case. What we can take from this result is that we should be careful when
anticipating that smallholders living in remote areas in landlocked African
countries will react to price incentives represented by global and national
price levels. Finally, while households with female farm managers could not
keep up with their male counterparts in terms of maize production they are
sharing in the productivity increase, and their farming strategies are influ-
enced by the same factors. This is a positive, and perhaps somewhat unex-
pected, result.
Concluding Remarks
In conclusion, a few results in our study are worth revisiting as they poten-
tially carry policy implications. First, regarding existing agricultural policies it
is clear that fertilizer subsidies have led to improved maize production. This
conclusion does not contradict the critique that has been raised against fertil-
izer subsidy programmes, but the way forward would be to improve on the
administration of existing programmes rather than to abandon them. Further,
considering the success of conservation farming in both labour-saving farm-
ing methods and yields in Zambia, there may well be some scope for a
systematic appraisal of conservation farming in Malawi. Third, while market
prices offered by the FRA in Zambia have been beneficial for large-scale and
emergent farmers, and contributed significantly to the growth in maize pro-
duction, there are further market-enhancing reforms that remain to be
3 This partly contradicts the claims of the labour intensity of conservation farming also in
Zambia as pointed to in Chapter 3. The explanation appears to lie in the type of conservation
farming being practiced, where the construction of basins is more labour intensive than ripping,
especially if the latter is not done by hand.
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addressed. Development of physical infrastructure and improved spread of
price information would greatly assist smallholders by lowering transaction
costs for market participation. It would make farmers less dependent on
middlemen and more directly involved in markets, thereby more likely to
profit from any future price hikes. Finally, considering their lower asset hold-
ings, the ability of female farm managers in both countries, and younger
households in Malawi, to share in broad productivity increases demonstrates
how maize and food security policy should not marginalize such households.
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Spatial and Gendered Linkages Between
Non-Farm Diversification and Farm
Productivity in Ghana
Fred Mawunyo Dzanku and Daniel B. Sarpong
Introduction
Increasing smallholder farm productivity in sub-Saharan Africa in general,
and Ghana in particular, has been at the core of many agriculture policy
interventions and the subject of several pieces of scientific research. Propon-
ents of an agriculture-led rural poverty reduction strategy argue that increas-
ing smallholder productivity is necessary for rural poverty reduction (World
Bank 2007). Yet, the empirical literature suggests that rural households in
developing countries straddle farm and non-farm employment (Davis et al.
2010, Dzanku 2015). A relevant research issue, then, is whether there exist
household-level complementarities between the two livelihood strategies.
This chapter, therefore, seeks to address this research issue by examining the
relationship between rural non-farm diversification and productivity in agri-
culture. Importantly, we also seek to answer the question as to whether this
relationship differs by the agro-productive potential and gender of non-farm
income (NFI) earners within the household.
The relationship between rural non-farm diversification and farm product-
ivity is ambiguous ex ante: on the one hand, the income generated from non-
farm labour market participation could be used to fund the adoption of new
technologies that improve yields, as well as mitigate the risk associated with
adoption, particularly under rain-fed conditions. On the other hand, if house-
hold labour allocations towards rural non-farm employment (RNFE) draws
labour away from the farm when the marginal physical product of on-farm
labour is positive, and where hired labour markets are prohibitive, then farm
output could decline. Depending on the magnitudes of these two effects, for
example, the effect of non-farm diversification on farm productivity could be
positive or negative, and this has to be determined empirically.
This study is not the first to examine the relationship between non-farm
diversification and farm outcomes in general (see, for example, Evans and
Ngau 1991, Ellis and Freeman 2004, Pfeiffer et al. 2009, Mathenge et al. 2015).
Our contribution to the existing body of knowledgeon farm–non-farm linkages
lies in the use of longitudinal data, which is rare in the context of Ghana in
particular. Probablymore important, the analysis incorporates a gender dimen-
sion in a way that the extant literature does not. This is important because
diversification into non-farm employment is not gender neutral; on the con-
trary, opportunities for non-farm diversification and the returns thereof differ
by gender (see, for example, Corral and Reardon 2001, Elbers and Lanjouw
2001, Rijkers and Costa 2012, Ackah 2013). Naturally, therefore, an assessment
of the linkages between non-farm diversification and farm productivity needs
to account for the gendered nature of non-farm participation.
The gender analysis of the link between non-farm diversification and farm
productivity is achieved through intra-household analysis. That is, we exam-
ine how, if at all, the effect of non-farm earnings on farm productivity differs
by the gender of the income earner within the household. Thus, we hypothe-
size that the gender of the household member diversifying into RNFE matters
for the effect on household agricultural productivity. Why might this be the
case? Reardon et al. (1994) note that, among other factors, the investment of
non-farm earnings into farming depends on who controls the NFI within the
household; and our assumption is that who earns the income could be an
important predictor of who controls it.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section provides an
overview of the country and local context. The data, theoretical framework,
and the empirical models appear in the section after this. The results of the
analyses and conclusions are in the two following sections respectively.
The Study Context
This section contextualizes the study area, first at the country level, and then
at the regional and village levels. At the country level we focus on broad
contextual issues during the years between 2000 and 2015 because the first
round of the Afrint surveys utilized in the analysis was collected in 2002.
Country Context
At the beginning of the Afrint studies (in 2002, hereafter Afrint I), Ghana was
designated a low-income country, according to the World Bank classification;
Non-Farm Diversification and Farm Productivity in Ghana
197
by the time of themost recent survey (2013, hereafter Afrint III) it had become
a lower middle income (LMI) country. The LMI country status, which came
about after the rebasing of GDP by the Ghana Statistical Service in November
2010, indicated that Ghana achieved this status in 2007 (i.e. around the time
of the second round of the Afrint surveys, hereafter Afrint II).
Real GDP (RGDP) per capita figures during the Afrint II period represent a 19
per cent increase over Afrint I levels, and the levels attained during the period
of Afrint III represent a 27 per cent rise over that of Afrint II. So, between the
two points (i.e. Afrint I and III), RGDP per capita rose by about 52 per cent—
from US$999 to US$1,521 (World Bank 2016). Since the year 2001, overall
annual GDP growth rates have been 4 per cent and above, although growth
has recently been sluggish (Figure 9.1). Ghana has also achieved significant
gains in poverty reduction, from the initial Afrint I level of around 44 per cent
(in 1999) to 32 per cent in 2006, and then to 24 per cent in 2013.
As one might expect, as in most other African countries south of the Sahara,
agriculture’s contribution toGDP inGhana has been falling consistently, from
around 40 per cent at the beginning of the 2000s to an average of about 22 per
cent over the lastfive years (2011–15). In the context of the present study, non-
farm activity and employment has thus increased at the national level.What is
worrying is that although the economically active population employed in
agriculture has been declining, as expected, the decline is slower compared
with the decline in agriculture’s GDP share, meaning that productivity has not
increased as fast as one would expect. Agriculture remains the single largest
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
GDP growth (annual %) 3.7 4.0 4.5 5.2 5.6 5.9 6.4 4.3 9.1 4.8 7.9 14.0 9.3 7.3 4.0 3.9



















Figure 9.1 Ghana’s overall and agricultural GDP growth, 2000–15.
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employer of labour, currently absorbing approximately 42 per cent of the
labour force, down from 50 per cent at the beginning of the twenty-first
century (Dzanku and Udry 2017). Indeed, as Figure 9.1 shows, average agricul-
turalGDPgrowthhas laggedbehindoverall growthover the period 2000–15 by
about 2.1 percentage points.
An example of low agricultural productivity can be seen with cereals. The
figures reported by the FAO and Ghana’s Ministry of Food and Agriculture
show cereal yields of about 1,268 kg/ha, 1,458 kg/ha, and 1,681 kg/ha during
Afrint I, II, and III, respectively. These figures are well below LMI country
standards by a factor of two, on average, while productivity-enhancing input
use (e.g. chemical fertilizers) in Ghana also lags that of LMI peers. For example,
fertilizer use (kg/ha of arable land) in Ghana is currently estimated at about 36,
compared with 118 for the average LMI country. Even then, current levels
represent a massive increase over Afrint I levels (less than 4 kg/ha).
On the policy front, the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategies (GPRS I and II)
contained government policy for the agriculture sector at the beginning of
the Afrint studies, with the main focus being agricultural modernization and
agro-industrialization. Details of the plans were contained in the Food
and Agriculture Sector Development Policy documents (FASDEP I and II),
and later, the Medium-Term Agriculture Sector Investment Plan which was
designed for implementing the policies contained in the FASDEPs until 2015.
A summary and analysis of these policies can be found in Dzanku and Aidam
(2013). The general story is that although these policies appear good on paper,
implementation challenges led to most of the sector growth targets being
missed. There is thus very little evidence that agricultural modernization has
begun to any large extent. One sign of this is that still less than 1 per cent of
cropped land is under irrigation.
Study Sites
The study is located in eight villages spread across four districts in two of
Ghana’s administrative regions: Eastern Region (ER) and Upper East Region
(UER). Importantly, the two regions are located in distinct agro-ecological
zones. The UER villages are all in the Guinea Savannah Zone (GSZ); two of
the ER villages are in the Semi-Deciduous Forest Zone (DFZ) and the other two
in the Forest Zone (FZ). This clearly has implications for agricultural produc-
tion potential and crop choice (or the lack thereof). This is more so because
Ghana’s agriculture is almost entirely rain-fed. In areas covering our study
villages, annual rainfall amount and distribution varies in ascending order
from the GSZ (800–1,200 mm) to the DFZ (900–1,500 mm) to the FZ
(1,500–2,000 mm). Another important difference between the study sites is
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that whereas the ER villages have two rainy seasons in a year (major andminor
based on duration), the UER villages have only one.
Sorghum, millet, rice, maize, and groundnut are the main crops grown in
the UER villages while cassava, maize, plantain, and vegetables are important
for the ER villages. In addition, the FZ villages grow tree crops such as cocoa
and oil palm. Livestock production is much more important and widespread
in the UER villages than in the ER. For example, in the nationally representa-
tive dataset 76 per cent of households in the UER owned livestock in 2013
compared with 45 per cent of households in the ER (84 per cent and 64 per
cent, respectively, when considering rural households only).
The seasonal differences could have ramifications for non-farm participa-
tion given that farm and non-farm work could be sequenced in the UER while
they may largely be concurrent in the ER. Among other factors, non-farm
activities are known to be related to population density or urbanization and
proximity to urban areas (Renkow 2007, Deichmann et al. 2008, Haggblade
et al. 2010). The villages being studied also have varying population sizes and
proximity to urban areas, all of which are important for participation in the
rural non-farm sector. Two of the villages in the ER are essentially suburbs
of their respective district capitals (Odumase-Krobo and Begoro); the other
two are more removed from the capital. Two of the UER villages are within a
25 km radius of the regional capital, Bolgatanga; of the other two, one is on
the Bolgatanga–Navrongo highway while the other is about 15 km from
Navrongo, the capital of the Kassena Nankana Municipality. An important
feature of this village is that it lies within the catchment area of the Tono
Irrigation Project.
Methods
This section provides a description of the data employed for the analysis,
motivates the empirical model by presenting a simple theoretical framework
using the agricultural household model, and then outlines the empirical
model and identification strategies. We begin with the data description.
Data
This study utilizes the Afrint panel datasets described in detail in Chapter 1.
Details of the Ghana sample and distribution can be found in Dzanku and
Sarpong (2014). The initial Afrint sample covered 416 households (in 2002) of
which 357 were successfully followed in 2008, but a refreshment sample was
also drawn in addition and so a total of 568 households were interviewed
during Afrint II. A third round of the surveys took place in 2013 and involved
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539 households, 87 per cent of whom were Afrint II households. Due to the
availability data on our main variables of interest, our analysis uses the last
two waves of the panel dataset (i.e. Afrint II and III), and the Afrint III cross-
section.
Theoretical Framework
Wemotivate the empirical application as follows. We assume that households
seek to maximize utility, U, defined over consumption of both own-produced
and purchased goods (C) and leisure (l), given household-specific characteris-
tics (Θhh). The household also supplies labour, Ln, to non-farm work which
received wages,w, as well as receives exogenous non-farm non-labour income,
V. In order to produce farm output, Q, the farm household uses land input,
A, and purchased inputs, X, including hired labour, Lh. Production is also
influenced by public goods and services, G (e.g. extension services), as well
as agro-ecological characteristics, Z, which affect both the type of crop the
household can cultivate and maximum attainable yields. Maximizing the
Lagrangian associated with the household’s utility maximization problem
with respect to C and l and taking the ratio of the two expressions yields
w* ¼ ð@U=@lÞð@U=@CÞ  w;L
n  0; ð@U=@lÞð@U=@CÞ w
 
Ln ¼ 0: ð9:1Þ
This expression is the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and
leisure, w*; and is an important first-order condition which states that each
household equates their marginal rate of substitution between consumption
and leisure (or shadow wage) either to their market wage or to their marginal
product in farm work. Thus, w* is endogenously determined due to the non-
separability of production and consumption decisions. However, if Ln is
observed, then w* can be equated to the household’s non-farm wage rate, w.
This simple framework motivates household labour allocations between farm
and non-farm livelihood activities.
Since some households may not supply any labour to non-farm activities, w
may not be observed for all households. Because the aim here is to examine
the effect of non-farm activity on productivity in agriculture rather than
estimate directly household labour supply decisions, the study follows
Sakurai and Reardon (1997) in introducing an NFI variable (nfmy) directly






In this context, non-farm diversification is considered an indirect household
labour supply decision, and as shown intuitively and from the empirical
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literature, the non-farm diversification effect cannot be signed a priori because
it could have either positive or negative effects on farm productivity in a
similar way as crop diversification may have (Coelli and Fleming 2004).
Empirical Model and Measures
For the measure of farm productivity we focus on the total value of farm
output per capita because we believe this is more directly related to house-
hold resource allocations between the farm and non-farm sector in the rural
economy. Besides, it is mainly increases in labour productivity that could be
expected to release labour for rural non-farm income-generating activities
(Valdés and Foster 2007). In constructing the outcome variable we aggregate
all crop output as determined through local markets. We then use the
implied village average price to impute the value of own crops used for
other purposes other than sale (i.e. home consumption, payment for hired
labour, transfers to relatives, seed, animal feed, brewing, gifts, etc.).
A limitation with our measure is that because our questionnaire did not
capture detailed production data for some important food crops in the
study areas, such as cassava, plantain, and groundnuts, only those marketed
could be captured in the output measure. The general form of the product-
ivity equation is specified as
Δyi ¼ α0 þ δΔnfmyi þ ΔXiβ0 þWiη0 þ ui; ð9:3Þ
where Δ represents change in the respective time-varying variables between
Afrint II and Afrint III for household i, nfmy is non-farm earnings;X contains a
vector of time-varying covariates of farm productivity described in equation
9.2, W is the vector of time-invariant control variables, and ui is the idiosyn-
cratic error which captures random production shocks that we did not meas-
ure, for example, weather and other risk factors; δ, β, and η are all parameters to
be estimated, with ourmain interest being δ. For the estimate that uses gender-
specific non-farm earnings, equation 9.3 is modified as
yi ¼ α0 þ δ1nfmywi þ δ2nfmymi þXiβ0 þ ui; ð9:4Þ
since the gender-specific non-farm earning variables (nfmy_w and nfmy_m, for
women andmen, respectively) were measured during Afrint III only. Thus, for
equation 9.4 the vector X contains all the controls.
In our panel data estimates, inputs and all other time-varying covariates are
ex ante allowed to be correlated with household unobservables, meaning the
fixed effects (FE) estimator is preferred. The specification in equation 9.3 is
essentially equivalent to the FE estimator for T = 2 (Wooldridge 2002: 284), as
is the case for the current application.
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Finally, we devise an identification strategy for dealing with the possibility
that non-farm earning is endogenous given that non-farm participation is not
randomly assigned. Since non-farm earning enters the models as semi-
continuous (or censored), we follow the control function approach of Vella
(1993). This procedure uses the generalized residual obtained from a Tobit
regression of nfmy* on all exogenous variables (including the full set of instru-
ments) as an additional regressor in equations 9.3 and 9.4. The null hypothesis
that this additional regressor is equal to zero is the relevant exogeneity test.
Due to the two-step nature of the procedure we bootstrap the standard errors
with 1,000 draws. An alternative approach to dealing with potential endo-
geneity is full information joint estimation, but both approaches yield similar
results in our case.
We use two excluded instruments that enter the first-step Tobit regression:
connection to electricity supply and the presence of non-farm productive
assets (mainly sewing machines). The justification for these instruments is as
follows. The literature suggests that infrastructural development enhances
non-farm diversification (Corral and Reardon 2001, Reardon et al. 2007,
Gibson and Olivia 2010, Losch et al. 2013). One such key infrastructure is
electricity, the absence of which limits non-farm activity (Rijkers and Costa
2012, Mathenge et al. 2015). Similarly, the sewing machine is a key non-farm
asset in rural Ghana. While these variables should be sufficiently correlated
with non-farm diversification, we do not expect that they independently
explain farm production and productivity except through non-farm earnings.
Results
Descriptive Analytical Results
We begin the discussion of the descriptive analytical results focusing on the
dependent variable and the key explanatory variable of interest (Table 9.1).
We compare these variables across gender of farm manager and between
regions.1 The literature documents gender gaps in farm productivity in favour
of males (Goldstein and Udry 2008, FAO 2011, Kilic et al. 2015, Slavchevska
2015) with gaps in the region of 4 per cent to 40 per cent. The descriptive
evidence from our data shows mixed results. The productivity gap in the
pooled data is in favour of female farm managers (FFMs) (1.7 per cent) but
not statistically different from zero. This result is due to two opposing
1 We use sex of farmmanager in all the analysis related to gender. FFM andMFM denotes female
andmale farmmanager, respectively, whereas FMF andMMF are as defined earlier. In the balanced
pooled Afrint II and III sample used for the present analysis, the sex of the farm operator/manager is
the same as that of the household head in 85 per cent of cases.
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outcomes: a significant gender gap in favour of FFMs in Afrint II (about 27 per
cent), and a significant gap in favour of male farm managers (MFMs) in Afrint
III (about 29 per cent).2
We expected significant regional differences in productivity owing to super-
ior agro-ecological conditions under rain-fed production systems in the ER
compared with the UER. This is what we observe. Productivity in the pooled
sample is higher in the ER than in the UER by approximately a factor of four
(or a gap of about 339 per cent). We note, however, that the productivity gap
narrowed markedly over time, from a factor of approximately eight during
Afrint II to a factor of about three during Afrint III.

































All HHs 138 54% 232 431 n.a. n.a.
FMF HHs 140 56% 181 326 n.a. n.a.
MMF HHs 138 53% 246 460 n.a. n.a.
Diff. 2 2% 64 134** n.a. n.a.
Afrint II All HHs 120 42% 201 478 n.a. n.a.
FMF HHs 154 42% 166 400 n.a. n.a.
MMF HHs 112 42% 210 496 n.a n.a.
Diff. 42* 1% 43 97 n.a. n.a.
Afrint III All HHs 157 66% 263 402 n.a. n.a.
FMF HHs 128 69% 195 284 n.a. n.a.
MMF HHs 165 65% 282 436 n.a. n.a.
Diff. 37* 4% 87* 151** n.a. n.a.
Afrint II
and III
ER HHs 244 42% 279 659 n.a. n.a.
UER HHs 56 63% 196 311 n.a. n.a.
Diff. 188*** 21%*** 83** 348*** n.a. n.a.
Afrint II ER HHs 235 30% 216 717 n.a. n.a.
UER HHs 30 52% 190 368 n.a. n.a.
Diff. 205*** 22%*** 26 349*** n.a. n.a.
Afrint III All HHs 368 593
ER HHs 253 55% 342 627 450 675
UER HHs 81 74% 201 272 298 524
Diff. 172*** 20%*** 141*** 355*** 151*** 152
Notes: a. Diff. denotes the gap between MMF and FMF households (i.e. MMF HHs  FMF HHs) or the gap between ER
and UER households (i.e. ER HHs  UER HHs).
b. n.a. means not available.
c. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 per cent, 5 per cent, and 1 per cent levels.
d. HH stands for household.
2 Unless otherwise specified, we use the word significant to connote statistical significance at
conventional levels.
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We now turn to the main explanatory variables of interest: non-farm diver-
sification and earnings. We define non-farm diversification as participation in
rural non-farm labour markets, thus excluding non-labour income (mainly
remittances and transfers). Table 9.1 shows that non-farm diversification
increased from 42 per cent participation rate in Afrint II to 66 per cent in
Afrint III, the time effect is significant at the 1 per cent level. Over the same
period, real non-farm earnings grew by approximately 31 per cent (about 5 per
cent a year), but this growth in earnings is not statistically significant. Accel-
erated growth of the services sector in the economy of Ghana as a whole was
observed between 2008 and 2013.
Based on the existing literature (e.g. Canagarajah et al. 2001, Ackah 2013),
one would expect non-farm diversification to be higher among women than
men. Overall, we find no significant gender gap in both non-farm labour
market participation and earnings in our sample. However, for Afrint III we
observe a gap of approximately 45 per cent in earnings in favour of MFM
households. Looking at non-farm earnings conditional on participation, we
see a significant gender gap in favour of MFM households in the pooled
sample as well as for Afrint III. This could be suggestive of females, on average,
being engaged in less remunerative non-farm work than males.
Turning to regional differences in non-farm activity, we observed a signifi-
cant gap in participation, with rates higher in the UER than in the ER by about
21 per cent in the pooled sample. Similar gaps in participation rate is observed
for Afrint II and Afrint III. This is not surprising given the longer agricultural
off-season in the UER, for which some household members migrate in search
of seasonal non-farm employment. Although participation rates are higher in
the UER, average earnings are significantly lower, with a significant average
earnings gap of about 42 per cent in favour of ER households in the pooled
sample. The pooled sample gap was driven mainly by a large gap of approxi-
mately 70 per cent in Afrint III. The average gap between the two regions is
even wider when we consider average earnings conditional on participation.
The last two columns of Table 9.1 consider intra-household differences in
non-farm earnings in the full sample and across regions. Overall, average
earnings are significantly higher for males than females, with an average gap
of about US$226 (or approximately 62 per cent). The intra-household gender
gap persists in both regions.Whenwe consider differences in female non-farm
earnings between the two regions we observe that women in the ER earn
significantly higher incomes. On the other hand, analysing male intra-
household income differences across the regions shows that although there
exists an average gap of approximately 29 per cent in favour of men in the ER
this difference lacks statistical significance at conventional levels.
Next, Figure 9.2 plots the correlation between farm labour productivity
and non-farm diversification probabilities. A general positive association is
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Figure 9.2 Non-farm diversification and farm labour productivity, by region.
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observed for both regions, but this shows up much more strongly in the UER
(lower panel of Figure 9.2) than in the ER (upper panel of Figure 9.2). This
could be related to the different agricultural seasonality patterns in the two
regions. In the next subsection, we control for other possible confounders,
including unobserved household heterogeneity and the possibility of
endogenous diversification behaviour using regression analysis.
Before then, Table 9.2 presents summary statistics of variables used in the
regressions for the pooled sample (Afrint II and III), and for each round of the
surveys (Afrint II and III). We also provide in the last column statistical tests of







Value of farm output per capita (2010 US$) 138.39 119.90 156.89 36.99***
Non-farm earnings (2010 US$) 232.42 201.35 263.49 62.14*
Women’s non-farm earnings (US$) 386.02 n.a
Men’s non-farm earnings (US$) 535.57 n.a
Cultivated area (ha) 2.18 1.79 2.56 0.77***
Household labour input (persons) 3.92 4.14 3.69 0.45***
Hired in-farm labour (yes) 66% 63% 69% 7%**
Used improved seeds (yes) 44% 60% 29% 31%***
Used chemical fertilizer (yes) 57% 53% 60% 8%**
Improved seed-fertilizer use
Uses neither improved seed nor chemical fertilizer (yes) 29% 25% 32% 7%**
Uses improved seed but not chemical fertilizer (yes) 15% 22% 8% 14%***
Use chemical fertilizer but not improved seed (yes) 27% 15% 39% 24%***
Used both improved seed and chemical fertilizer (yes) 30% 38% 21% 17%***
Use of irrigation water 35% 38% 32% 6%**
Used pesticides (yes) 33% 34% 33% 1%
Received agricultural extension advice (yes) 51% 53% 49% 3%
Belongs to farmer association (yes) 19% 22% 17% 5%**
Livestock wealth (tropical livestock unit) 1.88 1.92 1.84 0.08
Perception of improvement in output market prices
(yes)
26% 22% 31% 9%***
Has secure land rights (yes) 77% 74% 80% 5%**
Age of farm manager (years) 50 49 52 2.79***
Female farm manager (yes) 20% 20% 21% 2%
Farm manager’s years of schooling 4.8 5.0 4.7 0.33
Instruments
Connected to electricity (yes) 22% 14% 30% 16%***
Presence of non-farm assets (yes) 26% 28% 24% 4%
Ecological zones
Guinean Savana Zone (yes) 56% 56% 56%
Deciduous Forest Zone (yes) 23% 23% 23%
Forest Zone (yes) 21% 21% 21%
Regions
Eastern Region (yes) 44% 44% 44%
Upper East Region (yes) 56% 56% 56%
N 982 491 491
Note: a. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 per cent, 5 per cent, and 1 per cent levels.
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differences over the two waves (i.e. Afrint III  Afrint II). We observe that
mean farm labour productivity increased significantly over the two waves,
averaging a growth rate of about 5 per cent per year over the six-year period.
The farm productivity models control for traditional input variables,
namely land, labour, chemical fertilizer, irrigation, pesticides, type of planting
material, agricultural extension and farmer association membership, and
household head characteristics. Location FEs are included to control for local
climatic factors and other seasonal and spatial shocks and unobservables.
Table 9.2 shows that while there was a decrease in some of the factors of
production over time others experienced increases. The following experienced
a significant decline over the period: household labour input (10.9 per cent), the
proportion of farmers using improved planting materials (30.9 per cent),
the proportion of farmers using both improved seeds and chemical fertilizers
(16.7 per cent), the proportion of farmers using irrigation water (6.3 per cent),
and the proportion of farmers belonging to farmer associations (5.1 per cent).
On the other hand, the following increased significantly between Afrint II and
Afrint III: the proportion of farmers using chemical fertilizers (7.5 per cent),
total cultivated area (43.1 per cent), and the proportion of households hiring
farm labour (6.7 per cent). The proportion of farmers using pesticides, and the
proportion of farmers who had contacts with agricultural extension services,
experienced no significant change over the period.
Regression Results and Discussion
CHOICE OF ESTIMATOR AND ROBUSTNESS ISSUES
In the full sample estimation of the farm labour productivity equation the
robust test of overidentifying restrictions returned a Sargan–Hansen statistic
of 116.593 (with 16 degrees of freedom), which clearly rejects the null hypoth-
esis that the coefficients from FE and random effects (RE) are not systematic-
ally different (p-value = 0.000). The first-differencing procedure applied
(equation 9.3) with the modification to accommodate time-invariant covari-
ates is thus justified.
Although we believe our instruments are defensible based on the received
literature, we carried out a statistical test to verify whether they are statistically
relevant and valid. We use a linear specification where we estimate equation
9.3 by two-stage least squares. The resulting underidentification test—a test of
the null hypothesis that the instruments are uncorrelated with non-farm
earnings—easily rejects the null with zero p-values to three decimal places.
The joint F-test of the strength of the excluded instruments also shows that
they are strongly correlated with the endogenous regressor. The p-value from
the Hansen J statistic (0.518) suggests that the overidentifying restrictions are
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valid (i.e. the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term in the ‘struc-
tural equation’). We now turn to the discussion of our regression results.
NON-FARM DIVERSIFICATION AND FARM PRODUCTIVITY:
REGION-SPECIFIC PERSPECTIVES
Economic theory suggests that labour movements from agriculture to non-
agriculture could have a positive effect on agriculture in the presence of an
underdeveloped agricultural sector with surplus labour and declining mar-
ginal physical product. If there are no labour surpluses, however, the effect
could be hard to sign. Tables 9.3 and 9.4 report the coefficient estimates from
equations 9.3 and 9.4 respectively. In both cases, we report full sample results
as well as regionally disaggregated estimates. The justification for estimating
separate regressions for each region is borne out of the large differences in farm
production conditions as well as non-farm labour market differences evi-
denced in Table 9.1. More formally, we carried out a likelihood ratio test for
the null hypothesis that all coefficients of the farm productivitymodels do not
vary between the ER and UER. The chi-squared statistic for this hypothesis
with 17 degrees of freedom equals 65.56 (p-value = 0.000). The corresponding
statistic for equation 9.4 is 80.26, with 20 degrees of freedom (p-value = 0.000).
In all the control function estimates (CFE) reported in Table 9.3, none of the
coefficients on the correction factor, NFYGRES, is statistically different from
zero, meaning that there is insufficient evidence from our data to reject the
null hypothesis that non-farm earning is endogenous in the farm labour
productivity equations. All coefficients on non-farm earnings are negative
except in the CFE for the ER. Nonetheless, only the OLS estimates for the
UER shows statistical significance at the 5 per cent level. We also estimated
equation 9.3 using the value of farm output rather than output per capita as a
dependent variable and the results (available on request3) are very similar to
those reported in Table 9.3. The negative non-farm earnings effect observed
from our data is similar to the finding of Pfeiffer et al. (2009), who used cross-
sectional data on Mexico. This finding is suggestive of non-farm earning
opportunities competing rather than complementing agricultural production,
although the evidence is far from conclusive.
The overall lack of a significantly strong association between farm labour
productivity and non-farm earnings may be suggestive of the availability
of surplus household labour such that allocating time off-farm has no
productivity-reducing effect on-farm. What is surprising, however, is the
significant negative effect of non-farm earnings on farm labour productivity
in the UER where one would have expected the relatively longer agricultural
3 Please contact the lead author, via fdzanku@gmail.com or <http://freddzanku.com/>.
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Table 9.3. Effect of non-farm income on farm labour productivity, Afrint II and III balanced panel
Variables Full sample Eastern Region Upper East Region
OLS CFE OLS CFE OLS CFE
Δ Non-farm earnings (log) 0.024 0.026 0.007 0.007 0.044** 0.073
Δ Cultivated area 0.124*** 0.124*** 0.047 0.048 0.114** 0.120**
Δ Cultivated area squared 0.017** 0.017** 0.027* 0.027*
Δ Household labour input 0.063*** 0.063*** 0.085*** 0.086*** 0.039* 0.040*
Δ Hired in-farm labour 0.274*** 0.275*** 0.388** 0.379** 0.147 0.149
Improved seed-fertilizer use (ref. = none)
Δ Improved seed only 0.320** 0.320** 0.364 0.366 0.099 0.098
Δ Chemical fertilizer only 0.411*** 0.412*** 0.320 0.316 0.072 0.080
Δ Improved seed plus fertilizer 0.152 0.152 0.368* 0.373* 0.134 0.130
Δ Used irrigation 0.077 0.077 0.149 0.148 0.557*** 0.561***
Δ Used pesticides 0.269** 0.269** 0.069 0.061 0.506*** 0.501***
Δ Received agricultural extension advice 0.042 0.041 0.029 0.025 0.096 0.107
Δ Member of farmer association 0.028 0.029 0.084 0.095 0.022 0.018
Δ Livestock wealth 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.019 0.018
Δ Improved output market prices 0.377*** 0.378*** 0.306** 0.302** 0.503** 0.506**
Δ Has secure land rights 0.223** 0.224** 0.130 0.122 0.169 0.183
Age of farm manager 0.004 0.004 0.007 0.006 0.003 0.003
Female farm manager 0.189 0.188 0.200 0.203 0.079 0.076
Farm manager’s years of schooling 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.004 0.005
Ecological zone (ref. = Guinea Savanna)
Deciduous forest zone 0.685*** 0.685***
Forest zone 1.213*** 1.214***
Deciduous forest zone vs forest zone 0.450** 0.447**
Bolgatanga area vs Navrongo area 0.903*** 0.900***
Constant 1.067*** 1.073*** 0.012 0.041 1.526*** 1.563***
NFYGRES 0.004 0.045 0.072
Observations 491 491 215 215 276 276
Adj. R-squared 0.262 0.262 0.213 0.213 0.280 0.280
F-stat 8.291 7.906 3.346 3.170 5.919 5.683
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: a. Inference is based on heteroscedasticity consistent (HC3) standard errors.
b. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 per cent, 5 per cent, and 1 per cent levels.
Table 9.4. Effect of gendered intra-household non-farm earnings on farm labour productivity
Variables Full sample Eastern Region Upper East Region
OLS CFE OLS CFE OLS CFE
Women’s non-farm earnings (log) 0.029* 0.023 0.049** 0.062 0.013 0.038
Men’s non-farm earnings (log) 0.001 0.097* 0.044** 0.032 0.046** 0.073**
Cultivated area 0.472*** 0.442*** 0.368*** 0.363*** 1.010*** 0.971***
Cultivated area squared 0.050*** 0.046*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.145*** 0.137***
Household labour input 0.084*** 0.079*** 0.091*** 0.090*** 0.010 0.001
Hired in-farm labour 0.249** 0.230* 0.366* 0.384* 0.208* 0.157
Used improved seed 0.180 0.177
Used chemical fertilizer 0.071 0.170
Improved seed/fertilizer use (ref. = none)
Improved seed only 0.723*** 0.839*** 0.316 0.318
Chemical fertilizer only 1.048*** 1.126*** 0.558** 0.568**
Improved seed plus fertilizer 0.927*** 0.973*** 0.469* 0.458
Used irrigation 0.405*** 0.398*** 0.007 0.011 0.675*** 0.688***
Used pesticides 0.122 0.150 0.200 0.183 0.123 0.087
Received agricultural extension advice 0.091 0.086 0.178 0.184 0.148 0.113
Member of farmer association 0.033 0.004 0.106 0.118 0.134 0.154
Livestock wealth 0.008 0.013 0.204** 0.217* 0.006 0.008
Improved output market prices 0.526*** 0.532*** 0.470*** 0.477*** 0.649*** 0.782***
Has secure land rights 0.018 0.001 0.029 0.020 0.144 0.049
Age of farm manager 0.002 0.006 0.008 0.008 0.000 0.004
Female farm manager 0.072 0.241 0.107 0.102 0.120 0.049
Farm manager’s years of schooling 0.000 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001
Ecological zone (ref. = Guinea Savanna)
Deciduous forest zone 1.013*** 0.874***
Forest zone 0.693*** 0.477*
Deciduous forest zone vs Forest zone 0.220 0.230
Bolgatanga area vs Navrongo area 1.469*** 1.451***
Intercept 2.602*** 3.117*** 4.239*** 4.281*** 2.897*** 3.128***
NFYGRES_W 0.002 0.019 0.021
NFYGRES_M 0.232* 0.042 0.148
Observations 536 536 246 246 290 289
Adj. R-squared 0.540 0.544 0.293 0.293 0.642 0.646
F-stat 37.15 34.07 5.210 4.753 30.75 28.71
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: a. Inference is based on heteroscedasticity consistent (HC3) standard errors.
b. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 per cent, 5 per cent, and 1 per cent levels.
off-season to allow sequencing of farm and non-farm activities such that, at
worse, one has no adverse effect on the other.
NON-FARM DIVERSIFICATION AND FARM PRODUCTIVITY:
INTRA-HOUSEHOLD GENDER-SPECIFIC PERSPECTIVES
Table 9.4 provides estimates of the association between intra-household
gendered-specific non-farm earnings and farm labour productivity. First, we
note that the coefficient on the correction factor from the men’s non-farm
earnings equation is positive and statistically significant in the full sample
estimates. This means that unobserved factors that increase men’s non-farm
earnings also increase household farm labour productivity. The opposite is
true for women’s non-farm earnings, although this is not statistically signifi-
cant. Once regionally disaggregated, the correction factors return insignificant
coefficient estimates, suggesting that one cannot reject the null hypothesis of
exogeneity of gender-specific non-farm earnings.
Turning to the gender-specific coefficient estimates, we observe (for the
CFE) from the full sample results that both women’s and men’s non-farm
earnings are negatively associated with per capita household farm output, but
only the men’s earning coefficient is mildly significant—a 1 per cent increase
in men’s non-farm earnings is associated with a 0.1 per cent decrease in total
value of farm output per capita, ceteris paribus. Looking at the region-specific
estimates we see that the full sample result was dominated by what pertains in
the UER. In the ER, men’s non-farm earning is associated with increasing farm
output per capita, indicating complementarity between farm output and
men’s non-farm earnings. The opposite is true for women’s non-farm earnings
and farm output in the ER. Both effects are, however, not economically strong
given the small elasticities.
Explaining the differing effects of women’s and men’s non-farm earnings
on farm production requires further research. However, we note that in the ER
villages, commerce, the dominant non-farm earning activity, is considered
the preferred employment option for women. In households where women
are engaged in commerce and related non-farm work, farming is considered
themain occupation ofmen, even if they are involved in some non-farmwork
themselves (mainly artisanal jobs). This orientation means that it is men’s NFI
that is most likely to be used for purchasing inputs that could enhance farm
productivity while women’s engagement in non-farm work could drain the
household of farm labour, leading to a negative farm productivity effect. In
the UER, where returns to farming are much lower owing to the precarious
agro-ecological conditions in the absence of irrigation and soil amendments,
non-farm work (including seasonal migration to southern Ghana) is con-
sidered an alternative livelihood activity rather than one that complements
farming through the farm investment channel.
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These cross-sectional results (Table 9.4) should be interpreted with some
caution given that they could still suffer from endogeneity due to omitted
variable bias arising from unobserved household-specific heterogeneity. But
all cross-sectional estimates using observational data are prone to this problem.
OTHER FACTORS
Before closing this section, we briefly discuss other covariates in the estimated
equations. First of all, we note that the models have good explanatory power
for a two-period panel (Table 9.3) and cross-sectional data (Table 9.4). Also,
most of the explanatory variables are precisely estimated and are signed as
expected, particularly for the ER equations. In the interest of brevity, we
comment on only selected variables from the region-specific panel data results
reported in Tables 9.3: farm size, labour input, modern input use, irrigation,
agricultural extension contact, membership of farmer associations, market
opportunities, and gender.
A well-known empirical regularity in agricultural production economics is
the inverse relationship between output per unit of land and farm size. Our
estimates using land productivity as a dependent variable confirms this
empirical regularity. When it comes to labour productivity, however, while
the relationship is positive but not significant in the ER it is significantly
non-monotonic in the UER (joint F-stat = 3.93, p-value = 0.021)—labour
productivity is first increasing with farm size up to 2.2 ha and then begins to
decline with farm size. We note that in the UER, approximately 40 per cent
of farm households in our sample have farm sizes above this threshold. We
observe a significant inverse relationship between farm productivity and
labour input in the ER but not the UER: ceteris paribus, an additional house-
hold labour input is associated with a 9 per cent decrease in farm labour
productivity in the ER. On the other hand, hired labour use is positively
associated with labour productivity.
We note that the relationship between chemical fertilizers and improved
seed on the one hand and farm productivity on the other is not significant in
the UER. The use of irrigation is more important in such semi-arid conditions:
farmers in the UER using irrigation water are estimated to achieve 64 per cent
higher output per capita than farmers producing under only rain-fed condi-
tions. We observe no significant irrigation use effect in the ER. In this region,
however, farmers combining improved planting materials with chemical fer-
tilizers are estimated to achieve 53 per cent higher yields than those using
neither. But the null hypothesis that productivity does not differ between
those combining the two inputs and those using either one or the other could
not be rejected. The other input which shows up as a significant positive
predictor of productivity is the use of pesticide, but this is true only in the
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UER where it is estimated to raise productivity by approximately 61 per cent
over and above that of farmers who use no pesticides.
A few studies have analysed the association betweenmarket participation or
commercialization and farm productivity using various approaches (Govereh
and Jayne 2003, Ochieng et al. 2016). This suggests synergies between the two.
Owing to the endogeneity of commercialization or market participation in a
productivity model we attempt gauging the association using farmers’ per-
ception of output market price movements over time. We find that markets
do matter for farm productivity irrespective of region. The perception of
improvement in output market prices tends to be significantly associated
with increased productivity.
Finally, our results show no significant association between average farm
productivity and farm manager characteristics such as gender, age, and edu-
cation after controlling for inputs and location FEs.
Conclusions
We now return to the main objectives of the study and relate them to the
empirical findings. This study set two main objectives: (1) to examine the
relationship between non-farm diversification and farm labour productivity;
and (2) to investigate whether the gender of the person who diversifies into
RNFE within the household matters for the effect, if any, of non-farm diver-
sification on farm productivity. The novelty with this study and its contribu-
tion lies mainly in providing longitudinal evidence from Ghana as well as the
intra-household gender perspective which has not been previously studied to
the best of our knowledge.
After allowing for household-specific heterogeneity to be correlated with
diversification behaviour, we find no evidence that non-farm earning
increases farm labour productivity in the full sample. However, we find
evidence from the region-specific estimates (which also correspond to dif-
fering agro-ecological conditions) that increasing non-farm earnings reduces
average farm productivity in the region with poorer agricultural productive
potential. On the hypothesis that the gender of who within the household
diversifies into non-farm employment matters for the effect that diversifica-
tion might exert on farm productivity, we find that our data provide some
support for this hypothesis but that the relationship differs by region. In the
relatively richer region (both in terms of agro-ecological potential and infra-
structure endowment), farm labour productivity is significantly decreasing
with women’s non-farm earnings but increasing with men’s, although the
magnitude of the effect suggests that the association is not of strong eco-
nomic significance. In the poorer region with a unimodal rainfall pattern
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and a longer off-season during which labour migrates in search of non-farm
jobs, only men’s non-farm earnings exert a significant negative effect on
household farm labour productivity. However, we caution that the cross-
sectional relationships could well be due to any remaining endogeneity bias
attributable to omitted household-specific heterogeneity. Collecting intra-
household gender-specific data on diversification over time could help shed
more light on this hypothesis.
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Technology Use, Gender, and Impact of
Non-Farm Income on Agricultural
Investment: An Empirical Analysis of Maize
Production in Two Regions of Kenya
Stephen K. Wambugu, Joseph T. Karugia, and Willis Oluoch-Kosura
Introduction and Problem Overview
Agriculture continues to be a fundamental instrument for sustainable devel-
opment, poverty reduction, and enhanced food security in developing coun-
tries. Agricultural productivity levels in sub-Saharan Africa are far below those
of other regions in the world, and in most countries are well below the level
required to attain food security and poverty reduction goals. Nonetheless, the
rate of agricultural productivity has been growing since the early 2000s in
many African countries, including Kenya, although this is not a cause for
complacency (Kibaara et al. 2009). Sustained and accelerated growth requires
a sharp increase in productivity among smallholder farmers. The national
Strategy to Revitalize Agriculture (Republic of Kenya 2004), Kenya Vision
2030 (Republic of Kenya 2007), Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Develop-
ment Program, 2013 (NEPAD 2013), and the Alliance for Green Revolution in
Africa (AGRA 2014) have underscored the importance of increasing agricul-
tural productivity in the fight against poverty. In the past, agricultural pro-
duction was largely a function of acreage expansion, but further growth in
production will have to be driven by productivity growth given that the land
frontier has almost been exhausted in most countries. Adoption and con-
tinued use of improved agricultural technologies can play a big role in enhan-
cing productivity especially for food staples (Kibaara et al. 2009). Productivity
improvement can also be achieved through investing non-farm income (NFI)
in agriculture, particularly through purchasing improved farm inputs.
NFI has been used to boost agricultural productivity when it is used for
agricultural investment generally and in purchasing agricultural inputs spe-
cifically (Haggblade et al. 1989, Hazell and Hojjati 1995). Conversely, farm
income can also be invested in non-farm activities. The importance of NFI for
the livelihood strategies of rural people has attracted much attention among
development scholars, policymakers, and donors during the past decade.
Although NFI on an aggregate level is important in the rural economies of
sub-Saharan Africa, the distribution of such incomes is normally skewed in
favour of the better-off members of the population (Babatunde and Qaim
2009). The bulk of studies on income diversification out of agriculture have
focused on mechanisms that can lower entry barriers and increase participa-
tion of the poor in such income generation. In general terms, not much
attention has been devoted to the question: ‘How do non-farm activities affect
farming?’ This is a pertinent question given that the great majority of rural
Africans are increasingly deriving their livelihoods from NFI (Haggblade et al.
2010). Specifically, the link between NFI diversification and agricultural tech-
nology adoption and use has not received enough empirical investigation.
Non-farm activities have become important components of livelihood strat-
egies among rural households in most developing countries. Several studies
(Ruben 2001, De Janvry and Sadoulet 2005, Haggblade et al. 2007, Jirström
et al. 2012, Wambugu and Karugia 2014, Alobo Loison 2016) have reported a
substantial and increasing share of NFI in total household income. Reasons for
this observed income diversification include declining farm incomes and the
desire to insure against agricultural production andmarket risks (Reardon 1997,
Kijima et al. 2006, Matsumoto et al. 2006). It has been observed that when
farming becomes less profitable and more risky as a result of various factors—
including climate change and variability, population growth, and crop and
market failure—households are pushed into non-farm activities, leading to
‘distress-push’ diversification (Babatunde andQaim 2009). In other cases, how-
ever, households are pulled into thenon-farm sector, especiallywhen returns to
non-farm employment are higher or less risky than in agriculture, resulting in
‘demand-pull’ diversification (Babatunde and Qaim 2009).
Often it is unclear whether and how non-farm activities can contribute to
equitable development and to bridging the gender gap. The gendered aspects
of NFI diversification, and technology adoption and use (especially for the
main staples), have not received adequate empirical investigation, an aspect
that this chapter sets out to address. The chapter uses panel datasets collected
in two regions (counties) of Kenya to analyse gendered patterns of technology
use in relation to maize productivity and total household production. The
chapter also assesses the impact of NFI on agricultural investments, zeroing in
on fertilizer use (a key agricultural input) for maize production in Kenya.
These aspects are disaggregated by gender of the farm manager to capture
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the gender dimensions. Maize has been chosen because it is the major staple
food crop in Kenya.
This chapter addresses a number of research questions. The first research
question is: Comparing female-managed farms (FMFs) and male-managed
farms (MMFs) which ones achieve higher maize yields? The second question
is: How technology adoption and use explain any observed differences in
maize production? The third research question relates to how NFI is invested
in agriculture. While the findings presented in this chapter are specific to the
particular setting in two regions in Kenya, they may also contribute to a better
general understanding of the underlying issues and linkages.
Agricultural Production and Gender
Agricultural production is the preoccupation of rural households involving
men and women. Men and women are also involved in a wide range of farm
and non-farm activities. In addition to farming and undertaking reproductive
activities, women are actively engaged inmicro-manufacturing enterprises and
in trading agricultural and fishery products. In most developing countries,
women’s actual contribution to food security and the rural economy remains
undervalued. They have less access to productive resources compared to their
male counterparts. Quisumbing et al. (2014) stated that agriculture is underper-
forming because half of the farmers, women specifically, do not have equal
access to resources and opportunities to engage in farm andnon-farm activities.
Empowered women who make decisions about planting materials and inputs
have been found to bemore productive in agriculture (Quisumbing et al. 2014).
Many food-production activities in Africa are attributable to women, mak-
ing them the principal agents of food security and household welfare in rural
areas.Womenwork as unpaid family labourers, self-employed producers, farm
and non-farm employees, entrepreneurs, traders and providers of services, and
technology researchers and developers (Hill 2011).
Women are largely responsible for production that benefits local consump-
tion, including subsistence crops such as legumes and vegetables, operating
on smaller plots andmoremarginal lands (Guendel 2009).While certain crops
are often identified as women’s or men’s crops, gender roles vary, as do tasks,
and in practice the divisions are blurred. For example, men may help to
prepare the plots on which ‘women’s crops’ are grown and women may be
involved in weeding ‘men’s crops’. Because women lack access to capital and
resources, their decisions about what they grow are more limited (Guendel
2009). For example, a study in rural Kenya showed that men were responsible
for building the granary and women were responsible for most pre-harvest
farm activities, including hand digging, harvesting, and transporting the
crops. In another example, women farmers in Ghana chose to cultivate
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yams and cassava over maize—traditionally a ‘man’s crop’ (Brody et al. 2014).
This decision was made because these crops require fewer external inputs and
are more labour intensive and are often referred to as ‘women’s crops’. These
studies also indicate that decisions on what to plant and where to plant are
mostly controlled by men, therefore sometimes excluding women from deci-
sion making (Guendel 2009).
Despite their vital contributions, women do not get credit for much of their
farming labour, including laborious work such as weeding and post-harvest
processing as well as food preparation, not to mention fuel and water collec-
tion and the myriad other household chores they perform which contribute
directly to food availability and access.
Women’s participation is also significant in activities such as planting and
transplanting of crops, manual weeding, and harvesting. Male workers are
generally engaged in land preparation, seedbed preparation, levelling, and
care of irrigation canals. According to Quisumbing et al. (2014), women com-
prise about 43 per cent of the agricultural labour force in developing countries,
ranging from 20 per cent in Latin America to 50 per cent in sub-Saharan Africa
and East Asia. Hence women’s contribution to labour as well as their man-
agerial skills should not be underrated.
There is an increasing trend of FMFs in developing countries generally and
sub-Saharan Africa specifically (World Bank 2007). In spite of this feminiza-
tion, female farmmanagers in sub-Saharan Africa continue to face constraints
that affect their ability to improve yield, profit, and efficiency in agriculture
(World Bank 2007). These constraints include, inter alia: (1) women’s legal and
cultural status, which limits their degree of control on productive resources
and inputs; (2) property rights and inheritance laws, which limit their rights to
access land and other natural resources; (3) relationships among economic
and ecological factors which include product market failures, poor marketing
channels, seasonality of rainfall, and unavailability of fuel-wood; (4) exclusion
from employment options due to skewed design and management of agricul-
tural services such that less women are hired. Women are therefore major
contributors to agriculture, and they play a prime role in ensuring the food
security and nutrition status of their householdmembers. It is conceivable that
they could achieve much more in food production, provision, and utilization
if agricultural researchers, plant scientists, extension agents, and policymakers
could level the agricultural playing field (Pinstrup-Andersen et al. 1997).
Objectives
This chapter has three main objectives. First, the maize production trend
across farm types is analysed. The second objective is to establish whether
there are gender differences in maize technology use. The third objective is to
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examine the impact of NFI on agricultural investment. These objectives are
examined in the context of farm type, defined by the gender of the farm
manager. Previous studies (Kimenju and Tschirley 2009, Wambugu and
Karugia 2014) have not adequately investigated these aspects along gender
lines. The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section describes
the methods of data analysis, while the section following this discusses maize
production and use of maize technology across different farm types. After this
the impact of NFI on agricultural investment is discussed, followed by the
concluding section.
Conceptual Framework and Hypothesis
The quality of planting material has a significant impact on crop productivity
(Kibaara et al. 2009). The limited potential for further area expansion under
maize cultivation due to diminishing availability of arable land implies that
future growth inmaize production would have to depend on yield gains made
by widespread use of productivity-enhancing technologies, among which
include hybrid maize varieties. This chapter looks at technology use and the
impact of NFI on agricultural investment using a gender lens. Numerous
studies have shown that, in terms of agricultural outputs, FMFs produce less
than MMFs (Clark 2013, Palacios-López and López 2015). However, common
knowledge of agriculture shows that the location and quality of farmland have
a large effect on the level of output. Additionally, improved seed varieties,
fertilizers, irrigation water, pesticides, extension services, and other technolo-
gies strongly affect agricultural output. NFI has also been shown to affect
agricultural investment and therefore productivity. To truly understand the
interrelationship between technology use, gender, and the impact of NFI on
agricultural investment, these factors require empirical analysis. Figure 10.1 is
a simplified conceptual model that tries to depict the interrelationship among
these factors. The plus sign indicates the expected positive relationship among
the technologies and agricultural yield.
Farm households often have tomake complex decisions regarding consump-
tion, investment, and income-earning activities. These decisions are influenced
by a variety of external and internal factors. Farmers are often expected to invest
NFI in farming if the farm investment allows them tomaintain or increase farm
output (Harris et al. 2010). Investing part of the NFI in the farm in this case is
expected to increase agricultural productivity.
The working hypothesis in this chapter states that MMFs and FMFs are
equally as productive in Kenya’s agricultural sector. However, agricultural
output will differ by gender for a variety of reasons.
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The chapter argues that technology use and investment of NFI in agriculture
can explain differences in maize productivity. As FMFs are more likely to be
relegated to lower ranks in terms of access to agricultural inputs and NFI, their
productivity will tend to suffer. As already established by other studies (Ahuja
1998, López 1998, Ariga et al. 2006, Kibaara et al. 2009, Ogada et al. 2010), the
chapter anticipates that access to inputs such as fertilizer and improved seeds
will have a significant effect on maize production. The analysis also antici-
pates that use of NFI will enhance agricultural investment. Thus investment in
farm inputs might be affected by access to NFI. Farmers use both on-farm and
non-farm income for farm investment in order to enhance productivity and
reduce drudgery. NFI is necessary to complement on-farm income for farm
investment up to the required levels depending on the farmer’s total income
and priorities. This chapter zeroes in on the impact of NFI on fertilizer use, for
it is a key agricultural input.
Data and Methodology
This chapter uses panel data collected during three rounds (Afrint I, II, and III)
from ten villages in two regions (counties) of Kenya (Nyeri and Kakamega).
Gender and farm needs
Needs



















technologies+ + + + +
Figure 10.1 A simplified conceptual model.
Source: Adapted and modified from Clark (2013).
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Data that was collected included inter aliamaize production, use of technology
on maize, and sources of NFI. These data were disaggregated by gender of the
farm manager.
Methods of Data Analysis
In order to examine maize production trends and associated technology use,
descriptive statistics were used. In particular, means, percentages, and propor-
tions were used. In addition, the double-hurdle model and marginal effects
were used to assess the impact of NFI on agricultural investment. The analysis
assesses how engagement in non-farm work affects the decision to invest.
Double-hurdle models were run for fertilizer demand in maize production.




This section analyses trends on maize productivity using household panel
survey data collected from 300 households in ten villages in the two regions.
This panel data analysis overcomes problems of comparability and differences
in sample design that compromise other trend assessments and thus provides
a unique opportunity to evaluate changes in smallholder agricultural
productivity.
Results for maize productivity analysis are presented in Table 10.1. The
average maize yields for the two regions show no consistent trend. For
Kakamega the yields increased from 819.1 kg/ha during Afrint I to 1,459.4
kg/ha during Afrint II, before dropping to 1,104.5 kg/ha during Afrint III. The
Nyeri case is the same, with the yields increasing from 257.3 kg/ha during
Afrint I to 1,101.1 kg/ha during Afrint II, and then dropping to 349.9 kg/ha
during Afrint III. The impressive increase during Afrint II can be attributed to
Table 10.1. Maize yields (kg/ha) by gender and region
Afrint I Afrint II Afrint III
Kakamega Nyeri Sig. Kakamega Nyeri Sig. Kakamega Nyeri Sig.
FMFs 831 199 *** 1,106 1,263 1,119 474 ***
MMFs 807 315 *** 1,813 940 1,090 316 ***
MMFs  FMFs 24 116 707 323 28 158
Sig. (MMFs  FMFs) ***
Mean production 819 257 *** 1,459 1,101 1,105 395 ***
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the resumption of government input subsidies. However, the drop during
Afrint III can be accounted for by farmers diversifying into other crops. In
Nyeri there has been a diversification towards the growing of horticultural
crops which fetch better prices than maize. In Kakamega, farmers are diversi-
fying into the growing of sugarcane. Similar findings have been reported by
the Ministry of Agriculture (Kibaara et al. 2009).
Nationally the rising maize yield during the period between Afrint I and II is
attributed to a combination of good weather, use of improved seeds, higher
fertilizer application, and adoption of modern farming techniques and tech-
nologies (Republic of Kenya 2008). Kakamega recorded higher average yields
throughout the panel period compared to Nyeri. This is because Kakamega has
better agro-ecological potential and some of the villages sampled (Mukuyu
and Munyuki in particular) are areas where maize is predominantly produced
under monoculture cropping. Disaggregating maize yield by gender of the
farm manager, the results show a consistent upward trend for FMFs in
Kakamega while for MMFs the trend is mixed. In the case of Nyeri, results
for both FMFs andMMFs show amixed trend with an increase during Afrint II
and a drop during Afrint III.
The impressive growth in maize yields, especially for Kakamega FMFs and
during Afrint II, could be attributed to several factors, including increased
input use as well as physical and market infrastructural developments. How-
ever, data presented in Table 10.1 do not show any significant difference in
maize yields between MMFs and FMFs save for Nyeri during Afrint I and
II. This finding is therefore not in tandem with other studies (Clark 2013,
Palacios-López and López 2015) that have reported significant differences in
agricultural productivity between MMFs and FMFs. This result can possibly be
attributed to the various government affirmative action initiatives aimed at
gender equity in all sectors of the economy.
The results in Table 10.1 show significant differences in maize yields in
Kakamega between Afrint I and II and not between Afrint II and III. The
significant difference can be attributed to the resumption of the government
input subsidy programme and other policies aimed at revitalizing agriculture
instituted immediately after the National Rainbow Coalition Government
came into power in 2002. However, Nyeri doesn’t show any significant differ-
ence during the panel period. This can be explained by the fact that Nyeri is
traditionally not a maize-growing area—most of the farmers grow cash crops
(coffee, tea, and horticultural crops).
Technology Use in Maize
This section looks at technology use in maize in both regions. This is disag-
gregated by gender of farm manager to try and understand gender differences
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in technology use. The technologies applied in maize production are depicted
in Table 10.2.
The results in Table 10.2 show a general increasing trend in the proportion
of farms planting hybrid maize varieties over the panel period, from 39.3 per
cent during Afrint I, through 53.3 per cent in Afrint II, to 54.0 per cent in
Afrint III for MMFs in Kakamega. The trend is the same for FMFs in Kakamega,
with the percentages increasing from 22.7 per cent, through 25.3 per cent, to
33.3 per cent during Afrint I, II, and III respectively. However, analysis for
Nyeri reveals a decline for MMFs from 28 per cent using hybrid maize during
Afrint I to 2 per cent during Afrint II and III. For FMFs adoption dropped from
41.3 per cent during Afrint I, to 4.7 per cent and 0 per cent during Afrint II and
III respectively. The declining use of hybrid maize varieties in Nyeri over the
panel period could be attributed to some unscrupulous businessmen and
extension workers who provide farmers with uncertified seeds. While hybrid
maize varieties contribute towards improved crop yields, their use must be
supplemented by other productivity-enhancing inputs, mainly fertilizer, to
exploit their full productivity potential. In both regions, it is observed that
there is a significant difference in the adoption of hybrid seed between MMFs
and FMFs.
Fertilizer use for maize production in both FMFs and MMFs show no con-
sistent trend (Table 10.2). In Kakamega, fertilizer usage decreased from 48.7
per cent during Afrint I, to 44 per cent during Afrint II, before rising to 50 per
cent in Afrint III amongMMFs. For FMFs, the same trend is observed where we
see a decrease from 28.7 per cent to 22.7 per cent, and then a rise to 32 per cent
during Afrint I, II, and III respectively. In Nyeri we see a consistent increase in
fertilizer usage from 41.2 per cent during Afrint I, through 43.2 per cent during
Afrint II, to 55.4 per cent during Afrint III for MMFs. Taking cognizance of the
Table 10.2. Technology adoption for maize by survey round and gender (%)
Type of technology Afrint I Afrint II Afrint III
MMFs FMFs Sig. MMFs FMFs Sig. MMFs FMFs Sig.
Use of hybrid maize Kakamega 39.3 22.7 *** 53.3 25.3 *** 54 33.3 ***
Varieties Nyeri 48 41.3 ** 2.0 4.7 *** 2.0 0 ***
Use of chemical fertilizers Kakamega 48.7 28.7 44 22.7 * 50 32
Nyeri 41.2 34.5 43.2 28.4 55.4 25.7
Use of pesticides Kakamega 5.33 3.33 * 6.00 5.33 14.7 5.33 ***
Nyeri 2.70 0.67 12.84 6.67 39.13 17
Use of hoe Kakamega 24.7 16.7 32 20 32.7 12
Nyeri 50.7 32.4 53.4 31.1 52.0 46.6
Use of oxen plough Kakamega 32.0 20.7 32.7 12 ** 32.7 12 *
Nyeri 12.2 5.41 *** 11.9 0.0 * 0.68 0 ***
Use of tractor plough Kakamega 4.0 2.0 ** 2.0 0.67 10 4
Nyeri 0.68 0.0 *** 3.4 2.0 * 0.68 0.0
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declining trend in the percentage of farmers adopting hybrid maize and the
consistent increase in fertilizer usage, it is only logical to argue that fertilizer is
used in growing other crops. However, for FMFs there is a consistent decrease
in fertilizer usage from 34.5 per cent, through 28.4 per cent, to 25.7 per cent
during Afrint I, II, and III respectively. This can be attributed to FMFs resorting
to other soil fertility-enhancing technologies such as use of farmyard manure.
In both Nyeri and Kakamega the proportion of FMFs using fertilizers is lower
than that of MMFs, but the difference was not significant.
Though there has been a general increase in smallholder fertilizer use in
Kenya over the past decade (Kibaara et al. 2009), results from this study do not
mirror the same trend, especially for FMFs in Nyeri. This can be attributed
to the gender-linked differences in access to inputs. However, according to
Kibaara et al. (2009), the general increase in fertilizer usage, especially among
the MMFs, may be attributed to several factors, namely: (1) increased access of
fertilizer by smallholder farmers due to availability of the input in smaller
packs that more farmers can afford; (2) reduction in the distance from the
household to the nearest fertilizer stockist, reflecting increased investment in
private fertilizer retailing; (3) a reduction in real fertilizer prices in Kenya up to
2007, reflecting reduced fertilizer marketing costs (Ariga et al. 2006)—this
trend was reversed since 2007 following the dramatic rise in world fertilizer
prices; and (4) more farmers have been organized into groups, providing a
variety of benefits such as group loans for input purchase, information to
improve farmers management practices such as soil testing services, increased
awareness of the role of fertilizers in increasing maize productivity, and infor-
mation on how and when to apply fertilizer efficiently.
Analysing patterns in simultaneous use of fertilizer and high-yielding var-
ieties (HYVs) of maize can shedmore light on the observed productivity trends
and provide information that can be useful in proposing measures to improve
agricultural productivity. Table 10.3 presents the results of this analysis.
Table 10.3 shows a consistent general increase in the proportion of farms
combining fertilizer and HYVs for maize in Kakamega for both MMFs and
FMFs and for the panel period. However, the trend for Nyeri is mixed where we
see a decline during Afrint II and an upward trend during Afrint III for MMFs
Table 10.3. Percentage of farmers using both fertilizers and high-yielding maize varieties
Afrint I Afrint II Afrint III
Kakamega Nyeri Kakamega Nyeri Kakamega Nyeri
MMFs 34.34 33.1 36.15 22.1 38.83 28.2
FMFs 20.03 27.58 18.18 15.73 24.66 12.9
Sig. ** *** ** ** ***
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and a general decline for FMFs. The results show no significant difference in
the proportion of MMFs and FMFs that have adopted both fertilizer and high-
yielding maize varieties for Afrint I in Kakamega and Afrint II and III in Nyeri.
These results are not in agreement with the work by Kibaara et al. (2009), who
found that regionally there are distinct variations in the rate of adoption of the
combined fertilizer-improved seed package. Adoption of new maize varieties
and enhanced availability of HYVs has been fuelled by the liberalization of the
seed market. Distance to market, both for inputs and outputs, has been a key
issue in productivity improvement (Omamo 1998).
Application of pesticides is another important technology used in maize
production and for reducing post-harvest losses. Trends in pesticide use
(Table 10.2) on maize show a consistent general increase in Kakamega for
both MMFs and FMFs, though the trend stagnates for FMFs during Afrint II
and III. In Nyeri there is a consistent upward trend in the use of pesticides for
bothMMFs and FMFs, which can be attributed to extension services (provided
by the public and private sectors) where farmers have been sensitized on the
role of pesticides in controlling pests and thereby boosting production, but
which also carries significant risks to human health. Sales of pesticides to
developing countries, while remaining a relatively small proportion of global
turnover (about 25 per cent), have increased significantly in some developing
countries (London et al. 2002). Ironically, this is occurring at a time when
many developed countries have begun to implement pesticide-reduction pro-
grammes in the belief that excessive use of pesticides is harmful to workers,
consumers, and the environment.
Small-scale farmers use either the hoe, ox plough, or tractor plough to
prepare land. Table 10.2 shows that for MMFs in Kakamega the use of the
hoe is on the increase, with the proportion of farmers using it rising from 24.7
per cent, through 32 per cent, to 32.7 per cent over the course of the three
Afrint rounds. This can be accounted for by the decreasing farm sizes and the
high costs associated with the usage of the ox and tractor plough. However, for
FMFs there was a marginal increase from 16.7 per cent during Afrint I to 20 per
cent in Afrint II. This however decreased to 12 per cent during Afrint III. In
Nyeri, usage of the hoe shows mixed results. For MMFs there is an increase
from 50.7 per cent to 53.4 per cent, then a marginal decrease to 52 per cent
during Afrint I, II, and III respectively. For FMFs the use of the hoe shows
mixed results, with a decrease from 32.4 per cent to 31.1 per cent during Afrint
I and II, and then an increase to 46.6 per cent during Afrint III. The results also
show that for MMFs in Kakamega, the use of the ox plough increased margin-
ally from 32 per cent to 32.7 per cent, before stagnating at 32.7 per cent in
Afrint I, II, and III respectively.
For FMFs the same trend is maintained. There is a decrease from 20.7 per
cent during Afrint I to 12 per cent during Afrint II. Stagnation at 12 per cent is
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observed for Afrint II and III. There is a consistent decrease in the usage of the
ox plough for MMFs from 12.2 per cent, through 11.9 per cent, to 0.68 per
cent during Afrint I, II, and III respectively. For FMFs the usage of the ox
plough is very minimal. During Afrint I only a paltry 5.41 per cent used the
ox plough, while in Afrint II and III none of the FMFs used the ox plough. Use
of the tractor plough is not a common or popular method of land preparation.
In MMFs the percentage usage declined from 4 per cent during Afrint I to 2
per cent during Afrint II, however it increased to 10 per cent during
Afrint III. For FMFs, use of the tractor plough decreased from 2 per cent to
0.67 per cent during Afrint I and II respectively, before rising to 4 per cent
during Afrint III.
In Nyeri, tractor usage was extremely low at 0.68 per cent during Afrint I,
rising to 3.4 per cent during Afrint II, before sliding back to 0.68 per cent
during Afrint III. For FMFs in Nyeri, the use of the tractor plough is at 0 per
cent for Afrint I and Afrint III, while a small percentage of 2 per cent used it
during Afrint II. The low usage of land-preparation implements, especially
among FMFs, could be a pointer to the need to develop gender-friendly
agricultural technologies. A number of studies (IFAD 1998, FAO 2011) have
concluded that no quick-fix is possible for improving the production tools and
implements used by FMFs in Africa. However, over time, and with appropriate
action by governments, development agencies, NGOs, and the private sector,
the situation could be improved. The constraints FMFs face (such as access,
costs, and unfriendliness) in using farm implements and tools, and actions
necessary to overcome them, are issues of research and policy.
In a nutshell, the results presented in this section confirm the widely
accepted observation that technology adoption and use is positively correl-
ated with maize productivity. This is consistent with the findings by López
(1998), Ahuja (1998), and Ogada (2010). However, to enhance productivity
and to reduce drudgery farmers use both farm and non-farm income in their
farm investment. NFI is necessary to complement farm income for farm
investment. The next section therefore addresses the impact of NFI on agri-
cultural investment, zeroing in on fertilizer which is a key agricultural input
and which is often used to complement improved seed.
Investment of NFI in Agriculture
This section considers factors that determine the amount spent on fertilizer (a
key agricultural input) in maize (the main staple crop) production using the
double-estimation technique. The section uses data collected during the Afrint
III period. As a robustness check, the estimated parameters are compared to
the corresponding standard Tobit estimation, which is defined as
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Where ti is a latent endogenous variable representing individual i’s desired
level of expenditure on fertilizer, and ti is the corresponding actual observed
expenditure on fertilizer, Xi is a set of individual characteristics that explains
the use and level of expenditure on fertilizer, and β is a corresponding vector of
parameters to be estimated, ε1 is assumed to be a homoscedastic, normally
distributed error term.
In the double-hurdlemodel specification an individual has to overcome two
hurdles in order to report a positive amount ofmoney spent. The first hurdle is
based on whether the farmer uses fertilizer in maize production, and the
second hurdle models the decision on how much to invest in the fertilizer.
The double-hurdle model, originally formulated by Cragg (1971) modifying
the standard Tobit model, assumes that two hurdles are involved in the
process of investment decisions, each of which can be determined by a
different set of explanatory variables. A different latent variable is used to
model each decision process,
yi1 ¼ w
0
iαþ vi Investment decision ð10:3Þ
yi2 ¼ x
0
iβþ ui Level of investment ð10:4Þ
yi ¼ x0iβþ ui if yi1 >0 and yi2 > 0
yi ¼ 0 Otherwise ð10:5Þ
We can envision simultaneity (e.g. use of fertilizer and hybrid seed). However,
as Table 10.3 depicts, the majority of the farmers do not use both. We can also
envision multicollinearity (e.g. between farm income and NFI) of some of the
variables used in the model. Correlation analysis showed nomulticollinearity.
The variables used in the model were those that were thought to be important
in influencing the probability and intensity of fertilizer use in maize.
Tables 10.4 and 10.5 present parameter estimates of the fertilizer demand
model using Afrint III data. Results are aggregated for NFI (Table 10.4) to first
understand the impact of total NFI, and then disaggregated by source of NFI
(Table 10.5) to understand which of the NFI sources are important in farm
investment. The dependent variable is the total amount of financial resources
spent on fertilizer per hectare of maize grown. Coefficients in the first hurdle
indicate how a given decision variable affects the likelihood (probability) of
adopting fertilizer in maize. Those in the second hurdle indicate how decision
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variables influence the amount spent on fertilizer per hectare. Marginal effects
depict changes in the probability of adoption of fertilizer for an additional
unit increase in the independent/decision variable.
Results in the first hurdle indicate that age of the household head, educa-
tion, plan to sell maize, access to agricultural credit, and hybrid seed are
statistically significant decision variables that influence the probability of
adopting fertilizer technology among farming households in the study areas.
Table 10.4. Probability of investing in fertilizer and the intensity of use in maize
(aggregated non-farm income)
Variable First hurdle Sig. Second hurdle Sig
Sex of the household head 0.191 1,298.1
Age of the household head 0.016 ** 1.3722
Education 0.051 ** 14.377
Distance to the nearest town 0.014 242.99
Maize area recent season 0.031 8,793.1 *
Plan to sell maize 0.783 * 8,802.3 *
Access to agricultural credit 1.098 * 48.28 **
Agricultural income 8.8E-07 0.005
Non-farm income 1.3E-06 0.002
Hybrid seed 0.633 ** 6,037.0
Maize production previous season 3.2E-04 2.914 *
Constant 1.465 * 21,122 *
Log likelihood 2,340.8
Wald χ2 42.96
Table 10.5. Probability of investing and the intensity of fertilizer use in maize
(disaggregated non-farm income)
Variable First hurdle Sig. Second hurdle Sig.
Sex of the household head 0.22 1,209.0
Age of the household head 0.015 ** 34.20
Education 0.058 ** 10.74
Distance to the nearest town 0.015 192.8
Maize area recent season 0.138 8,623.2 *
Plan to sell maize 0.815 8,323.3 *
Access to agricultural credit 1.097 * 483.7
Agricultural income 1.1E-06 0.008
Hybrid seed 0.620 ** 5,954.8
Maize production previous season 4.0E-04 3.066 *
Salary 1.7E-06 0.002
Micro-business 1.4E-06 0.004
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The probability of fertilizer adoption increases by 1.6 per cent for every one
year increase in the age of the household head. This implies that as age
increases, the probability of adopting fertilizer increases.
A unit increase in education level increases the likelihood of adopting
fertilizer by 5.1 per cent. The farmers’ age and education level had positive
and significant coefficients. This indicates that the probability of investment
in fertilizer increases with age and as the farmers gained more experience in
farming. This might suggest that older and more experienced farmers may be
using NFIs to finance farm investments or substitute higher NFI for farm
income. This could be attributed to the experience gathered over the years
in coping with the menace of soil infertility. However, sex of the farm man-
ager did not significantly influence the decision to invest in fertilizer.
The plan to sell maize increases the probability of fertilizer adoption by
78.3 per cent. This means that commercialized farmers have a very high
probability of adopting fertilizer use in maize in the belief that the more
fertilizer they use the more maize they can harvest for selling.
The use of hybrid seed increases the probability of fertilizer adoption by
63.3 per cent, and was a significant factor influencing the probability of
investment in fertilizer. Households using hybrid seed also tend to use fertil-
izer, and thus the two inputs are likely complements.
The results further reveal that access to agricultural credit increases the
probability of fertilizer adoption by 109.8 per cent. This implies that access
to agricultural credit is a very important factor in overcoming constraints to
agricultural technology adoption. Agricultural credit services are the major
sources of finance to those farmers who adopt improved agricultural tech-
nologies like fertilizer application (Kimenju and Tschirley 2009). Although
agricultural credit is mostly provided for cash crop farming, there is some
expected spillover effect to cereals and other food crops. It is therefore
expected that households that can access agricultural credit will have a
higher likelihood of using fertilizer. Access to agricultural credit had
the expected positive and significant effect on the decision to invest in
fertilizer.
Distance to the village centre was included to proxy for transport costs.
Proximity of farmers to markets is essential for timely input delivery and
output disposal, and results in inputs and outputs incurring less transport
costs. The coefficient of distance was, however, not significant for the inten-
sity of fertilizer use, meaning farmers interested in using fertilizer were not
deterred by cost of transport.
The previous season’s maize production was included based on the expect-
ation that the amount of maize harvested the previous season positively
influenced the intensity of investment in fertilizer, meaning that when farm-
ers experienced increased production they tended to invest more in fertilizer
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in the following season. However, this variable was found not to be
significant.
Results further show that NFI has no significance on the probability of
adopting fertilizer technology. This could be attributed to farmers investing
their NFI in less risky and perhaps more lucrative non-farm activities. NFI had
a negative but insignificant coefficient for adoption and intensity models. The
negative and insignificant impact of NFI imply that, holding other factors
constant, NFI seems not to impact both adoption and intensity of investment
in fertilizer. This suggests that these households are not using some of their
non-farm earnings to purchase fertilizer for maize production. In this case,
non-farm earnings may not be needed to relieve cash constraints for fertilizer
purchase. Therefore, it can be concluded that NFI is not driving the level of
farm investments.
Table 10.5 presents results with disaggregated NFI. This analysis was done
to identify which of the different types of NFI may be driving decisions to
invest on the farm.
Results from the first hurdle reveal that none of the NFI activities were
significant in influencing the probability of adopting fertilizer technology.
Micro-business, large-scale business, and remittances had very small increases
in the probability of fertilizer adoption, while salary, rent/interest, and pension
tended to very marginally decrease the probability of fertilizer adoption.
Income from micro-businesses, large-scale businesses, and remittances had
negative and insignificant small coefficients in the second hurdle, implying
that income from these activities was not important in determining the level of
investment in fertilizer.
Salary, rent/interest, and pension had positive and insignificant impacts on
the level of investment in fertilizer. The very small positive and insignificant
coefficients suggest that for households using income from these sources, the
level of investment increases very slightly as the income increased. Income
from these sources are likely to be in high amounts and on a regular basis, and
therefore farmers might not see the need to invest so much of it on the farm.
These incomes might also make it possible to invest in non-farm activities.
These results corroborate the results in Table 10.4 that NFI is not significantly
influencing farm investment.
Conclusions and Policy Implications
In this chapter, we have examined aspects of maize productivity, technology
use in maize, and the impact of NFI on agricultural investment, giving them a
gender dimension. The study first concludes that there are no significant
differences inmaize yields betweenMMFs and FMFs in the study area. Second,
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technology use for maize production was lower and significant in some
instances for FMFs. Significant differences, especially in the use of hybrid
seeds and the tractor plough, were noted. A third conclusion is that the NFI
is not used in farm investment. The results of the double-hurdle models
showed that NFI had no significant effect on adoption and intensity of
fertilizer use.
One policy recommendation is that government policies, programmes, and
interventions targeting improved agricultural production should continue
considering FMFs and cushion them against risks associated with technology
adoption. The chapter has also presented evidence to show that NFI is not
invested in agriculture. Consequently, another policy implication is that
policies that increase both on-farm and non-farm income for households
should be encouraged, given the complementary roles that they play. Any
entry barriers for disadvantaged households, especially for the FMFs, to par-
ticipate in higher-paying non-farm activities need to be overcome. In addition
to increasing household income directly, improved access to non-farm activ-
ities can also lead to positive indirect effects. Especially when rural financial
markets are imperfect, cash from NFI can partly be invested in agriculture,
thus also increasing farm production and income.
Given the complementarities between non-farm and farm income, and the
fact that both sectors actually face similar constraints, appropriate policy
instruments can actually serve both purposes. For instance, accessible credit
schemes can facilitate the establishment of non-farm businesses and promote
agricultural development simultaneously. The argument here is that there are
a lot of synergies and positive spillover effects between agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors. Over time, it is likely that the relative importance of the
non-farm sector will increase further. Improved opportunities in rural areas
targeting FMFs and other disadvantaged groups can help level the playing
field and reduce the gender gap, thereby improving their well-being.
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As noted in Chapter 1, as well as in several other chapters, numerous changes
have characterized the decade and a half over which the Afrint project has
been running. In some respects, the original aim of the project—to focus on
small farmers as the prospective bearers of agricultural intensification—has
been outpaced by policies and events that have resurrected small farms as the
linchpin of rural development and poverty reduction. In this sense, the
smallholder focus of the Maputo Declaration and the World Development
Report 2008 (World Bank 2007) for was in some ways strengthened by the
renewed emphasis on domestic agriculture following the global food price
crisis of 2008. A spate of policies focusing on smallholders has characterized
the project period.
More recently, however, the unfolding social and economic realities outside
agriculture are providing opportunities as well as challenges for the smallholder
model. Suchdynamics—described indetail in earlier chapters—include demand
generated by the relatively rapid growth of the non-farm sector, tempered in
some respects by thenatureofAfricanurbanizationandayouthfuldemographic
bulge of labour market entrants. At the same time, signs of growing socio-
economic differentiation within agriculture along the lines of gender and gen-
eration are apparent. Concerns over land fragmentation and the fear that the
relatively limited prospects of women,migrants, and othermarginal groupswill
dwindle further over time are expressed by researchers as well as policymakers.
The prospects for leaving agriculture altogether appear dim for the rural resi-
dents of sub-Saharan Africa, however, as suggested by several studies showing
the persistently high share of income generated from agriculture.
The project period (2002–15) thus overlaps with a rising interest in
smallholder-based agriculture among researchers and policymakers, but also
an increasing recognition of the challenges facing the smallholder sector and
particular groups of small farmers. More recently, however, policy experi-
ments to encourage emergent or middle sized farmers, in combination with
more longstanding support for large-scale agriculture in several of the coun-
tries under study, could portend the gradual abandonment of the smallholder
model. Increasingly politicized land deals and speculation do not augur well
in this respect.
This book set out with three aims, the simplest one relating to summarizing
and analysing patterns of change among the households followed by the
project over close to fifteen years, departing from the overarching themes of
the research: agriculture, rural livelihoods, and gender. This largely descriptive
aim was complemented by a theoretical one—aspiring to nuance macro-level
narratives of structural change through analysing local-level realities of rural
livelihoods that straddle the farm and non-farm sectors, as seen in sometimes
localized specifics. Finally, we envisaged a practical outcome to which the
empirical and analytical aims would contribute, namely a policy-related ambi-
tion to outline alternative options to current policy practices.
Agriculture, Rural Livelihoods, and Gender:
A Longitudinal Perspective
So, what do the data tell us about the smallholder sector and rural livelihoods
over the past fifteen years? We identify a set of trends for the sample as a
whole, which broadly speaking can be summarized as increasing dynamism
accompanied by rising polarization. The changing relationship between the
farm and non-farm sectors and the role of the state in steering and sometimes
misguiding agricultural development are other tendencies that emerge from
the data.
Differentiation Amid Agricultural Dynamism
The growing vigour of smallholder agriculture is evinced in the cross-sectional
data through a set of positive trends: on average, farm sizes have increased;
production has risen substantially for grain crops; crop diversification away
from grain staples towards more lucrative food crops has occurred widely;
while commercialization has generally increased, especially for maize and
rice. The lion’s share of farmers was commercialized at the time of Afrint III,
with the share of commercialized farmers increasing from 71 per cent to 84 per
cent during the course of the study. At the same time, yields have remained
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largely stagnant—production increases have therefore been tied to increasing
areas under cultivation—and yield gaps remain stubbornly persistent over the
project phases. The distribution of land, moreover, is becoming increasingly
unequal—while the land sizes are stagnant at the bottom of the distribution
they have increased considerably at the top.
The gender dynamics of land access show that households headed by
women have persistently smaller cultivated areas, but also that changes in
land sizes since the first phase of the project have affected these households
negatively when compared with their male counterparts. In regions where
mean land size increased, the gender gap between female- and male-headed
households has widened, even if land sizes for the former increased on aver-
age. Slight increases in formalization of tenure can be noted over the period,
and where this has occurred it has also been in favour of male-headed house-
holds. Control over land was, however, generally gender neutral.
Overall, female farmmanagers have poorer access to agricultural assets such
as land, water sources, and livestock. In combinationwith lower access tomale
labour specifically, this reduces the possibilities for producing marketable
surpluses on these farms. While it must be stressed that commercialization
patterns shift over time and that patterns vary nationally, the strong trends
towards commercialization in themaize sector in Zambia has been accompan-
ied by a growing differentiation based on gender. Markets for non-staple food
crops have also been masculinized in Tanzania, Malawi, and Mozambique,
while they have been feminized in the case of Kenya. In terms of cash incomes,
gender gaps have widened and also emerged in some countries since the
second round of data collection. Four of the six countries had statistically
significant gender gaps in cash income by the time of Afrint III, compared
with two for the earlier period. Such gaps are tied predominantly to farm-based
income sources, where better access to agrarian resources among male farm
managers translates into higher incomes.
New Patterns of Diversification
While agricultural sources dominate the income portfolios of the
respondents—indeed, on average more than two-thirds of the cash income
generated is based on agriculture—households specializing in agriculture have
lower incomes when compared with diversified households. Despite cultivat-
ing larger plots of land, using fertilizer seed technology, and being highly
commercialized, earning non-farm income (NFI) has a stronger differentiating
influence than superior access to agrarian resources.
Whether NFI can in this way compensate for poorer access to agrarian
resources among female-headed households is less clear, however—indeed,
the only income source that is persistently pitched towards female-headed
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households is remittances. Regionally, however there are exceptions in this
respect, with micro-businesses complementing male incomes for female-
headed households and for women within male-headed households in some
areas. Nonetheless, the principal indication that emerges from the data are the
relatively limited possibilities that women have for generating cash incomes
in general—whether from agriculture or otherwise, whether as female heads of
household or as women in male-headed households.
While gender gaps in assets as well as incomes have widened over the
period, female-headed households have nonetheless benefited from the dyna-
mism that has characterized the smallholder sector in some countries and
regions, especially since Afrint II. The housing standard has increased across
the board, and here there are no differences based on the sex of head of
household. Similarly, ownership of mobile phones has expanded dramatic-
ally, and again there are no gender-based differences. In contrast, the ability to
save and the transportation assets owned show the familiar tendencies of
improvements accompanied by growing gender gaps. In general, therefore,
the patterns in the cross-sectional data point to rising living standards, but
also growing differentiation based on gender.
The cross-sectional findings for the whole dataset are to some extent also
corroborated in the chapters using panel data. The three key processes of struc-
tural transformation (ST) studied in Chapter 5 show that for the second panel
period, grain intensification was a gender-neutral process, whereas commercial
diversification intomarkets for non-staple cropswas skewed against female farm
managers. In turn this suggests that more lucrative commercial opportunities
have opened up outside the staple crop sector, but that these are predominantly
seized bymale-headed households.While intensification in food grains may be
benefitting female farm managers and their families through improved food
security, commercialization in more lucrative food crops favours male-headed
households. Conversely, non-farm diversification does not discriminate against
female-headed households, and is also negatively related to increases in farm
sizes and positively connected with grain intensification. Moreover, the process
is more common in villages with unequal land distribution, while it is also
negatively related to being part of the upper decile of landowners at the village
level. In turn this seems to suggest that livelihood diversificationmay be amore
forthcoming option for households that have smaller agrarian assets, such as
female-headed households. As suggested by the cross-sectional data, non-farm
diversification is on the whole associated with higher incomes than specializa-
tion within farming. Results from the panel data also suggest a shift from
distress-based diversification towards more accumulation-based processes.
While commercial dynamism within agriculture since the second round of
data collection has favoured male farm managers, movement into the non-
farm sector during the same time has been beneficial for both groups.
Agriculture, Diversification, and Gender in Rural Africa
236
While the dataset as a whole suggests a complementary role for non-farm
diversification and grain intensification, the country-level study on Ghana
(Chapter 9) points to a slightly different pattern, and reinforces the need for
regional contextualization of linkages between farm and non-farm sectors.
In the region with poorer agricultural potential, increasing non-farm earn-
ings are connected to lower agricultural labour productivity. This relation-
ship is found only when male earners generate such income, however. For
the more dynamic region, farm labour productivity drops with female gen-
erated NFIs, but rises when men earn NFIs, pointing to a competing role
between female non-farm earnings and agriculture, but a complementary
one between male-earned NFI and agriculture in regions of relatively high
agricultural potential. While non-farm diversification may benefit the
household in terms of higher incomes and less vulnerability to seasonality
and price volatility, such incomes may therefore not always be related to
higher agricultural productivity.
Agricultural Policy
Several of the contributions point to the influential role of state policies. Many
of the countries under study have experimented with input subsidies targeted
at smallholders, but also more recently at the high-end segment of the
sector—as shown in the comparative discussion on Zambia and Malawi
(Chapter 8). The country-level experiences vary in this regard, with agricul-
tural subsidies inMalawi, for instance, failing tomake any long-term improve-
ments in food security and self-sufficiency (Chapter 7). Here other small-scale
initiatives appear to have been more fruitful in terms of encouraging diversi-
fication in the study sites, although the scaling up of such projects pose
considerable challenges of their own. Nonetheless, as suggested by thefindings
from Tanzania, the on-and-off nature of many subsidy schemes, and their con-
comitant effects on smallholder production and productivity, point to the need
for sustainable policies—whether based on subsidized inputs or not (Chapter 6).
Moreover, several other types of rural development policies related to improving
accessibility and lowering transaction costs may be equally relevant.
Theoretical Implications
Standard models of ST depict a combination of processes which together
interact to move economies as well as people out of agriculture and rural
areas and into non-farm pursuits in urban areas—at least at the macro level.
The most fundamental of these processes relates to raising agricultural prod-
uctivity in staple crops such as grains, roots, and tubers. Standard models of ST
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rest on a number of presumptions in this regard—suppositions based on the
historical experience of the countries of the Global North. On the one hand,
the exit from rural areas constituted a clean break with agriculture in the sense
that livelihoods shifted into urban activities, and on the other, such activities
were predominantly centred on manufacturing industries that developed
during the Industrial Revolution. Several caveats can be raised with respect
to present-day Africa in relation to both of these aspects: on the one hand, as
suggested by evidence from Africa as well as other parts of the Global South,
the break with agriculture is not quite as definite as presumed—instead, as
suggested also by our findings, livelihoods increasingly straddle the farm and
non-farm sectors as well as urban and rural spaces (Andersson Djurfeldt 2014,
Andersson Djurfeldt 2015). One of the reasons for this pattern relates to the
nature of African urbanization, driven as it is by consumption, natural
resource extraction, and trade, rather than manufacturing (McGranahan
et al. 2009, Gollin et al. 2016). The other is connected to the limited possibil-
ities for raising smallholder productivity, as suggested by the persistent yield
gaps found in the study sites. Rather, what we seem to be seeing is a process of
grain production increases based on expansion in some regions and an
intensification based on value rather than volume in other regions. In turn,
this may call for a renegotiation of ST narratives to acknowledge spatial
differentiation, as well as the different pathways of agrarian transformation
that Africa may take in the future.
Overall, the gender aspects have been largely absent from discussions of
agrarian change over the long term, possibly because the family structure of
the historical Global North, as well as present-day South East Asia, is different
from sub-Saharan Africa. Given the relatively large share of female-headed
households in the dataset and the particularities of women’s exclusion from
agrarian resources, an understanding of the gendered patterns of agrarian
transformation as well as the linkages to the non-farm sector is overdue. In
this regard, somewhat surprisingly we show that grain intensification is
largely gender neutral and that yield gaps in grain production based on sex
are small. Nonetheless, with respect to the two processes described above
(expansion-based increases in grain production and intensification through
high-value crops), female-headed households, although not necessarily left
behind, are nonetheless disadvantaged through their relative lack of agrarian
resources. The possibilities of expansion-based production are smaller for
households that (relatively speaking) lack land and labour, while commercial
diversification also predominantly benefits male-headed households. The
prospects for pro-poor agricultural growth in this sense are constrained
among women. Here diversification into the non-farm sector may offer
other opportunities, even if such diversification is not connected to higher
agricultural productivity.
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Policy Implications
Three interconnected policy implications arise from the study. First, an obser-
vation is that programmes aimed at being gender inclusive should be carefully
formulated and require a clear understanding of the patterns of gender-based
factors and their underlying causes. In this respect, farm and non-farm liveli-
hood sources may vary in importance based on gender, generation, and
geography.
Second, to balance farm and non-farm sources of income to enable a guided
process of rural transformation requires monitoring and strategic facilitation
by way of public and private investments in rural areas.
Finally, while Africa may learn from the transformation path of other
continents, the path she takes will be unique and consistent with the circum-
stances driving change in Africa at the present and in the foreseeable future.
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